Judicial Reform And Democratization

This title examines the political role of courts in new democracies in Latin America and Africa, focusing on their ability to hold political power-holders accountable when they act outside their constitutionally defined powers. The book also issues a warning: there are problems inherent in the current global move towards strong constitutional government, where increasingly strong powers are placed in the hands of judges who themselves are not made accountable.

This book examines Taiwan’s judicial reform process, which began three years after the 1996 transition to democracy, in 1999, when Taiwanese legal and political leaders began discussing how to reform Taiwan’s judicial system to meet the needs of the new social and political conditions. Covering different areas of the law in a comprehensive way, the book considers, for each legal area, problems related to rights and democracy in that field, the debates over reform, how foreign systems inspired reform proposals, the political process of change, and the substantive legal changes that ultimately emerged. The book also sets Taiwan’s legal reforms in their historical and comparative context, and discusses how the reform process continues to evolve.

Mexico's Unrule of Law: Human Rights and Police Reform Under Democratization looks at recent Mexican criminal justice reforms. Using Mexico City as a case study of the social and institutional realities, Niels Uildriks focuses on the evolving police and justice system within the county's long-term transition from authoritarian to democratic governance. By analyzing extensive and penetrating police surveys and interviews, he goes further to offer innovative ideas on how to simultaneously achieve greater community security, democratic policing, and adherence to human rights.

Judiciaries must be politically impartial and immune from political interference if democracy is to be consolidated in countries in transition from authoritarian rule. Without an independent judiciary there can be no rule of law, and without the rule of law there can be no democracy. Judges and Democratization is based on the premise that democracy cannot be consolidated without the rule of law of which judicial independence is an indispensable part. It pays particular attention to the restraints placed upon judicial independence, and the reforms which are being applied, or remain to be adopted, in order to guard against the different kinds of interference which prevent judicial decisions being taken in a wholly impartial way. It examines the paradox of judicial activism arising from the independence endowed upon the judiciary by post-authoritarian constitutions. The book asks how, in the context of this endowed authority, such accountability can be made compatible with the preservation of judicial independence when the concept of an accountable, independent judiciary appears to be a contradiction in terms. This text will be of key interest to teachers and students of politics, comparative government/politics, combined politics and law, democracy and governance, human rights and democratization, and democratic development.

After more than seventy years of uninterrupted authoritarian government headed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Mexico formally began the transition to democracy in 2000. Unlike most other new democracies in Latin America, no special Constitutional Court was set up, nor was there any designated bench of the Supreme Court for constitutional adjudication. Instead, the judiciary saw its powers expand incrementally. Under this new context inevitable questions emerged: How have the justices interpreted the constitution? What is the relation of the court with the other political institutions? How much autonomy do justices display in their decisions? Has the court considered the necessary adjustments to face the challenges of democracy? It has become essential in studying the new role of the Supreme Court to obtain a more accurate and detailed diagnosis of the performances of its justices in this new political environment. Through critical review of relevant debates and using original data sets to empirically analyze the way justices voted on the three main means of constitutional control from 2000 through 2011, leading legal scholars provide a thoughtful and much needed new interpretation of the role the judiciary plays in a country’s transition to democracy This book is designed for graduate courses in law and courts, judicial politics, comparative judicial politics, Latin American institutions, and transitions to democracy. This book will equip scholars and students with the knowledge required to understand the importance of the independence of the judiciary in the transition to democracy.

In this context, JR is also an attempt to modernize the Latin American judiciaries, promoting the rule of law as a tool for social, political and economic development. Nonetheless, research and assessments of the current state of judicial reform in the region have begun to question whether reforming the legal system is indeed conducive to democracy. Importantly, these concerns arise from researchers and scholars who have promoted reform efforts in different Latin American nations for various years, but who believe that a traditional analysis of judicial reform provides an incomplete assessment and insufficiently explores necessary criteria associated with development objectives. Perhaps due to a lack of communication between different disciplines in the social sciences, especially sociology and law, JR discussions have failed to acknowledge the complexity of development processes.

The growing disconnect between China's market-oriented economy with its emerging civil society, and the brittle, anacronistic, and authoritarian state has given rise to intense discussion and debate about political reform, not only by Western observers, but also among Chinese intellectuals. While some expect China's political reform to lead to democratization, others have proposed to strengthen the institution of single-party rule and provide it with a solid legal base. This book brings the ongoing debate to life and explores the options for political reform. Offering the perspectives of both Western and Chinese scholars, it presents the controversial argument for building a consultive rule of law regime as an alternative to liberal democracy. It provides several critiques of this thesis, and then tests the thesis through empirical studies on the development of the rule of law in China.

New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop in the early stages of democratic liberalization, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in Asia: Taiwan, Korea, and Mongolia. In a region that has traditionally viewed law as a tool of authoritarian rulers, constitutional courts in these three societies are becoming a real constraint on government. In contrast with conventional culturalist accounts, this book argues that the design and functioning of constitutional review are largely a function of politics and interests. Judicial review - the power of judges to rule an act of a legislature or national leader unconstitutional - is a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing insurance to prospective electoral losers, judicial review can facilitate democracy.

Improving systems of justice in Latin America is important to consolidate democracy and develop equitable and efficient market economies. Judicial reform involves strengthening the rule of law and developing a moder and transparent juridical process, as well as a system of justice that is impartial, independent, efficient and accessible to all.

Judging Policy analyzes the causes and consequences of the increasingly prominent role courts are being asked to play in the public policy process in Latin America’s largest nation, Brazil.