Judicial Power In Ireland

This volume brings together academics and judges to consider ideas and arguments flowing from the often complex relationships between law and politics, adjudication and policy-making, and the judicial and political branches of government. Contributors explore numerous themes, including the nature and extent of judicial power, the European Court of Human Rights decision in O'Keeffe v Ireland, the process of appointing judges and judicial representation, judicial power and political processes. Contrasting judicial and academic perspectives are provided on the role of the European Court of Human Rights and the nature of exhausting domestic remedies, including a contribution from the late Mr. Justice Adrian Hardiman. The role of specific judges, social and political disputes and case law are examined and socio-economic rights, the rule of law and electoral processes are all addressed.

SCOTT (Copy 1): From the John Holmes Library collection.

The political theory of the Irish Constitution considers Irish constitutional law and the Irish constitutional tradition from the perspective of Republican theory. It analyses the central devices and doctrines of the Irish Constitution – popular sovereignty, constitutional rights and judicial review – in light of Republican concepts of citizenship and civic virtue. The Constitution, it will argue, can be understood as a framework for promoting popular participation in government as much as a mechanism for protecting individual liberties. It will be of interest to students and researchers in Irish politics, political theory and constitutional law, and to all those interested in political reform and public philosophy in Ireland.

Ball, F. Elrington. The Judges in Ireland, 1221-1921. London: John Murray. [1926]. 2 volumes, each with frontispiece. Reprint available September 2004 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ISBN 1-58477-428-2. Cloth. $195. * "These interesting volumes serve a double purpose; they supply condensed biographies (in the style of the Dictionary of National Biography) of all who held judicial office in Ireland from the earliest days down to the new constitution, with references to sources and chronological tables. In short, they are the Irish counterpart to Foss's book, The Judges of England. And secondly, the general chapters are a careful history of the Irish judiciary, its members, their politics and connections, and the legal profession in general, with some remarks upon the history of the courts in Ireland. ": T.F.T. Plucknett, Harvard Law Review 41:275.

This collection focuses on the particular nexus of popular sovereignty and constitutional change, and the implications of the recent surge in populism for systems where constitutional change is directly decided upon by the people via referendum. It examines different conceptions of sovereignty as expressed in constitutional theory and case law, including an in-depth exploration of the manner in which the concept of popular sovereignty finds expression both in constitutional provisions on referendums and in court decisions concerning referendum processes. While comparative references are made to a number of jurisdictions, the primary focus of the collection is on the experience in Ireland, which has had a lengthy experience of referendums on constitutional change and of legal, political and cultural practices that have emerged in association with these referendums. At a time when populist pressures on constitutional change are to the fore in many countries, this detailed examination of where the Irish experience sits in a comparative context has an important contribution to make to debates in law and political science.

This book examines the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Ireland since its creation in 1924. It sets out the origins of the Court, explains how it operated during the life of the Irish Free State (1922-1937), and considers how it has developed various fields of law under Ireland's 1937 Constitution, especially after the 're-creation' of the Court in 1961. As well as constitutional law, the book looks at the Court's views on the status and legal system of Northern Ireland, administrative law, criminal justice and personal and family law. There are also chapters on the Supreme Court's interaction with European Union law and with the European Convention on Human Rights. The argument throughout is that, while the Court has been well served by many of its judges, who on occasion have manifested a healthy degree of judicial activism, there are still several legal fields in which the Court has not developed its jurisprudence as clearly or as imaginatively as it might have done. It has often displayed undue conservatism and deference. For many years its performance was hampered by its extreme workload, generated by its inability to control the number of appeals brought to it. However, the creation of a new Court of Appeal in 2014 has freed up the Supreme Court to act in a manner more analogous to that adopted by supreme courts in other common law countries. The Court's future looks bright.

A sitting justice reflects upon the authority of the Supreme CourtÑhow that authority was gained and how measures to restructure the Court could undermine both the Court and the constitutional system of checks and balances that depends on it. A growing chorus of officials and commentators argues that the Supreme Court has become too political. On this view the confirmation process is just an exercise in partisan agenda-setting, and the jurists are no more than Òpoliticians in robesÓÑtheir ostensibly neutral judicial philosophies mere camouflage for conservative or liberal convictions. Stephen Breyer, drawing upon his experience as a Supreme Court justice, sounds a cautionary note. Mindful of the CourtÕs history, he suggests that the judiciaryÕs hard-won authority could be marred by reforms premised on the assumption of ideological bias. Having, as Hamilton observed, Òno influence over either the sword or the purse,Ó the Court earned its authority by making decisions that have, over time, increased the publicÕs trust. If public trust is now in decline, one part of the solution is to promote better understandings of how the judiciary actually works: how judges adhere to their oaths and how they try to avoid considerations of politics and popularity. Breyer warns that political intervention could itself further erode public trust. Without the publicÕs trust, the Court would no longer be able to act as a check on the other branches of government or as a guarantor of the rule of law, risking serious harm to our constitutional system.