Joint Doctrine For Military Deception

Military deception operations are conducted by the commanders of combatant commands and subordinate joint forces in support of overall campaign objectives. This publication provides fundamental guidance and principles for the planning and execution of military deception at the combatant command and/or subordinate joint force level.

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning and execution of military deception (MILDEC) at the combatant command and/or subordinate joint force level.

This monograph examines U.S. Joint doctrine for operational deception (Joint Pub 3-58: Joint Doctrine for Military Deception). The monograph provides information to operational planners on deception concepts that are unique to Joint doctrine and how these concepts can be used when planning operational deception. The monograph provides historical examples of operational deception by briefly examining deception operations in the Napoleonic Era, WWI, WWII, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The monograph compares unique Joint deception concepts with the deception operations performed by USCENTOOM in the Persian Gulf War. The monograph also compares Joint doctrine for operational deception with the earlier doctrines of the four U.S. Services. The monograph concludes that USCENTCOM's operational deception in the Persian Gulf War is in concordance with subsequent Joint doctrine. Based on historical examples, the monograph makes recommendations for planners to consider when planning for and conducting operational deception. The monograph suggests changes to Services' doctrine for military deception.

Second World War history offers the military strategist a cornucopia of lessons learned on how to apply the art of military deception. This paper analyzed six Allied deception operations to identify the fundamental reasons why Allied deception efforts were the most successful in history. The six deception operations reviewed were Barclay, Cockade, and Bodyguard as well as the Soviet deception operations at Stalingrad, Kursk, and White Russia. A critical analysis of these six operations identified seven major factors that made Allied deception efforts extremely effective. These seven factors were that the Allies controlled all key channels of information, had great intelligence “feedback” on their deception operations, had high-level and centralized control over deception planning, practiced sound deception techniques, subordinated deception to strategic and operational objectives, maintained adequate secrecy, and provided sufficient time for deception execution. These factors are relevant for today's operations and should be imbedded within US doctrine. This study then examined Joint Publication 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, and determined it could better incorporate the lessons learned from World War II. Current joint doctrine could be improved by underscoring the contribution that deception provides to surprise, the importance of integrating deception within all three levels of war, and the importance of exploiting an adversary's preexisting beliefs when creating a deception story. Applying these World War II lessons will bolster US deception capabilities.

United States military joint doctrine was designed with a conventional enemy in mind. However, as the United States finds itself embroiled in more and more unconventional conflicts, an assessment regarding the applicability of current joint doctrine needs to be conducted. This paper discusses the joint doctrine of military deception and its applicability against a non-state actor. It looks at the basic tenets of military deception doctrine, conventional historical examples, organizational structures utilized by non-state actors, and an unconventional historical example. The paper then provides some guidance to the operational commander on how to best evaluate the adversarial decision maker and identify potential channels of influence through which a successful deception operation can be conducted. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the applicability of current joint military deception doctrine against a non-state actor, and recommendations on how an operational commander can best be prepared for success against unconventional adversary.

This field manual aims to provide techniques to assist planners in planning, coordinating, executing, synchronizing, and assessing military deception (MILDEC). While the means and techniques may evolve over generations, the principles and fundamentals of deception planning remain constant. FM 3-13.4 applies to all members of the Army profession: leaders, Soldiers, Army Civilians, and contractors. The principal audience for this publication is Army commanders, staffs, and all leaders. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning joint or multinational planning. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this publication as a guide for teaching MILDEC. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations.