Japans Financial System

Specialists in various aspects of the Japanese financial industry describe, analyze, and evaluate the crisis that began with bursting real east bubbles in the early 1990s and resulting non-performing loans, delay by regulatory authorities and the banks themselves, a decompressive deregulation in 1996, major reforms in 1998 and early 1999 that made $500 billion of government funds available, and the resulting lack of regulatory control. In the context of the transition from a bank-centered and relationship-based system to market-based and competitive, they investigate why the banks got into such serious trouble, why the Ministry of Finance lost its immense power, how financial regulation will further change the industry and the huge government financial institutions and postal savings, and what some broader implications are of the transitions. Most of the 12 studies are revised from presentations at an October 1998 conference in New York. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

This book analyzes how the bank-dominated financial system—a key element of the oft-heralded "Japanese economic model"—broke down in the 1990s and spawned sweeping reforms. Japan's financial institutions and policy underwent remarkable change in the past decade. The country began the 1990s with a heavily regulated financial system managed by an unchallenged Ministry of Finance and ended the decade with a Big Bang financial market reform, a complete restructuring of its regulatory financial institutions, and an independent central bank. These reforms have taken place amid recession and rising unemployment, collapsing asset prices, a looming banking crisis, and the lowest interest rates in the industrial world. This book analyzes how the bank-dominated financial system—a key element of the oft-heralded "Japanese economic model"—broke down in the 1990s and spawned sweeping reforms. It documents the sources of the Japanese economic stagnation of the 1990s, the causes of the financial crisis, the slow and initially limited policy response to banking problems, and the reform program that followed. It also evaluates the new financial structure and reforms at the Bank of Japan in light of the challenges facing the Japanese economy. These challenges range from conducting monetary policy in a zero-interest rate environment characterized by a "liquidity trap" to managing consolidation in the Japanese banking sector against the backdrop of increasing international competition.

At the start of the twenty-first century, the Japanese financial system is undergoing a major transformation. This process is spurred by a sense of crisis. Dominated by large institutions, the Japanese banking system has suffered from serious problems with non-performing loans since the early 1990s, when the Japanese stock market and urban real estate market both crashed. Delays in responding to these twin asset bubbles, by both regulatory authorities and the banks themselves, made matters worse and led to a banking crisis in late 1997 and early 1998. Not anticipating this setback, in late 1996 the Japanese government inaugurated its Big Bang of comprehensive financial deregulation designed to complete the process of creating `free, fair, and open financial markets'. Beginning in late 1998 and early 1999 the government finally embarked on a major rehabilitation of the Japanese banking system, including making available some Yen 60 trillion (approximately USD 500 billion) of government funds to recapitalize fifteen major banks, adequately fund the deposit insurance program, and write off the bad loans of nationalized or bankrupted banks. One result of this reform process is that the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which dominated Japanese financial system policy for most of the post-war period, has been stripped of most of its former regulatory powers. The purpose of this book is to describe, analyze, and evaluate the process that is transforming the Japanese financial system. The chapters address various issues relating to the transition of the Japanese financial system from a bank-centered and relationship-based system to a competitive market-based system. Questions taken up include: Why did Japanese banks get into such serious trouble? Why has the MOF lost its immense power? How will the Big Bang's financial deregulation further change the Japanese financial system, including the huge government financial institutions and postal savings system? What are some of the broader implications of this transition? The book is divided into three parts: Part I considers the origins of Japan's banking crisis; Part II focuses on five particularly important areas of major actual and potential changes; Part III addresses the effects of the Big Bang, including its potential systemic externalities. Taken together, this book offers an unusually up-to-date, comprehensive and thorough appraisal and evaluation of the profound changes occurring in Japan's financial system.

This paper assesses the stability of the financial system in Japan. Although the financial system has remained stable, the low profitability environment is creating new risks, and pressures are likely to persist. The search for yield among banks has led some to expand their overseas activities, and more generally to a growth in real estate lending and foreign securities investments. Efforts to increase risk-based lending to small-and medium-sized enterprises are welcome, but many banks still need to develop commensurate credit assessment capacities. Stress tests suggest that the banking sector remains broadly sound, although market risks are increasing, and there are some vulnerabilities among regional banks.

At the beginning of the 1990s, a massive speculative asset bubble burst in Japan, leaving the nation's banks with an enormous burden of nonperforming loans. Banking crises have become increasingly common across the globe, but what was distinctive about the Japanese case was the unusually long delay before the government intervened to aggressively address the bad debt problem. The postponed response by Japanese authorities to the nation's banking crisis has had enormous political and economic consequences for Japan as well as for the rest of the world. This book helps us understand the nature of the Japanese government's response while also providing important insights into why Japan seems unable to get its financial system back on track 13 years later. The book focuses on the role of policy networks in Japanese finance, showing with nuance and detail how Japan's Finance Ministry was embedded within the political and financial worlds, how that structure was similar to and different from that of its counterparts in other countries, and how the distinctive nature of Japan's institutional arrangements affected the capacity of the government to manage change. The book focuses in particular on two intervening variables that bring about a functional shift in the Finance Ministry's policy networks: domestic political change under coalition government and a dramatic rise in information requirements for effective regulation. As a result of change in these variables, networks that once enhanced policymaking capacity in Japanese finance became "paralyzing networks"--with disastrous results.

Japan experienced a remarkable growth in international finance, through a series of liberalization measures in the 1980s. However, her position in the global financial system is still limited, as the reserve currency share of yen illustrates. Why does such a contrast exist? Historical comparison with Britain and the United States as well as extensive data provide a key to answer the question.

This book, first published in 1994, takes a broad look at the reasons behind the failure of foreign banks to penetrate Japanese financial markets. It accepts the common argument that the Japanese bureaucracy has skilfully limited the scope of foreign banks and discusses at length the methods used to do so. However, in examining the history of foreign banking activity in Japan, it becomes clear that ineptitude on the part of the foreign banks and governments has also been a major factor.

This book evaluates the salient features of Japanese relation-based banking, particularly in the post war period, and Anglo-American mode of banking to explain the nature and extent of transition failure that caused prolonged financial and economic slump in Japan.