Iraqs Interior Ministry

The most critical, and most often neglected, focus of security sector reform (SSR) is the bureaucratic agency responsible for the police and other internal security forces. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and earlier peace and stability operations, the United States went directly to the task of training indigenous police, giving little thought to the interior ministry, the institution to which the police would report.

This USIPeace briefing presents information drawn from a discussion hosted by the U.S. Institute of Peace's Security Sector Reform. Speakers included four people directly involved in a two year effort to reform the operations of the Iraq Ministry of the Interior from 2007 to 2009 or who had worked with the Ministry prior to that time. Robert Perito served as moderator.

From May 2003 to June 28, 2004 (when it handed over authority to the Iraqi Interim Government), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) worked to field Iraqi security forces and to develop security sector institutions. This book-all of whose authors were advisors to the CPA-breaks out the various elements of Iraq's security sector, including the defense, interior, and justice sectors, and assesses the CPA's successes and failures.

An examination of ethnic demography, historical governments, political parties, force structure, organizational structure, and partnership efforts within the Iraqi Ministry of Interior leads to several recommendations that, if followed, would provide permanent security and stability to the nation. These recommendations must be seriously considered as the United States and its coalition partners assist the nation of Iraq in its transformation to a democracy. This thesis examines the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and its ongoing efforts to provide internal security to the nation without discrimination with regard to ethnicity, religious beliefs, or political ties. The reformation of the nation requires the Ministry of Interior to recruit, vet, and develop an adequate police force to secure the nation during this extremely complex insurgency. This police force must be able to unify ethnic factions and protect and serve all the people of Iraq. The author presents recommendations that would provide rigidity to a fragile Iraqi police infrastructure. If implemented, these recommendations would enhance the Ministry of Interior's ability to effectively govern, secure, and police the nation and provide the stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) that are so sorely needed.

As one Ministry of Interior official stated to us, "We cannot deny that the Ministry was sectarian." This is true. Significant challenges still remain with the MOI, but the institution has turned an important corner. When compared to the actions of 2005-2006, the Ministry is no longer a driver for sectarian violence. Leadership is what drives the Ministry. Not only at the top starting with the Minister but also among the generals that command the National Police and the police officers who run their stations. However, shocks to the political system and Ministry are still possible. Extremist agendas could still take hold if there were to be a radical diversion in leadership direction. This is why strengthening the institution is critically important as it attempts to reach the goal of providing social peace