Interconnectedness Of Global Systemically Important Banks And Insurers

Interconnectedness among global systemically important banks (GSIBs) and global systemically important insurers (GSIIs) has important financial stability implications. This paper examines connectedness among United States, European and Asian GSIBs and GSIIs, using publicly-available daily equity returns and intra-day volatility data from October 2007 to August 2016. Results reveal strong regional clusters of return and volatility connectedness amongst GSIBs and GSIIs. Compared to Asia, selected GSIBs and GSIIs headquartered in the United States and Europe appear to be main sources of market-based connectedness. Total system connectedness—i.e., among all GSIBs and GSIIs—tends to rise during financial stress, which is corroborated by a balance sheet oriented systemic risk measure. Lastly, the paper demonstrates significant influence of economic policy uncertainty and U.S. long-term interest rates on total connectedness among systemically important institutions, and the important role of bank profitability and asset quality in driving bank-specific return connectedness.

Interconnectedness among global systemically important banks (GSIBs) and global systemically important insurers (GSIIs) has important financial stability implications. This paper examines connectedness among United States, European and Asian GSIBs and GSIIs, using publicly-available daily equity returns and intra-day volatility data from October 2007 to August 2016. Results reveal strong regional clusters of return and volatility connectedness amongst GSIBs and GSIIs. Compared to Asia, selected GSIBs and GSIIs headquartered in the United States and Europe appear to be main sources of market-based connectedness. Total system connectedness—i.e., among all GSIBs and GSIIs—tends to rise during financial stress, which is corroborated by a balance sheet oriented systemic risk measure. Lastly, the paper demonstrates significant influence of economic policy uncertainty and U.S. long-term interest rates on total connectedness among systemically important institutions, and the important role of bank profitability and asset quality in driving bank-specific return connectedness.

This paper seeks to advance our understanding of global financial interconnectedness by (i) mapping aspects of the architecture of global finance and (ii) investigating critical fault lines related to interconnectedness along which systemic risks were built up and shocks transmitted in the crisis. It thus takes initial steps toward operationalizing enhanced financial sector and macro-financial surveillance called for by the IMF’s Executive Board and by experts such as de Larosiere et al. (2009). Getting a better handle on interconnectedness would strengthen the Fund‘s ability, together with the Financial Stability Board, to track systemic risk concentrations. It would also inform spillover and vulnerability analyses, and sharpen bilateral and multilateral surveillance.

The analysis of interconnectedness and contagion is an important part of the financial stability and risk assessment of a country’s financial system. This paper offers detailed and practical guidance on how to conduct a comprehensive analysis of interconnectedness and contagion for a country’s financial system under various circumstances. We survey current approaches at the IMF for analyzing interconnectedness within the interbank, cross-sector and cross-border dimensions through an overview and examples of the data and methodologies used in the Financial Sector Assessment Program. Finally, this paper offers practical advice on how to interpret results and discusses potential financial stability policy recommendations that can be drawn from this type of in-depth analysis.

Interconnectedness among global systemically important banks (GSIBs) and global systemically important insurers (GSIIs) has important financial stability implications. This paper examines connectedness among United States, European and Asian GSIBs and GSIIs, using publicly-available daily equity returns and intra-day volatility data from October 2007 to August 2016. Results reveal strong regional clusters of return and volatility connectedness amongst GSIBs and GSIIs. Compared to Asia, selected GSIBs and GSIIs headquartered in the United States and Europe appear to be main sources of market-based connectedness. Total system connectedness—i.e., among all GSIBs and GSIIs—tends to rise during financial stress, which is corroborated by a balance sheet oriented systemic risk measure. Lastly, the paper demonstrates significant influence of economic policy uncertainty and U.S. long-term interest rates on total connectedness among systemically important institutions, and the important role of bank profitability and asset quality in driving bank-specific return connectedness.

This paper evaluates the risks and vulnerabilities of the German financial system and reviews both the German regulatory and supervisory framework and implementation of the common European framework insofar as it is relevant for Germany. The country is home to two global systemically important financial institutions, Deutsche Bank AG and Allianz SE. The system is also very heterogeneous, with a range of business models and a large number of smaller banks and insurers. The regulatory landscape has changed profoundly with strengthened solvency and liquidity regulations for banks (the EU Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive IV), and the introduction of macroprudential tools.

The current Global Financial Stability Report (April 2016) finds that global financial stability risks have risen since the last report in October 2015. The new report finds that the outlook has deteriorated in advanced economies because of heightened uncertainty and setbacks to growth and confidence, while declines in oil and commodity prices and slower growth have kept risks elevated in emerging markets. These developments have tightened financial conditions, reduced risk appetite, raised credit risks, and stymied balance sheet repair. A broad-based policy response is needed to secure financial stability. Advanced economies must deal with crisis legacy issues, emerging markets need to bolster their resilience to global headwinds, and the resilience of market liquidity should be enhanced. The report also examines financial spillovers from emerging market economies and finds that they have risen substantially. This implies that when assessing macro-financial conditions, policymakers may need to increasingly take into account economic developments in emerging market economies. Finally, the report assesses changes in the systemic importance of insurers, finding that across advanced economies the contribution of life insurers to systemic risk has increased in recent years. The results suggest that supervisors and regulators should take a more macroprudential approach to the sector.

The U.S., the U.K., and more recently, the E.U., have proposed policy measures directly targeting complexity and business structures of banks. Unlike other, price-based reforms (e.g., Basel 3 and G-SIFI surcharges), these proposals have been developed unilaterally with material differences in scope, design and implementation schedules. This may exacerbate cross-border regulatory arbitrage and put a further burden on consolidated supervision and cross-border resolution. This paper provides an analysis of the potential implications of implementing different structural policy measures. It proposes a pragmatic and coordinated approach to development of these policies to reduce risk of regulatory arbitrage and minimize unintended consequences. In doing so, it also aims to identify a set of common policy measures that countries could adopt to re-scope bank business models and corporate structures.

This Financial System Stability Assessment paper discusses that Canada has enjoyed favorable macroeconomic outcomes over the past decades, and its vibrant financial system continues to grow robustly. However, macrofinancial vulnerabilities—notably, elevated household debt and housing market imbalances—remain substantial, posing financial stability concerns. Various parts of the financial system are directly exposed to the housing market and/or linked through housing finance. The financial system would be able to manage severe macrofinancial shocks. Major deposit-taking institutions would remain resilient, but mortgage insurers would need additional capital in a severe adverse scenario. Housing finance is broadly resilient, notwithstanding some weaknesses in the small non-prime mortgage lending segment. Although banks’ overall capital buffers are adequate, additional required capital for mortgage exposures, along with measures to increase risk-based differentiation in mortgage pricing, would be desirable. This would help ensure adequate through-the cycle buffers, improve mortgage risk-pricing, and limit procyclical effects induced by housing market corrections.