Institutions Economic Performance And The Visible Hand

'This book represents an important next step in the new institutional economics. Using this perspective, it undertakes a thorough re-examination of the problems of development.' – Barry R. Weingast, Stanford University, US 'Institutions, Economic Performance and the Visible Hand is a wide ranging, well-written, and provocative contribution to the study of political and economic organization. Ashok Chakravarti advances arguments and interpretations that are both interesting and, often, controversial. Although I find myself "arguing" with many of them, this is one of the many virtues of the book. I recommend the book to others who have an interest in institutional economics – why it is important, where it has been, and where it is going.' – Oliver E. Williamson, Nobel Laureate in Economics, University of California, Berkeley, US 'This is an ambitious and wide-ranging book, which seeks to overthrow the minimalist view of the role of institutions in economic systems contained in the standard economic model, and instead advocates a more active institution-building effort to promote the development of poor countries. This important contribution is to review and consolidate the themes and issues that emerge from a very large literature on the subject of institutions and economic development, and to coherently formulate hypotheses relating institutions to economic performance. This should be useful to a wide range of scholars.' – John Toye, University of Oxford, UK This timely study convincingly argues that it is not resources but the institutions which govern the interaction and decision-making of economic and political agents, that are the key factor in determining the economic performance of nations. The book challenges the conventional wisdom on the determinants of economic performance and provides an alternative vision of the functioning of an economic system. The author provides a structured survey which critically evaluates the theory and evidence of neoclassical approaches to growth and development. He then skillfully integrates insights from the old and new institutional economics into an original and comprehensive vision of the relationship between institutions, growth and economic development. Institutions, Economic Performance and the Visible Hand will be of special interest to academics, financial analysts and commentators, staff of international development agencies and NGOs, researchers and post-graduate students.

An analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies is developed in this analysis of economic structures.

Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organisations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.)

This text examines the domestic and global consequences of Chinese state capitalism, focusing on the impact of state-owned enterprises on regulation and policy, while placing China's variety of state capitalism in comparative perspective.

This is a book about one of the most controversial concepts in economics: the invisible hand. The author explores the unintended social consequences implied by the invisible hand and discusses the mechanisms that bring about these consequences.The book questions, examines and explicates the strengths and weaknesses of invisible-hand explanations co

Institutions and Economic Performance explores the question of why income per capita varies so greatly across countries. Even taking into account disparities in resources, including physical and human capital, large economic discrepancies remain across countries. Why are some societies but not others able to encourage investments in places, people, and productivity? The answer, the book argues, lies to a large extent in institutional differences across societies. Such institutions are wide-ranging and include formal constitutional arrangements, the role of economic and political elites, informal institutions that promote investment and knowledge transfer, and others. Two core themes run through the contributors’ essays. First, what constraints do institutions place on the power of the executive to prevent it from extorting the investments and effort of other people and institutions? Second, when are productive institutions self-enforcing? Institutions and Economic Performance is unique in its melding of economics, political science, history, and sociology to address its central question.

This is an excerpt from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This extract concentrates on the theory of the invisible hand.

The role of large-scale business enterprise—big business and its managers—during the formative years of modern capitalism (from the 1850s until the 1920s) is delineated in this pathmarking book. Alfred Chandler, Jr., the distinguished business historian, sets forth the reasons for the dominance of big business in American transportation, communications, and the central sectors of production and distribution.

The Invisible Hand? offers a radical departure from the conventional wisdom of economists and economic historians, by showing that 'factor markets' and the economies dominated by them — the market economies — are not modern, but have existed at various times in the past. They rise, stagnate, and decline; and consist of very different combinations of institutions embedded in very different societies. These market economies create flexibility and high mobility in the exchange of land, labour, and capital, and initially they generate economic growth, although they also build on existing social structures, as well as existing exchange and allocation systems. The dynamism that results from the rise of factor markets leads to the rise of new market elites who accumulate land and capital, and use wage labour extensively to make their wealth profitable. In the long term, this creates social polarization and a decline of average welfare. As these new elites gradually translate their economic wealth into political leverage, it also creates institutional sclerosis, and finally makes these markets stagnate or decline again. This process is analysed across the three major, pre-industrial examples of successful market economies in western Eurasia: Iraq in the early Middle Ages, Italy in the high Middle Ages, and the Low Countries in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period, and then parallels drawn to England and the United States in the modern period. These areas successively saw a rapid rise of factor markets and the associated dynamism, followed by stagnation, which enables an in-depth investigation of the causes and results of this process.