Incorporating Vision In Defense Transformation

The inadequate definition of transformation in the April 2003 Department of Defense Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) has resulted in military transformation efforts not meeting national security objectives. Transformational concepts have led to emotional reactions throughout their introduction. The author analyzes strategy and transformation since the end of the cold war to show there exists institutional momentum to define transformation in terms of major combat operations and technology as a panacea. A paradox in transformation exists since the US military can only transform to meet the lower level of conflict if it retains its preeminence in major combat. The institutional momentum and paradox can only be solved if doctrine, concepts, and technology are developed in an orderly process and force transformation management is removed from the Pentagon. Analysis of the international security environment shows, though, that national-level transformation is required to end the Department of Defense's role as the first provider for any US crisis. Only through focused vision in Defense transformation can the US succeed in accomplishing future security objectives. This vision starts with a new definition of transformation, implements a transformation process, and bifurcates force and business practice transformation efforts. Through these recommendations, the Department of Defense will set the standard for national-level transformation.

This document is intended to provide an understanding of the key elements of defense transformation. To that end, this brochure seeks to answer some fundamental questions about defense transformation. What is defense transformation and what is its scope? Why is transformation so urgent? In general, how will defense transformation be accomplished? What is the Department's force transformation vision for the future and what is needed to support this vision? What are the primary senior leadership roles and responsibilities for implementing the force transformation strategy? What are some of the key force transformation issues requiring additional investment in the years ahead? How can we measure the effectiveness of our force transformation process? Transformation is a key component of the U.S. defense strategy and will affect everyone in the Department as we seek creative, innovative solutions to the challenges we face at home and abroad. In the April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG), Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld identifies transformation as: A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world. Transformation is more than just acquiring new equipment and embracing new technology. It is rather the all encompassing process of thinking creatively in order to work better together with other parts of the Department and other agencies within the U.S. Government. It also means working better with our numerous coalition allies, leveraging new technologies and operational concepts in order to create U.S. and coalition advantage against current and potential future adversaries. Transformation should be thought of as a process, not an end state.

Why are some military organizations more adept than others at reinventing themselves? Why do some efforts succeed rapidly while others only gather momentum over time or become sidetracked or even subverted? This book explicates the conditions under which military organizations have both succeeded and failed at institutionalizing new ideas and forms of warfare. Through comparative analysis of some classic cases - US naval aviation during the interwar period; German and British armour development during the same period; and the US Army's experience with counter-insurgency during the Vietnam War - the authors offer a novel explanation for change rooted in managerial strategies for aligning service incentives and norms. With contemporary policy makers scrambling to digest the lessons of recent wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as to meet the unfolding challenges of the new revolution in military affairs (RMA), understanding the sources and impediments to transformation has become critical.

A military historian describes three basic transformations that have taken place within the U.S. military since the Vietnam War, including a move to an all-volunteer force, the emergence of stealth technology, and the application of information technology after the fall of the Soviet Union.

In the Secretary's Transformation Planning Guidance, transformation is described as "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our Nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategichposition, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world." There are, of course, other ideas about what defense transformation is or should be, but the main objectives of the Department of Defense (DOD) transformation process are clear: support the U.S. defense strategy, and sustain and enhance the Nation's competitive advantage in warfare. To achieve these objectives, transformation advocates aim to anticipate and create the future rather than react to a future that adversaries seek to impose. While the coevolution of military concepts, processes, organizations, and technology is not entirely new, the current DOD approach to transformation recognizes that a profound change in one of these areas can trigger a change in the others, creating both new competencies and new competitions.

Although DOD has made progress toward establishing a management framework for overall business transformation, the framework currently focuses on business systems modernization and does not fully address broader business transformation efforts. In 2005, DOD set up the Defense Business Systems Management Committee to review and approve the business enterprise architecture a transformation blueprint and new business systems modernization investments. It also established the Business Transformation Agency, which currently reports to the Vice Chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, to coordinate and lead business transformation across the department. Despite these steps, DOD has not clearly defined or institutionalized interrelationships, roles and responsibilities, or accountability for establishing a management framework for overall business transformation. For example, differences of opinion exist within DOD about the roles of various senior leadership committees. Until DOD's business transformation management framework is institutionalized and encompasses broad responsibilities for all aspects of business transformation, it will be challenging for DOD to integrate related initiatives into a sustainable, enterprise-wide approach to successfully resolve weaknesses in business operations that GAO has shown are at high risk of waste, fraud, and abuse.