How Shareholder Reforms Can Pay Foreign Policy Dividends

Not only can good governance practices facilitate free trade by taking many disputes off the trade agenda, they can also stabilize the financial system by avoiding expensive and unpopular bailouts. This paper argues that U.S. foreign policymakers must accelerate the pace of corporate governance reform.

Volume 1A covers corporate finance: how businesses allocate capital - the capital budgeting decision - and how they obtain capital - the financing decision. Though managers play no independent role in the work of Miller and Modigliani, major contributions in finance since then have shown that managers maximize their own objectives. To understand the firm's decisions, it is therefore necessary to understand the forces that lead managers to maximize the wealth of shareholders.

The World Bank Legal Review is a publication for policy makers and their advisers, attorneys, and other professionals engaged in the field of international development. It offers a combination of legal scholarship, lessons from experience, legal developments, and recent research on the many ways in which the application of the law and the improvement of justice systems promote poverty reduction, economic development, and the rule of law. In keeping with the theme of the World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development, and following the success of the World Bank Group’s Legal Forum on “Law, Equity, and Development” in December 2005, volume 2 of The World Bank Legal Review focuses on issues of equity and development. The volume draws together some of the key ideas of the Legal Forum, including articles by many of its distinguished participants, and explores the role of equity in the development process, highlighting how legal and regulatory frameworks and equitable justice systems can do much to level the playing field in the political, economic, and sociocultural domains, as well as how they can reinforce existing inequalities. Consistent with the interdisciplinary nature of this endeavour, Law, Equity and Development contains work by academics and practitioners in law, criminal justice, economics, human rights, social development, cultural studies, and anthropology.

Thanks to the rise of mutual funds and retirement plans, the actual owners of the world’s corporate giants are no longer a few wealthy families. Rather, they’re the huge majority of working people who have their pensions and life savings invested in shares of today’s largest companies. These grassroots owners have ideas about value that differ from those of tycoons or Wall Street traders. And corporate directors and executives are coming under increasing pressure to respond. The New Capitalists provides examples—from GE to Disney to British Petroleum—of enterprises whose shareholders have recently wielded their control in ways unimaginable just several years ago. Authors Stephen Davis, Jon Lukomnik and David Pitt-Watson describe how civil ownership will profoundly alter our world—including forcing the rise of a new species of corporation. It has already begun demolishing old rules and habits, laying the groundwork for a new “constitution of commerce.” The authors spell out conventional thinking destined for extinction—and fresh strategies companies must implement to survive in the emerging “civil economy.” They also outline how investors, advisors, activists, and policy makers can make their voices heard.

Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.

"Law can be viewed as a body of rules and legal sanctions that channel behavior in socially desirable directions - for example, by encouraging individuals to take proper precautions to prevent accidents or by discouraging competitors from colluding to raise prices. The incentives created by the legal system are thus a natural subject of study by economists. Moreover, given the importance of law to the welfare of societies, the economic analysis of law merits prominent treatment as a subdiscipline of economics. This two volume Handbook is intended to foster the study of the legal system by economists. The two volumes form a comprehensive and accessible survey of the current state of the field. Chapters prepared by leading specialists of the area. Summarizes received results as well as new developments."--[Source inconnue].

International Investment for Sustainable Development critically examines the interface between sustainability, development, and the governance of international investment. It challenges the conventional view that foreign direct investment is a 'miracle drug' for developing countries and exposes serious shortcomings in the current international investment regime. Composed of norms, agreements, treaties and regulations, the emerging investment regime expands the rights of transnational corporations (TNCs) without commensurate rewards for the common good. Drawing on both research and engaged advocacy, the contributors ultimately map out a new way forward, towards the creation and implementation of international investment rules that will promote global sustainability and equity.

This fascinating book investigates the strategic importance of the production and dissemination of expertise in the activities of the international organizations (IOs) that have come to symbolize the dominance of the Western political and economic order.

The essays in this volume employ the insights and techniques of political science, economics and history to provide a fresh answer to this question.

Critics of globalization claim that economic integration drains political authority from states: devolving authority to newly empowered regions, delegating it to supranational organizations, and transferring it to multinational firms and nongovernmental organizations. Globalization is also attacked for forcing convergence of state institutions and policies and threatening the ability of societies to chart their own democratically determined courses. In Governance in a Global Economy, Miles Kahler and David Lake assemble the contributions of seventeen leading scholars who have systematically investigated how global economic integration produces changes of governance. These authors conclude that globalization has created a new and intricate fabric of governance, but one that fails to match the stark portrait of beleaguered states. Exploring changes in governance across several policy areas (such as tourism, trade, finance, and fiscal and monetary policy), the authors demonstrate that globalization changes the policy preferences of some actors, increases the bargaining power of others, and opens new institutional options for yet others. By reintroducing agency and choice into our understanding of globalization, this book provides important new insights into the complex and contingent effects of globalization on political authority and governance. The introduction and the conclusion are by the editors; the contributors are James A. Caporaso, Benjamin J. Cohen, Barry Eichengreen, Zachary Elkins, Geoffrey Garrett, Peter Gourevitch, Virginia Haufler, Michael J. Hiscox, Robert O. Keohane, Lisa L. Martin, Walter Mattli, Kathleen R. McNamara, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Jonathan Rodden, Ronald Rogowski, Beth A. Simmons, and Peter Van Houten.