How Adverse Selection Affects The Health Insurance Market

There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers.

Many Americans believe that people who lack health insurance somehow get the care they really need. Care Without Coverage examines the real consequences for adults who lack health insurance. The study presents findings in the areas of prevention and screening, cancer, chronic illness, hospital-based care, and general health status. The committee looked at the consequences of being uninsured for people suffering from cancer, diabetes, HIV infection and AIDS, heart and kidney disease, mental illness, traumatic injuries, and heart attacks. It focused on the roughly 30 million-one in seven-working-age Americans without health insurance. This group does not include the population over 65 that is covered by Medicare or the nearly 10 million children who are uninsured in this country. The main findings of the report are that working-age Americans without health insurance are more likely to receive too little medical care and receive it too late; be sicker and die sooner; and receive poorer care when they are in the hospital, even for acute situations like a motor vehicle crash.

Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

The United States is unique among economically advanced nations in its reliance on employers to provide health benefits voluntarily for workers and their families. Although it is well known that this system fails to reach millions of these individuals as well as others who have no connection to the work place, the system has other weaknesses. It also has many advantages. Because most proposals for health care reform assume some continued role for employers, this book makes an important contribution by describing the strength and limitations of the current system of employment-based health benefits. It provides the data and analysis needed to understand the historical, social, and economic dynamics that have shaped present-day arrangements and outlines what might be done to overcome some of the access, value, and equity problems associated with current employer, insurer, and government policies and practices. Health insurance terminology is often perplexing, and this volume defines essential concepts clearly and carefully. Using an array of primary sources, it provides a store of information on who is covered for what services at what costs, on how programs vary by employer size and industry, and on what governments doâ€"and do not doâ€"to oversee employment-based health programs. A case study adapted from real organizations' experiences illustrates some of the practical challenges in designing, managing, and revising benefit programs. The sometimes unintended and unwanted consequences of employer practices for workers and health care providers are explored. Understanding the concepts of risk, biased risk selection, and risk segmentation is fundamental to sound health care reform. This volume thoroughly examines these key concepts and how they complicate efforts to achieve efficiency and equity in health coverage and health care. With health care reform at the forefront of public attention, this volume will be important to policymakers and regulators, employee benefit managers and other executives, trade associations, and decisionmakers in the health insurance industry, as well as analysts, researchers, and students of health policy.

Leading economists discuss current health policy challenges, including prescription drugs benefits as a component of Medicare and conversion to for-profit health plans.

In this volume, leading American health economists provide a critical assessment of the current state of knowledge of insurance market reform that is accessible to both policy-makers and researchers.

This eight-volume encyclopedia brings together a comprehensive collection of work highlighting established research and emerging science in all relevant disciplines in gerontology and population aging. It covers the breadth of the field, gives readers access to all major sub-fields, and illustrates their interconnectedness with other disciplines. With more than 1300 cross-disciplinary contributors—including anthropologists, biologists, economists, psychiatrists, public policy experts, sociologists, and others—the encyclopedia delves deep into key areas of gerontology and population aging such as ageism, biodemography, disablement, longevity, long-term care, and much more. Paying careful attention to empirical research and literature from around the globe, the encyclopedia is of interest to a wide audience that includes researchers, teachers and students, policy makers, (non)governmental agencies, public health practitioners, business planners, and many other individuals and organizations.

A novel book that argues that, contrary to received wisdom, some adverse selection in insurance markets is beneficial to society as a whole. It is for all those interested in public policy arguments about insurance and discrimination: policymakers, academics, actuaries, underwriters, disability activists, geneticists and other medical professionals.

This study, reprinted from the Journal of Health Economics, uses simulation methods to quantify the effects of adverse selection. The data used to develop the model provide information about whether families can accurately forecast their risk and whether this forecast affects the purchase of insurance coverage--key conditions for adverse selection to matter. The results suggest that adverse selection is sufficient to eliminate high-option benefit plans in multiple choice markets if insurers charge a single, experience-rated premium. Adverse selection is substantially reduced if premiums are varied according to demographic factors. Adverse selection is also restricted in supplementary insurance markets. In this market, supplementary policies are underpriced because a part of the additional benefits that purchasers can expect is a cost to the base plan and is not reflected in the supplementary premium. As a result, full supplementary coverage is attractive to both low and high risks.