Heideggers Concept Of Fundamental Ontological Transcendence In The Late 1920s

In the late 20s Heidegger begins to speak continually of something called 'transcendence' and of its radical centrality to the problem of fundamental ontology. In particular he connects this problem back to the terse, enigmatic and somehow almost buried analysis of SZ sect69. There has long been evidence for the importance of this problem for Heidegger, and there is mounting evidence for its centrality to the problem of division three of Being and Time. -- And yet, as a question, transcendence has received even less dedicated attention than the similarly decisive problem of temporality. This thesis seeks to remedy the above deficiency by applying itself wholly to the problem of fundamental ontological transcendence. -- This thesis is divided into three parts. The first offers a preliminary sketch for the problem by discussing Being and Time in general, along with the problems of the surrounding world in particular and the history of the concept of world. The second part is concerned with the unity of the problem and this means with the interpretation of transcendence as a radicalisation of the existential concept of world. The third part is concerned with the completeness of the phenomenon, thus it unfolds the previously won unity according to its connection with the problems of freedom, selfhood, historicity and the question of being. Throughout the whole analysis the phenomenon of transcendence will be clarified, and through this, the problem and the import of transcendence will be demonstrated.

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) was one of the most original thinkers of the twentieth century. His work has profoundly influenced philosophers including Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Richard Rorty, Hubert Dreyfus, Stanley Cavell, Emmanuel Levinas, Alain Badiou, and Gilles Deleuze. His accounts of human existence and being and his critique of technology have inspired theorists in fields as diverse as theology, anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science, and the humanities. This Lexicon provides a comprehensive and accessible guide to Heidegger's notoriously obscure vocabulary. Each entry clearly and concisely defines a key term and explores in depth the meaning of each concept, explaining how it fits into Heidegger's broader philosophical project. With over 220 entries written by the world's leading Heidegger experts, this landmark volume will be indispensable for any student or scholar of Heidegger's work.

"It is by all means a dubious thing to depend and rest on what an author himself has brought to the forefront. The important thing is rather to give attention to those things he left shrouded in silence." Such was the methodological advice, given in 1924 by Heidegger himself, that is rigorously followed in this book, Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology. The project involves the vast complex of problems that emerged around Being and Time (1927) and then continued from the time of the Marburg lecture courses (1923-1928) up to the Freiburg lectures (1928-1935), today available in the Gesamtausgabe. Heidegger's silence concerning some of his foundational sources is a fact fully recognized by those who have carefully read him. This book systematically explores and critically assesses the silences concerning Husserl, the Aristotle of Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, the Hegel of Phenomenology, Nietzsche, and even Descartes. What emerges is a systematic and original reinterpretation of 'fundamental ontology' focused on the self-understanding of the human Dasein as the key for understanding the various meanings of Being and the entire deconstructed history of ontology. The project culminated in the pretensions to absoluteness rampant in modern metaphysics, with its peak and paroxysm to be found in The Introduction to Metaphysics (1935). In regard to the 'Heidegger affair', this book, which was begun well before the present turmoil, shows both the ambiguity and coherence of Heidegger's involvement with the Nazis, and, for the first time, exposes the work of the young Heidegger to a rigorous and wholesome internal criticism. By delineating the origins, the shifts, and the final outcome from within his own field, phenomenology, it allows us to reflect on this difficult question at its depth and origin.

A new 2024 translation of Martin Heidegger's major work "Being and Time" (Sein und Zeit), originally published in 1927 in multiple publications. This edition contains a new afterword by the Translator, a timeline of Heidegger's life and works, a philosophic index of core Heideggerian concepts and a guide for terminology across 19th and 20th century Existentialists. This translation is designed for readability and accessibility to Heidegger's enigmatic and dense philosophy. Complex and specific philosophic terms are translated as literally as possible and academic footnotes have been removed to ensure easy reading. Being and Time presents a complex philosophical discourse on the nature of being (Sein) and time (Zeit), focusing in particular on the temporal-existentialist concept of Dasein, a term that combines the German words for "to be" (sein) and "there" (da). This classic philosophic work examines the traditional metaphysical understanding of being, arguing that this understanding, typically based on the idea of a constant presence, fails to account for the temporal and existential dimensions of being. Heidegger proposes that an understanding of being requires an analysis of Dasein, which is characterized not only by its existence, but also by its being in the world and its temporal existence. The concept of Dasein is central to the his argument, emphasizing that Dasein is always already situated in a world, and its understanding of being is shaped by its temporal existence. This perspective challenges traditional metaphysical notions of being as static and unchanging, proposing instead that being is fundamentally temporal and connected to human existence and understanding. As the title suggests, Heidegger sees the question of Being as indistinguishable from Time, arguing that Newtonian conceptions of time as a series of now-points are inadequate for understanding the being of Dasein. His Ontochronology argues that the existential and ontological analysis of Dasein reveals a more fundamental concept of time, one that is integral to the structure of Being itself. The text further elaborates on the idea of "thrownness" and several other existentialist themes. Thrownness is one of the three conditions that signifies Dasein's immersion in the world, where it finds itself already entangled in a web of relations and meanings. This "thrownness", combined with Dasein's inherent being-toward-death, underscores the existential condition of human beings, framing their existence as a continual engagement with their own finitude and the possibilities of their being. Heidegger posits that understanding the nature of being requires a fundamental rethinking of both being and time, dogmatically stating that the true nature of being can only be grasped through an understanding of the temporality that characterizes the existence of being.

The thirteen original essays in this volume represent the most sustained investigation, in any language, of the connections between Heidegger's thought—both early and late—and the tradition of transcendental philosophy.

This book demonstrates how Heidegger's departure from ontotheology occurs initially as a preparation for the concept of Dasein's transcendence and subsequently as its explicit development and overcoming. Dasein's transcendence is revealed as the foundation for the subsequent concept of Beyng as an Event, which stands in contrast to all ontotheological perspectives that assert a singular a priori foundation of the universe attributed to beings, God, consciousness, or even an independent "process" of Being that doesn't rely on Dasein. The book illustrates that transcendence is not an attribute of human consciousness or a connection to something external to it. Instead, as a "primal act," transcendence paves the way for a non-representational dwelling in the essence of a historically unfolding Being, a contemplative recollection of the truth of Beyng. Throughout the book, there is a gradual progression towards an understanding of transcendence as an active engagement, wherein we "do" transcendence. This process involves a reconstruction of the ontological significance of action, emphasizing its performative embeddedness in existence and its inseparability from Beyng.

Written in 1938/9, Mindfulness (translated from the German Besinnung) is Martin Heidegger's second major being-historical treatise. Here, Heidegger develops some of his key concepts and themes including truth, nothingness, enownment, art and Be-ing and discusses the Greeks, Nietzsche and Hegel at length. In addition to the main text, the text also includes two further important essays, 'A Retrospective Look at the Pathway' (1937/8) and 'The Wish and the Will (On Preserving What is Attempted)' (1937/8), in which Heidegger surveys his unpublished works and discusses his relationship to Catholic and Protestant Christianity and reflects on his life's path. This is a major translation of a key text from one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century, now available in the Bloomsbury Revelations Series.

Heidegger's Metaphysics explores how Heidegger continued the project of Being and Time, developing a new kind of metaphysics through a critique of Kantian transcendental philosophy. Drawing on Heidegger's published work, lecture courses, drafts, and correspondence from the late 1920s, it reconstructs the philosophical justification for this project, its implications for Heidegger's phenomenology of time, and his understanding of philosophical concept formation. Daly proposes that Heidegger's project neither failed nor remained indebted to a Kantian transcendental framework, and challenges the widespread interpretation of Heidegger as a critic of metaphysics. This work examines a wide range of themes that have been largely neglected in discussions of Heidegger's work, including a phenomenology of the mythical world (in dialogue with Ernst Cassirer's work), the origin of religious concepts, the development of a temporality of thrownness, and Heidegger's critique of Kantian transcendentalism. It finishes by challenging the separation of Heidegger's philosophy from his politics and asks what we can retrieve from his project today.

Explores the evolution of Heidegger’s thinking about nature and its relevance for environmental ethics. In Naturalizing Heidegger, David E. Storey proposes a new interpretation of Heidegger’s importance for environmental philosophy, finding in the development of his thought from the early 1920s to his later work in the 1940s the groundwork for a naturalistic ontology of life. Primarily drawing on Heidegger’s engagement with Nietzsche, but also on his readings of Aristotle and the biologist Jakob von Uexküll, Storey focuses on his critique of the nihilism at the heart of modernity, and his conception of the intentionality of organisms and their relation to their environments. From these ideas, a vision of nature emerges that recognizes the intrinsic value of all living things and their kinship with one another, and which anticipates later approaches in the philosophy of nature, such as Hans Jonas’s phenomenology of life and Evan Thompson’s contemporary attempt to naturalize phenomenology.

Denis McManus presents a new interpretation of Martin Heidegger's early vision of our subjectivity and of the world we inhabit. Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology' allows us to understand the creature that thinks as also one which acts, moves, even touches the world around it, a creature at home in the same ordinary world in which we too live our lives when outside of the philosophical closet; it also promises to free us from seemingly intractable philosophical problems, such as scepticism about the external world and other minds. But many of the concepts central to that vision are elusive; and some of the most widely accepted interpretations of Heidegger's vision harbour within themselves deep and important unclarities, while others foist upon us hopeless species of idealism. Heidegger and the Measure of Truth offers a new way of understanding that vision. Drawing on an examination of Heidegger's work throughout the 1920s, McManus takes as central to that vision the proposals that propositional thought presupposes a mastery of what might be called a 'measure', and that mastery of such a 'measure' requires a recognizably 'worldly' subject. These insights provide the basis for a novel reading of key elements of Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology', including his concept of 'Being-in-the-world', his critique of scepticism, his claim to disavow both realism and idealism, and his difficult reflections on the nature of truth, science, authenticity and philosophy itself. According to this interpretation, Heidegger's central claims identify genuine demands that we must meet if we are to achieve the feat of thinking determinate thoughts about the world around us.