Heath Nixon And The Rebirth Of The Special Relationship

This book reveals that 1969-74 was a crucial period for the special relationship. The Heath Government attempted to reverse Britain's decline as a great power by forging an American-European special relationship out of the Anglo-American relationship. Simultaneously the Nixon Administration tried to recoup the global position of the United States.

Britain, America and the Special Relationship since 1941 examines the Anglo-American strategic and military relationship that developed during the Second World War and continued until recent years. Forged on a common ground of social, cultural, and ideological values as well as political expediency, this partnership formed the basis of the western alliance throughout the Cold War, playing an essential part in bringing stability to the post-1945 international order. Clearly written and chronologically organized, the book begins by discussing the origins of the ‘Special Relationship’ and its progression from uneasy coexistence in the eighteenth century to collaboration at the start of the Second World War. McKercher explores the continued evolution of this partnership during the conflicts that followed, such as the Suez Crisis, the Vietnam War, and the Falklands War. The book concludes by looking at the developments in British and American politics during the past two decades and analysing the changing dynamics of this alliance over the course of its existence. Illustrated with maps and photographs and supplemented by a chronology of events and list of key figures, this is an essential introductory resource for students of the political history and foreign policies of Britain and the United States in the twentieth century.

To date, the Heath-Nixon years have been widely portrayed as marking a low-point in the history of Anglo-American relations – even the end of the 'special relationship'; using a wealth of archival material on both sides of the Atlantic, and examining a range of global developments, Allies Apart offers a fresh interpretation of this pivotal period.

This book re-examines the Nixon administration’s attitude and approach to the European integration project. The formulation of US policy towards European integration in the Nixon presidential years (1969-1974) was conditioned by the perceived relative decline of the United States, Western European emergence and competition, the feared Communist expansionism, and US national interests. Against that backdrop, the Nixon administration saw the need to re-evaluate its policy on Western Europe and the integration process on this continent. Underpinning this study is the extensive use of newly-released archival materials from the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, the Library of Congress, and the State Department. Furthermore, the work is based on the public papers in the American Presidency Project and the materials on the topic of European integration and unification in the Archive of European Integration. Finally, the study has extensively used newspaper archives as well as the declassified online documents, memoirs and diaries of former US officials. Mining these sources made it possible to shed new light on the complexity and dynamism of the Nixon administration’s policy towards European integration.

This handbook examines the personal relationships between American presidents and British prime ministers. It aims to determine how personal diplomacy shaped the Anglo-American relationship and whether individual leaders made the relationship “special.” From the great rapprochement of the 1890s to the Cold War and contemporary transatlantic rapport, the Anglo-American relationship has been one of global significance, making presidents and prime ministers central to international security, trade and commerce, culture, and communication. Naturally, it explores the ideas and convictions of presidents and prime ministers, the political parties they led, as well as the political images constructed in the media and how the aura of the Anglo-American relationship might differ from the reality. With a deeper understanding of these political leaders and the relationship they forge with their counterparts, we come that much closer to appreciating the dynamics of transatlantic statecraft.

Too often, scholarship on Anglo-American political relations has focused on mutual social and economic interests between Britain and the United States as the basis for cooperation. Breaking new ground, Anglo-American Relations and the Transmission of Ideas instead explores how ideas, on either side of the Atlantic have mutually influenced each other. In those transnational interactions, there forms a shared tradition of political ideas, facilitating “a common cast of mind” that has served as the basis for transatlantic relations and socio-political values for decades.

Investigates the involvement of presidents Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton in the Northern Ireland TroublesWhat influence did the Irish dimension have upon Anglo-American relations?Did the Special Relationship impact American and British handling of the aTroubles?What motivated American policymaking towards Northern Ireland?These are just some of the questions dealt with in this fascinating account of Anglo-American relations and Northern Ireland. Developed through the prism of the U.S. presidency, and drawing on American, British, and Irish archival material, this major study examines the administrations of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, tracing the attitudes of successive US presidents towards, and their involvement in, the Northern Ireland conflict.

This electronic version has been made available under a Creative Commons (BY-NC-ND) open access license. This is the first monograph-length study that charts the coercive diplomacy of the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford as practised against their British ally in order to persuade Edward Heath’s government to follow a more amenable course throughout the ‘Year of Europe’ and to convince Harold Wilson’s governments to lessen the severity of proposed defence cuts. Such diplomacy proved effective against Heath but rather less so against Wilson. It is argued that relations between the two sides were often strained, indeed, to the extent that the most ‘special’ elements of the relationship, that of intelligence and nuclear co-operation, were suspended. Yet, the relationship also witnessed considerable co-operation. This book offers new perspectives on US and UK policy towards British membership of the European Economic Community; demonstrates how US détente policies created strain in the ‘special relationship’; reveals the temporary shutdown of US-UK intelligence and nuclear co-operation; provides new insights in US-UK defence co-operation, and re-evaluates the US-UK relationship throughout the IMF Crisis.