Handbook Of Spectrum Auction Design

An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the FCC in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum. Spectrum auctions have raised hundreds of billion dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The PCS spectrum was sold via a simultaneous multi-round auction, which forces bidders to compete for licenses individually even though they typically value certain combinations. This exposes bidders to risk when they bid aggressively for a desired combination but end up winning an inferior subset. Foreseeing this possibility, bidders may act cautiously with adverse effects for revenue and efficiency. Combinatorial auctions allow for bids on combinations of licenses and thus hold the promise of improved performance.Recently, a number of countries have switched to the combinatorial clock auction to sell spectrum. However, the number of possible packages grows exponentially with the number of licenses, which adds complexity to the auction. We analyze the impact of two main design choices: simple "compact'' bid languages versus complex "fully expressive'' bid languages and simple "pay-as-bid'' payment rules versus complex "bidder-optimal core-selecting'' payment rules. We consider these design choices both for ascending and sealed-bid formats. We find that simplicity of the bid language has a substantial positive impact on the auction's efficiency and simplicity of the payment rule has as a substantial positive impact on the auction's revenue. The currently popular combinatorial clock auction, which uses a complex bid language and payment rule, scores worst on both dimensions.

Access to the radio spectrum is vital for modern digital communication. It is an essential component for smartphone capabilities, the Cloud, the Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, and multiple other new technologies. Governments use spectrum auctions to decide which companies should use what parts of the radio spectrum. Successful auctions can fuel rapid innovation in products and services, unlock substantial economic benefits, build comparative advantage across all regions, and create billions of dollars of government revenues. Poor auction strategies can leave bandwidth unsold and delay innovation, sell national assets to firms too cheaply, or create uncompetitive markets with high mobile prices and patchy coverage that stifles economic growth. Corporate bidders regularly complain that auctions raise their costs, while government critics argue that insufficient revenues are raised. The cross-national record shows many examples of both highly successful auctions and miserable failures. Drawing on experience from the UK and other countries, senior regulator Geoffrey Myers explains how to optimise the regulatory design of auctions, from initial planning to final implementation. Spectrum Auctions offers unrivalled expertise for regulators and economists engaged in practical auction design or company executives planning bidding strategies. For applied economists, teachers, and advanced students this book provides unrivalled insights in market design and public management. Providing clear analytical frameworks, case studies of auctions, and stage-by-stage advice, it is essential reading for anyone interested in designing public-interested and successful spectrum auctions.

Auction is a mechanism for selling goods and services. Today, auctions are employed in a variety of transactions that extend from online sales to sales of public resources such as spectrum. The ubiquity of auctions has generated tremendous interest among economist and public alike. It has also led to many open questions about the auction design.The paper reviews the seminal literature on auctions, focusing on its basic models, and issues involved in auction design. The primary objective of the review is to offer some critical thoughts on auction design for its application in spectrum allocation.

The Nobel Prizes is the official yearbook of the Nobel Foundation. This edition provides extensive information about the 2020 laureates: their Nobel Prize lectures and their autobiographies, as well as presentation speeches and background about the Nobel festivities.Published on behalf of the Nobel Foundation.

Handbook of Industrial Organization Volume 4 highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters. Each chapter is written by an international board of authors. Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 12h International Symposium on Business Modeling and Software Design, BMSD 2022, which took place in Fribourg, Switzerland, in June 2022. The 12 full and 9 short papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 56 submissions. BMSD is a leading international forum that brings together researchers and practitioners interested in business modeling and its relation to software design. Particular areas of interest are: Business Processes and Enterprise Engineering; Business Models and Requirements; Business Models and Services; Business Models and Software; Information Systems Architectures and Paradigms; Data Aspects in Business Modeling and Software Development; Blockchain-Based Business Models and Information Systems; IoT and Implications for Enterprise Information Systems. Each year, a special theme is chosen, for making presentations and discussions more focused. The BMSD 2022 theme is: Information Systems Engineering and Trust.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics is a cutting-edge reference work to philosophical issues in the practice of economics. It is motivated by the view that there is more to economics than general equilibrium theory, and that the philosophy of economics should reflect the diversity of activities and topics that currently occupy economists. Contributions in the Handbook are thus closely tied to ongoing theoretical and empirical concerns in economics. Contributors include both philosophers of science and economists. Chapters fall into three general categories: received views in philosophy of economics, ongoing controversies in microeconomics, and issues in modeling, macroeconomics, and development. Specific topics include methodology, game theory, experimental economics, behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, computational economics, data mining, interpersonal comparisons of utility, measurement of welfare and well being, growth theory and development, and microfoundations of macroeconomics. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics is a groundbreaking reference like no other in its field. It is a central resource for those wishing to learn about the philosophy of economics, and for those who actively engage in the discipline, from advanced undergraduates to professional philosophers, economists, and historians.

This Brief introduces the wireless spectrum market and discusses the current research for spectrum auctions. It covers the unique properties of spectrum auction, such as interference relationship, reusability, divisibility, composite effect and marginal effect, while also proposing how to build economic incentives into the network architecture and protocols in order to optimize the efficiency of wireless systems. Three scenarios for designing new auctions are demonstrated. First, a truthful double auction scheme for spectrum trading considering both the heterogeneous propagation properties of channels and spatial reuse is proposed. In the second scenario, a framework is designed to enable spectrum group secondary users with a limited budget. Finally, a flexible auction is created enabling operators to purchase the right amounts of spectrum at the right prices according to their users’ dynamic demands. Both concise and comprehensive, Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market is suited for professionals and researchers working with wireless communications and networks. It is also a useful tool for advanced-level students interested in spectrum and networking issues.

This brief explores current research on dynamic spectrum auctions, focusing on fundamental auction theory, characteristics of the spectrum market, spectrum auction architecture and possible auction mechanisms. The brief explains how dynamic spectrum auctions, which enable new users to gain spectrum access and existing spectrum owners to obtain financial benefits, can greatly improve spectrum efficiency by resolving the artificial spectrum shortage. It examines why operators and users face significant challenges due to specialty of the spectrum market and the related requirements imposed on the auction mechanism design. Concise and up-to-date, Dynamic Spectrum Auction in Wireless Communication is designed for researchers and professionals in computer science or electrical engineering. Students studying networking will also find this brief a valuable resource.