German Foreign Policy And The Outbreak Of The Yugoslav War

Seminar paper from the year 2001 in the subject Politics - Topic: German Foreign Policy, grade: 1.0, Free University of Berlin (Otto-Suhr-Institut), language: English, abstract: In the summer of 1991, Yugoslavia was on fire. Two of the Yugoslav republics – Slovenia and Croatia – had held referendums on independence from Belgrade. In December 1990 and May 1991, the great majority in both states voted for independence. Since August 1991, Germany supported the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia actively. Finally, on the 23rd of December 1991, the German foreign minister Genscher announced Germany ́s recognition of Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign states. A long debate about what became known as “recognition policy” followed. Germany ́s unilateral recognition was widely criticized as the most profound mistake of German foreign policy since 1945 or – as Horsley put it – “a deadly sin of German foreign policy”. The criticism not only came from the German political left, who accused the Kohl government of a retardation to a Bismarckian Machtpolitik. Even Germany ́s closest allies in Europe criticized Germany harshly. The French foreign minister Dumas warned Genscher that a unilateral recognition by Germany “will set Europe back twenty years”. Uncertainties about Germany ́s future role in Europe may partly explain the critizism. France and Great Britain were unsure whether Germany would continue its policy of self-restraint or if it would implement a more unilateralist policy, especially towards its new neighbours in the east. Unsurprisingly, only one year after reunification, the question of recognition was perceived as a paradigmatic case of a “new German foreign policy”. Was it the beginning of unilateralist power politics, a mere muscle play or just a diplomatic mistake? It has since become obvious that the unilateral recognition was not the beginning of a “new German foreign policy”. Germany kept on the multilateral track. Today, more than a decade later, Germany is still a driving force behind the integration and enlargement of the EU. Nevertheless, the reasons why Germany acted the way it did, remain unclear. It is not difficult to understand the defection of Germany from multilateral cooperation in December - this is easily explained by a spiral of mistrust between Germany, France and Great Britain. [...]

In American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 1939-1941, Ivo Tasovac contends that Yugoslavia acted as an unwilling prop for American involvement in World War II. As a result of America's commitment to Britain as an exception to their doctrine of neutrality, and of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt's shared eagerness for conflict and suppression of Germany, the war and ensuing Communist takeover of Eastern Europe were inevitable. With Yugoslavia cast as the endangered barrier between the Germans and the Mediterranean, Churchill was able to establish an unquestionable need for U.S. military action. Britain's leader could seize on the small country as a staging area for activating the Soviets in order to eliminate Italy and weaken Germany in the process. Tasovac contends that pressure from the British government and the American diplomats investigating the situation in fact enforced the Serbian coup d'etat to overthrow Prince Paul of Yugoslavia when he appeared sympathetic to Germany, even though the Serbians had no intentions of fighting. With all of the ingredients for conflict in place, the ensuing struggle for Yugoslavian freedom was unavoidable. By bringing the war to the Balkans, Churchill and Roosevelt shaped the next half-century of international politics and domination. American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia documents and analyzes the decisions and policies that made this action so detrimental to Yugoslavia and other Balkan states. Tasovac brings new light to the realities of the engagement in Yugoslavia and the long-standing effects, discarding the appearances of history for the truth. This study is ideal for a broad audience of scholars, including those interestedin NATO policies applied to the Balkan states, the relationship between the United States and those states, Franklin D. Roosevelt's influence on the world stage during his presidency and World War II, and the history of Yugoslavia as a whole.

With the phasing out of the Cold War, not only the countries of the former Eastern bloc faced challenges in their internal and external policies, but also those of the Western bloc. Countries belonging to the Western alliance had to deal with indigenous problems that emerged with the end of the bipolar world order on the one hand, and also cope with changing international circumstances in their foreign policies on the other hand. Two countries of the western world emerged as the ones that were most deeply affected by the new phase of international politics and faced considerable pressure to transform their structures accordingly. These were Turkey and Germany. This study aims to explain the attitudes of Turkey and Germany to Yugoslav conflicts, beginning with the wars in Slovenia and Croatia in the summer of 1991 to the end of the Kosovo War. It tries to analyse how state identity or search for a new state identity affected foreign policy of Turkey and Germany in the the post-Cold War era in the case of the Yugoslav wars. It argues that during the conflicts Turkey wanted to prove that it was still Western-oriented, still interested in contributing to Western security by trying to acquire a new identity of "regional power". On the other hand, Germany was attempting to show that it was not considering a renationalization of foreign policy or projection of power politics. Berlinalso aimed at showing it was still a loyal ally and was concerned with not being behindthe other countries. In other words, Germany remained committed to its European identity. The aim of this study is to contribute to identity studies in the international relations discipline.

This volume offers a comprehensive account of the wars before the Great War and their role in undermining international instability.

What can outside powers do now to help heal the terrible wounds caused by Yugoslavia's wars? Why did the victors in the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War not act to stop the slaughter? The nature, scope, and meaning of the actions and inactions of outsiders is the subject of this book.