Gdp Based Burden Sharing In Nato The Politics Of Defense Financing Study Of Military Spending By Allies Germany France Poland Italy Greece Def

The NATO Allies agreed at the September 2014 Wales Summit to spend at least two percent of their gross domestic products (GDPs) on defense by 2024. This commitment has become a point of contention among the Allies and a distraction from the imperative of improving the Alliance's burden sharing system. The GDP-based burden sharing policy has not proven to be effective or fair, and its implementation has been subject to national political and economic constraints. NATO as a whole has struggled to sufficiently fund the capabilities necessary for its mission effectiveness, even as individual Allies (above all, the United States) have spent enormous amounts on defense. At the same time, some Allies have made significant security contributions

The purpose of this book is to analyse world military expenditure at the end of the 1980s, and to discuss its political and economic implications. After a decade of unprecedented expansion of international military spending, its level is falling, though modestly. Political developments in Europe and the success of arms control negotiations raise hopes for further reductions. In addition, technological and economic structural disarmament is adding to the pressure for reductions. However, performance has not matched up to promises, and formidable obstacles to defence spending limitations still remain. Military Expenditure surveys recent events and describes the process of change that characterizes international military expenditure, and its determinants, at this time of transformation.

NATO has endured beyond the end of the Cold War by shifting its focus from collective defense to out of area operations. NATO exists only through the voluntary contributions of its members. The United States provides a very large proportion of NATO forces and resources and, thus, has been very interested in getting members to contribute more. In his seminal book, The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olsen found that smaller alliance members tend to freeride after meeting the minimum cost, while larger members contribute disproportionately large shares to the collective good. Most studies of NATO burden sharing measure the proportion of GDP spent on defense. The problem with this measurement is that it evaluates members based on how much they spend on their own national defense, not on how much they contribute to the alliance. Thus, the question is, do NATO members contribute adequately to the alliance? Alternative ways to measure NATO member contributions were investigated to answer that question. Proportionality is the most important principle for defining how member nations share the burden. Members can only be rightfully accused of freeriding if they fail to provide their apportioned share, but NATO does not have a formal system for determining shares. Bases for apportionment were created to determine fair shares based on national capacity in terms of GDP and population. By comparing financial contributions to NATO common funding and troop contributions NATO's three largest out of area operations (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) to GDP and population-based shares, clear trends emerged in contemporary NATO burden sharing. Analysis of the various alternative measures leads to the conclusion that despite the failure of most NATO member nations to spend the agreed two percent of GDP on defense, they do contribute effectively and proportionally toward NATO funding and operations. Collective action theory only partially applies to NATO; the smallest members tend to contribute equal or greater amounts, proportionally, than their larger counterparts. Furthermore, all members, especially the United States, tend to adjust contributions based upon national interests. Finally, if NATO wishes to better assess and distribute the burden, it must first develop a formal system to apportion it.

En række eksperter i international økonomi analyserer Vestens økonomi og de utilstrækkelige forsvarsbudgetters indflydelse på opretholdelsen af den militære sikkerhed.

This study of European military prospects and economic constraints (EMPEC) was motivated by the long-standing concern of U.S. policymakers with moving toward a better balance with our European allies in providing military capabilities, as well as in the sharing of responsibilities, decisionmaking, and costs of our alliance relationship. This concern is largely shared by our NATO allies, who also nurture-with varying degrees of intensity-the additional aim of enhancing the autonomous military capabilities of the European Union (EU) apart from the NATO alliance, while at the same time moving toward a better balance within the alliance itself. The principal focus of the EMPEC project is the Union's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the ESDP's instrument, the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), with secondary attention to the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) within NATO and the relationship be- tween the ESDP and the DCI. The DCI is a separate set of commitments by the members of NATO to upgrade their individual and collective capabilities and thereby enhance their capacity for bearing a larger share of the burden of and responsibility for NATO operations, together with U.S. forces. While these issues have many important political, diplomatic, and legal aspects, the narrower focus of this study is on defense economics. Specifically, this report addresses the prospects for economic growth, military spending, and military investments in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy to provide sufficient resources for enhancing the military capabilities sought by these four principal European NATO members for the ESDP/RRF in the EU, or for the DCI within NATO.

At the EU's Helsinki summit in 1999, European leaders took a decisive step toward the development of a new Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) aimed at giving the EU a stronger role in international affairs backed by a credible military force. This report analyzes the processes leading to the ESDP by examining why and how this new European consensus came about. It touches upon the controversies and challenges that still lie ahead. What are the national interests and driving forces behind it, and what steps need to be taken to realize Europe's ambitions to achieve a workable European crisis mgmt. capability?

This volume contributes to empirical research on the role of national fiscal rules and institutions in shaping fiscal policies. It provides original, policy-oriented analysis on a number of questions and gives illuminating conclusions about the devices which promote sound and sustainable policy. Contributors are leading experts.