G E Moores Ethical Theory

This 2001 book is a comprehensive study of the ethics of G. E. Moore, the most important English-speaking ethicist of the twentieth century. Moore's ethical project, set out in his seminal text Principia Ethica, is to preserve common moral insight from scepticism and, in effect, persuade his readers to accept the objective character of goodness. Brian Hutchinson explores Moore's arguments in detail and in the process relates the ethical thought to Moore's anti-sceptical epistemology. Moore was, without perhaps fully realizing it, sceptical about the very enterprise of philosophy itself, and in this regard, as Brian Hutchinson reveals, was much closer in his thinking to Wittgenstein than has been previously realized. This book shows Moore's ethical work to be much richer and more sophisticated than his critics have acknowledged.

G.E. Moore's work shaped twentieth century ethics. But while his metaethical doctrines have seen decades of debate, little attention has been paid to his normative theory. Yet Moore broke fresh and important ground in elaborating an indirect, sophisticated, and non-hedonistic form of utilitarianism. Moore on Right and Wrong is a critical reconstruction and exposition of this neglected side of his ethical thought. It situates his normative ethics with respect to traditional utilitarianism and assesses Moore's case for consequentialism. The final chapters explore in detail the implications of Moore's theory for individual moral conduct -- in particular, his denial of self-evident moral rules; his skepticism about knowledge of one's duty; his attempt to establish the validity of certain moral rules; and his account of what moral agents should do in situations where such rules apply and in situations where they do not.

Recognized as the definitive starting point for twentieth-century ethical theory, the text is reprinted with the previously unpublished preface Moore wrote for a planned, but never completed, second edition. "Free Will" and "The Conception of Intrinsic Value" are also included from his later ethical writings.

This Element critically surveys the full range of G. E. Moore's ethical thought, including: (1) his rejection of naturalism in favor of the view that 'good' designates a simple, indefinable property, which cannot be identified with or reduced to any other property; (2) his understanding of intrinsic value, his doctrine of organic wholes, his repudiation of hedonism, and his substantive account of the most important goods and evils; and (3) his critique of egoism and subjectivism and his elaboration of a non-hedonistic variant of utilitarianism that, among other things, creatively blends aspects of act- and rule-oriented versions of that theory.

George Edward Moore’s Principia Ethica was published by Cambridge University Press in 1903 and this was the birth of the science of ethics. So groundbreaking was this book at the time, that practically overnight, ethicists became meta-ethicists and the book ever since has been recognised as the definitive starting point for 20th century ethical theory. In it Moore is concerned with applying logic to ethics, and with demonstrating that logic can give ethics a better foundation. Moore defines ethics as an inquiry into what is good, including what is good in human conduct. Moore supposed that common sense beliefs about the world were correct as they were and shows how false premises about the way in which good is to be defined can lead to false conclusions about ethical conduct. Known to influence the thinking of Russell, Wittgenstein, Ryle and Keynes to mention but a few, understanding this key work in 20th C ethics is essential, and made achievable in this Briefly guide.

G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica is a landmark publication in twentieth-century moral philosophy. Through focusing on the origin and evolution of his main doctrines, this guidebook makes it clear that Moore was an innovator whose provocative take on traditional philosophical problems ignited heated debates among philosophers. Principia Ethica is an important text for those attempting to understand and engage with some major philosophical debates in ethics today. The Routledge Guidebook to Moore's Principia Ethica provides a comprehensive introduction to this historic text, examining key Moorean themes including: ethical non-naturalism the naturalistic fallacy the Open Question Argument moral ontology and epistemology ideal utilitarianism vindictive punishment and organicity moral intuition for epistemic justification in ethics theory of value Ideal for anyone wanting to understand and gain perspective on Moore's seminal work, the book is essential reading for students of moral philosophy, metaethics, normative ethics, philosophical analysis, and related fields.

G. E. Moore's fame as a philosopher rests on his ethics of love and beauty, which inspired Bloomsbury, and on his 'common sense' certainties which challenge abstract philosophical theory. Behind this lies his critical engagement with Kant's idealist philosophy, which is published here for the first time. These early writings, Moore's fellowship dissertations of 1897 and 1898, show how he initiated his influential break with idealism. In 1897 his main target was Kant's ethics, but by 1898 it was the whole Kantian project of transcendental philosophy that he rejected, and the theory which he developed to replace it gave rise to the new project of philosophy as logical analysis. This edition includes comments by Moore's examiners Henry Sidgwick, Edward Caird and Bernard Bosanquet, and in a substantial introduction the editors explore the crucial importance of the dissertations to the history of twentieth-century philosophical thought.

This work offers an important and critical analysis of Moore's conception of good and right. Preface G.E. Moore's ethical theory is usually remembered and studied these days because of Moore's denunciation of ethical naturalism on the ground that it involves a fallacy, 'the naturalistic fallacy, ' which, according to Moore, is inherent in all positions of this kind. But Michela Marzano invites us to turn away from this over-familiar theme and attend to a different element of Moore's theory, his theory of intrinsic value. By doing so, she shows, we gain a much better perspective on Moore's ethics and its relationship to his metaphysics. We can put his criticisms of ethical naturalism into the broader context which is provided by his account of the relationship between 'intrinsic nature' and 'intrinsic value'. But the main gain is that we obtain a perspective from which we can appreciate his positive theory of value