Future Visions For Us Defense Policy

"Though threats to American security have changed dramatically in the last decade, U.S. defense policy and military forces look a lot like they did during the closing days of the Cold War - only smaller. Are the policies and the forces about right to deal with a wide range of threats and uncertaintiesfrom resurgent big powers to civil/ethnic wars to Persian Gulf-like wars to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction - or should they be redesigned before it's too late? That question drives this book." "Council on Foreign Relations staff, joined by a wide range of other experts, offer four choices: First, meet present threats seriously, that is, by building up forces with a 10 percent spending increase; second, anticipate breakthroughs in military technology by possible future adversaries and concentrate now on U.S. technological superiority at about present spending levels: third, focus more on low-level but serious threats from terrorists and civil/ethnic wars and answer with greater reliance on our allies and international organizations, like NATO or the United Nations, and cut expenditures by 15 to 20 percent; or fourth, maintain present capabilities and hold spending at about $250 billion yearly." "The book presents these choices as "Presidential" speeches, so that they can be read and understood by interested Americans."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved

Though threats to American security have changed dramatically in the last decade, U.S. defense policy and military forces look a lot like they did during the closing days of the Cold War. The new administration has promised to make significant changes to U.S. defense spending, yet no book, until now, has explored the options and implications of each approach. Future Visions for U.S. Defense Policy, a revised and updated Council Policy Initiative (CPI), explores these alternatives to U.S. defense policy through four "presidential" speeches. The alternatives are the following: the present level of funding, which the Council CPI labels "a prudent defense," allows the U.S. military to wage two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously and to do some peacekeeping for about $300 billion per year; the "enhanced defense" option, which would increase defense spending to $330 billion per year and assure the United States that it can execute the two-war strategy by improving U.S. military capabilities across the board and relying on allies for peacekeeping missions; a "cooperative defense," which emphasizes building ad hoc international coalitions and focusing U.S. military forces on the real threats to U.S. interests--"civil and ethnic violence"--allowing a 15 percent to 20 percent budget cut; and an "innovative defense," which keeps spending at the current level but switches defense dollars to future technologies rather than maintaining the existing force structure and buying additional current-generation weapon systems. The case for a national missile defense is made in the enhanced defense option, the case against it in cooperative defense. This book is required reading for members of the Bush administration and anyone else concerned with America's national security.

This book analyzes President Bush's new Regional Defense Strategy--the master plan that will guide the transformation of U.S. defense policy for the post-Cold War era. Most recent books on defense prescribe how U.S. policy ought to change or critique past policies without taking Bush's new strategy into account. This book takes a different approach, providing the first comprehensive assessment of the new Regional Defense Strategy, analyzing the consequences for U.S. forces and alliance relations, and examining the political difficulties of transforming President Bush's vision into reality. It explains major changes in U.S. defense doctrine and strategy, force and command structure, future programming requirements, and the major question of how such a significant change was managed in the United States. Much is new and even radical about the Regional Defense Strategy. Bush has built it around the concept of reconstitution, under which the United States will scrap the forces needed to fight a large-scale conflict and rely on the ability to create new forces if such a conflict looms on the horizon. However, reconstitution will impose demanding requirements on U.S. intelligence and the defense industrial base. Congress will also have an important say over this proposal and the new national security strategy as a whole. So will U.S. allies in Europe and the Far East, some of whom are already moving to recast the strategy's proposals for basing U.S. forces abroad. The primary audience of this book is politico-military strategic planners and those interested in organizational theory, management of change in large organizations, and government policy.

Recent concern about mainland China's intentions towards Taiwan, and more general concern about the risk of instability in the region, has led to growing interest in Taiwan's military strategy, in how Taiwan perceives threats to itself, and in how the Taiwanese military are reacting to these perceived threats. This book, which includes contributions by leading Taiwanese military thinkers, explores current military strategy in Taiwan and how it is evolving. It discusses Taiwan's military modernisation, and the implications of the recent defeat after fifty years in power of the Kuomintang Party, implications which include a move away from an authoritarian garrison state culture, and the beginnings of a more open debate about defence. The book concludes with an overall appraisal of Taiwan's defence vision and makes recommendations on how Taiwan's defence might be enhanced.

In this volume, national security experts, academics, and business leaders discuss how to balance the aims and objectives of U.S. defense strategy with current fiscal realities.The book also offers strategies to coordinate defense spending between the executive branch and Congress.

The Air Force Future Operating Concept broadly portrays how the future Air Force will conduct its five core missions as part of a joint, interagency, or multinational force, or independently in support of national security objectives. The central idea is this: "In 2035, AF forces will leverage operational agility as a way to adapt swiftly to any situation or enemy action. Operational agility is the ability to rapidly generate -and shift among -multiple solutions for a given challenge." By using operational agility as a guiding principle in the conduct of our core missions, we can preserve the Air Force's ability to act quickly in response to any challenge. Through application of this central idea, we describe our vision for how future Air Force forces may operate. The Air Force seeks bold and innovative approaches to its core missions, and success will also depend on close relationships with partners, particularly the members of the joint team. The ideas in this concept form a basis for examination, experimentation, and capability development planning for building the Air Force of the future. We now face another of those crucial moments in time. The dynamic, complex future is already beginning to challenge us. It is time for this generation of Airmen to develop a way to succeed. We invite you to read about our concept and visualize how Air Force forces of the future may contribute to a strong National defense, support for our allies and partners, and a free and stable world for all.Contents: Concept for Future air Force Operations * Air Force Core Missions - 2035 * Implications * ConclusionWhile the AF Future Operating Concept portrays skilled Airmen employing advanced technology in innovative ways to deter and defeat adversaries, it also emphasizes that the nature of warfare will not change over the next two decades. War will remain a clash of wills between thinking adversaries, and it will occur in an environment of uncertainty and rapid change. However, the character of warfare is becoming far less predictable and more complex. No technology or technique will eliminate the metaphorical fog and friction of warfare, and no military advantage will go unchallenged by adversaries seeking to achieve their objectives and deny us ours. While war will remain an instrument of policy, with associated constraints/restraints and specified missions for military forces, navigating the relationship between policy and war will be even more challenging in the complex future.The AFSEA, which compiles the expert analyses of the future environment across the Department of Defense, Intelligence Community, and think tanks, highlights that the era in which the United States can project power globally essentially uncontested has ended. It identifies four emerging trends that are highly likely to characterize the future: increasing speed and proliferation of technological change, geopolitical instability, increasing scarcity of natural resources, and an increasingly important and vulnerable global commons. The AFSEA uses these trends to derive six emerging trends with implications for the Air Force: 1) adversaries' acquisition and development of capabilities to challenge the U.S.; 2) increasing importance or frequency of irregular, urban, humanitarian, and intelligence operations; 3) increasing challenges to deterrence; 4) energy costs; 5) exploiting new technology opportunities; and 6) challenges of climate change. The rapid pace of change occurring throughout the world acts as a common thread between these trends and implications, and compounds the uncertainty and complexity of the future environment.

This important report was issued by the Department of Defense in June 2019. The Indo-Pacific is the Department of Defense's priority theater. The United States is a Pacific nation; we are linked to our Indo-Pacific neighbors through unbreakable bonds of shared history, culture, commerce, and values. We have an enduring commitment to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific in which all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty and able to pursue economic growth consistent with accepted international rules, norms, and principles of fair competition. The continuity of our shared strategic vision is uninterrupted despite an increasingly complex security environment. Inter-state strategic competition, defined by geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions, is the primary concern for U.S. national security. In particular, the People's Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, seeks to reorder the region to its advantage by leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce other nations. In contrast, the Department of Defense supports choices that promote long-term peace and prosperity for all in the Indo-Pacific. We will not accept policies or actions that threaten or undermine the rules-based international order - an order that benefits all nations. We are committed to defending and enhancing these shared values.China's economic, political, and military rise is one of the defining elements of the 21st century. Today, the Indo-Pacific increasingly is confronted with a more confident and assertive China that is willing to accept friction in the pursuit of a more expansive set of political, economic, and security interests. Perhaps no country has benefited more from the free and open regional and international system than China, which has witnessed the rise of hundreds of millions from poverty to growing prosperity and security. Yet while the Chinese people aspire to free markets, justice, and the rule of law, the People's Republic of China (PRC), under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), undermines the international system from within by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously eroding the values and principles of the rules-based order.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. 1. Introduction * 1.1. America's Historic Ties to the Indo-Pacific * 1.2. Vision and Principles for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific * 2. Indo-Pacific Strategic Landscape: Trends and Challenges * 2.1. The People's Republic of China as a Revisionist Power * 2.2. Russia as a Revitalized Malign Actor * 2.3. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a Rogue State * 2.4. Prevalence of Transnational Challenges * 3. U.S. National Interests and Defense Strategy * 3.1. U.S. National Interests * 3.2. U.S. National Defense Strategy * 4. Sustaining U.S. Influence to Achieve Regional Objectives * 4.1. Line of Effort 1: Preparedness * 4.2. Line of Effort 2: Partnerships * 4.3. Line of Effort 3: Promoting a Networked Region * Conclusion

The inadequate definition of transformation in the April 2003 Department of Defense Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) has resulted in military transformation efforts not meeting national security objectives. Transformational concepts have led to emotional reactions throughout their introduction. The author analyzes strategy and transformation since the end of the cold war to show there exists institutional momentum to define transformation in terms of major combat operations and technology as a panacea. A paradox in transformation exists since the US military can only transform to meet the lower level of conflict if it retains its preeminence in major combat. The institutional momentum and paradox can only be solved if doctrine, concepts, and technology are developed in an orderly process and force transformation management is removed from the Pentagon. Analysis of the international security environment shows, though, that national-level transformation is required to end the Department of Defense's role as the first provider for any US crisis. Only through focused vision in Defense transformation can the US succeed in accomplishing future security objectives. This vision starts with a new definition of transformation, implements a transformation process, and bifurcates force and business practice transformation efforts. Through these recommendations, the Department of Defense will set the standard for national-level transformation.

Future War and the Defence of Europe offers a major new analysis of how peace and security can be maintained in Europe: a continent that has suffered two cataclysmic conflicts since 1914. Taking as its starting point the COVID-19 pandemic and way it will inevitably accelerate some key global dynamics already in play, the book goes on to weave history, strategy, policy, and technology into a compelling analytical narrative. It lays out in forensic detail the scale of the challenge Europeans and their allies face if Europe's peace is to be upheld in a transformative century. The book upends foundational assumptions about how Europe's defence is organised, the role of a fast-changing transatlantic relationship, NATO, the EU, and their constituent nation-states. At the heart of the book is a radical vision of a technology-enabling future European defence, built around a new kind of Atlantic Alliance, an innovative strategic public-private partnership, and the future hyper-electronic European force, E-Force, it must spawn. Europeans should be under no illusion: unless they do far more for their own defence, and very differently, all that they now take for granted could be lost in the maze of hybrid war, cyber war, and hyper war they must face.