Forced Federalism

Over the past twenty years, American Indian policy has shifted from self-determination to “Forced Federalism” as indigenous nations in the United States have encountered new threats from state and local tribes over such issues as taxation, gaming, and homeland security. This book demonstrates how today's indigenous nations have taken unprecedented steps to reorient themselves politically in response to such challenges to their sovereignty.

Classic Books Library presents this brand new edition of “The Federalist Papers”, a collection of separate essays and articles compiled in 1788 by Alexander Hamilton. Following the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776, the governing doctrines and policies of the States lacked cohesion. “The Federalist”, as it was previously known, was constructed by American statesman Alexander Hamilton, and was intended to catalyse the ratification of the United States Constitution. Hamilton recruited fellow statesmen James Madison Jr., and John Jay to write papers for the compendium, and the three are known as some of the Founding Fathers of the United States. Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755–1804) was an American lawyer, journalist and highly influential government official. He also served as a Senior Officer in the Army between 1799-1800 and founded the Federalist Party, the system that governed the nation’s finances. His contributions to the Constitution and leadership made a significant and lasting impact on the early development of the nation of the United States.

In the past few years, scholars in Political Science and American Indian Studies have identified a change in the relationship between Indian nations, the United States Government and state governments across the country. This important, and expanding, relationship in public policy making focuses on the devolution of public policy decisions from the federal/tribal level to an expanded state/tribal relationship (Corntassel and Witmer 2008, Steinman 2004). This paper first touches on the transition to the Forced Federalism era, beginning with the Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA). Second, we identify the types of legislation proposed and passed in the American states during this new era. Third, we consider a number of possible explanations for legislative activity including institutional, constituent, state/tribal relations and state political measures. Our findings suggest that states with an established institutional structure in their legislative and executive branches are more likely to propose and pass American Indian related legislation. Similar findings for constituent measures were evident, namely that the size and percentage of the population that is American Indian. Other explanatory factors such as whether a gaming compact had been signed, state political ideology, initiative and unified government were less likely to increase the number of proposed and passed legislation.

Challenging the myth that the federal government exercises exclusive control over U.S. foreign-policymaking, Michael J. Glennon and Robert D. Sloane propose that we recognize the prominent role that states and cities now play in that realm. Foreign Affairs Federalism provides the first comprehensive study of the constitutional law and practice of federalism in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. It could hardly be timelier. States and cities recently have limited greenhouse gas emissions, declared nuclear free zones and sanctuaries for undocumented immigrants, established thousands of sister-city relationships, set up informal diplomatic offices abroad, and sanctioned oppressive foreign governments. Exploring the implications of these and other initiatives, this book argues that the national interest cannot be advanced internationally by Washington alone. Glennon and Sloane examine in detail the considerable foreign affairs powers retained by the states under the Constitution and question the need for Congress or the president to step in to provide "one voice" in foreign affairs. They present concrete, realistic ways that the courts can update antiquated federalism precepts and untangle interwoven strands of international law, federal law, and state law. The result is a lucid, incisive, and up-to-date analysis of the rules that empower-and limit-states and cities abroad.

Alphabetic entries are used to discuss the people, court cases and events that exemplified federalist beliefs, or opposition to those beliefs.

This Article questions the experimental value of state immigration laws. Analyzing the Supreme Court's major decisions in this area, including Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, the Article explains why state immigration laws fail to satisfy two necessary conditions of effective experimentation: internalization and replication. When states internalize costs, other jurisdictions can effectively evaluate outcomes. Replication occurs when states take diverse approaches to common problems. Unfortunately, state immigration laws do not meet these criteria because states operate in a system of “forced federalism”: a division of power between the two levels of government in which subnational jurisdictions attempt to force the federal government to accept state-defined immigration enforcement schemes. But as states thrust their chosen levels of immigration control on the federal government, their potential to innovate on immigration matters is quite restricted. Essentially, forced federalism limits states to a narrow set of enforcement decisions based on federally defined norms -- far from the type of diverse testing associated with true innovation. Today's state immigration laws also fail to internalize costs -- another condition of successful subnational tests. Restrictionist states that encourage unauthorized immigrants to resettle in other jurisdictions export the economic damage they claim illegal immigration causes. In addition to economic spillovers, laboratory states export social costs to the nation by fundamentally altering the concept of a shared national identity. For example, when immigrants flee restrictionist states in order to avoid racial profiling or harassment, the national commitment to values such as egalitarianism and nondiscrimination is weakened. These harms are not confined to restrictionist states but are felt by the nation as a whole. Not all subjects are ripe for local experimentation and not all tests produce valid results. Despite the appealing image of states as laboratories, today's immigration experiments will not advance the nation's ongoing search for sounder immigration policies.

"As James Madison led America's effort to write its Constitution, he made two great inventions-the separation of powers and federalism. The first is more famous, but the second was most essential because, without federalism, there could have been no United States of America. Federalism has always been about setting the balance of power between the federal government and the states-and that's revolved around deciding just how much inequality the country was prepared to accept in exchange for making piece among often-warring states. Through the course of its history, the country has moved through a series of phases, some of which put more power into the hands of the federal government, and some rested more power in the states. Sometimes this rebalancing led to armed conflict. The Civil War, of course, almost split the nation permanently apart. And sometimes it led to political battles. By the end of the 1960s, however, the country seemed to have settled into a quiet agreement that inequality was a prime national concern, that the federal government had the responsibility for addressing it through its own policies, and that the states would serve as administrative agents of that policy. But as that agreement seemed set, federalism drifted from national debate, just as the states began using their administrative role to push in very different directions. The result has been a rising tide of inequality, with the great invention that helped create the nation increasingly driving it apart"--

Federalism and the Tug of War Within explores how constitutional interpreters reconcile the competing values that underpin American federalism, with real consequences for governance that require local and national collaboration. Drawing examples from Hurricane Katrina, climate governance, health care reform, and other problems of local and national authority, author Erin Ryan demonstrates how the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence can inhibit effective inter-jurisdictional governance by failing to navigate the tensions within federalism itself. The Constitution's dual sovereignty directive fosters an ideal set of good governance values, including checks and balances, accountability, local autonomy, and local and national synergy, that are nevertheless in constant competition. This inherent "tug of war" is responsible for the epic instability in the Court's federalism jurisprudence, but it is poorly understood. With new conceptual vocabulary to wrestle with old dilemmas, Ryan traces the development of federalism's tug of war, and proposes innovations to manage judicial, legislative, and executive efforts with more focus. Her analysis clarifies how the tug of war is already mediated through balancing, compromise, and negotiation. She proposes a Balanced Federalism model that mediates tensions on three separate planes: fostering balance among competing federalism values, leveraging the functional capacities of the three branches in interpreting federalism, and maximizing the wisdom of both state and federal actors in so doing. The new framework better harmonizes values that-though in tension-have made the American system of government so effective and enduring.

The chapters of this book have diverse origins. They were written over the period 1954-1984. Several (i.e., three, four, seven, and ten) were originally published in scholarly journals. Several (i.e., one, eight, nine, and eleven) are excerpts from my previous books: Soldiers of the States and Federalism: Origin, Operation and Significance. And several (i.e., two, five, and six) were written for conferences and are now published here for the first time. Despite the fact that this history suggests they are quite unrelated, these chapters do indeed center on one theme: the continuity of American federalism. In order to emphasize that theme, I have written an introduction and an initial commentary for each chapter. These commen taries, taken together, with the introduction, constitute the exposition of the theme. Some of these chapters (four, six, and ten) were written with my students, Ronald Schaps, John Lemco, and William Bast. They did much of the research and analysis so the credit for these chapters belongs to them as much as to me. Chapter five is based quite closely on William Paul Alexander's dissertation for the Ph. D. degree at the University of Rochester, 1973.