Fiscal Performance Institutional Design And Decentralization In European Union Countries

This paper analyzes the impact of decentralization on overall fiscal performance in the European Union, taking into account fiscal institutional arrangements. We find that spending decentralization has been associated with sizably better fiscal performance, especially when transfer dependency of subnational governments is low. However, subnational fiscal rules do not seem to be associated with better performance.

This publication has been produced as part of a capacity building programme to strengthen the ability of national statistical systems to collect subnational demographic, socio economic and fiscal data. This is important in the design of public policy options, particularly as subnational governments in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe become responsible for the delivery of local services. This publication contains case studies from five countries in Central and Eastern Europe that are at different stages of fiscal decentralisation (covering Bulgaria, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine).

This paper analyzes the impact of decentralization on overall fiscal performance in the European Union, taking into account fiscal institutional arrangements. We find that spending decentralization has been associated with sizably better fiscal performance, especially when transfer dependency of subnational governments is low. However, subnational fiscal rules do not seem to be associated with better performance.

Combining theoretical and empirical analysis this book explores the core issues of fiscal federalism in the European context.

This edited collection provides a comprehensive geographic and chronological overview of the decentralisation processes in the successor states of former Yugoslavia and Albania during their transition and EU integration years, from 1990 until 2016. These countries present a unique laboratory for the analysis of economic, social and political change, having traversed armed conflicts, dramatic economic and political changes, and EU pre-accession processes involving deep institutional reform. They have also endured the Eurozone crisis, which has led to high levels of unemployment, wide fiscal gaps and dangerously high levels of indebtedness. Observing the quarter century-long transition from socialism to capitalism through the prism of decentralisation sheds new light on studying the political economy of the region and the current status of the individual countries in terms of economic development and their EU integration progress. The contributors enrich the wider literature on fiscal decentralisation in transition countries by exploring several broad questions on democratisation, the political economy of post-communist transition, the role of external actors in policy transfer and the issue of financial stability in the post-crisis period.

This paper explores the impact of fiscal decentralization on fiscal policy performance in a large sample of advanced and developing economies. The findings suggest that a larger share of decentralized expenditure is associated with a stronger fiscal balance; however, fiscal decentralization can lead to more pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Thus, the design and pace of fiscal decentralization need to be tailored to the specificities of the economy. Countries that have already established strong accountablity and budget management capacity at the local level can benefit from fiscal decentralization. In contrast, in economies prone to large volatility from internal and external shocks, the central government may need to retain a sufficient share of expenditure and revenue to conduct counter-cyclical policies. Finally, the pace of expenditure and revenue decentralization should be aligned.

Does the European Union need closer fiscal integration, and in particular a stronger fiscal centre, to become more resilient to economic shocks? This book looks at the experience of 13 federal states to help inform the heated debate on this issue. It analyses in detail their practices in devolving responsibilities from the subnational to the central level, compares them to those of the European Union, and draws lessons for a possible future fiscal union in Europe. More specifically, this book tries to answer three sets of questions: What is the role of centralized fiscal policies in federations, and hence the size, features and functions of the central budget? What institutional arrangements are used to coordinate fiscal policy between the federal and subnational levels? What are the links between federal and subnational debt, and how have subnational financing crises been handled, when they occurred? These policy questions are critical in many federations, and central to the current discussions about future paths for the European Union. This book brings to the table new, practical insights through a systematic and comprehensive comparison of the EU fiscal framework with that of federal states. It also departs from the decentralization perspective that has been prominent in the literature by focusing on the role of the centre (which responsibilities are centralized at the federal level and how they are handled, rather than which functions belong to the local level). Such an approach is particularly relevant for the European Union, where a fiscal union would imply granting new powers to the centre.

This book examines the impacts of fiscal decentralization reforms on the efficiency of local governments in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. By offering a comparative perspective and by applying econometric methods and regression models, it analyses various reform trajectories and their effects on individual CEE countries. Furthermore, the book discusses input and output indicators for evaluating the efficiency of municipalities. Readers will learn about the common features of these countries, the impact of path dependence, and future prospects for decentralization reforms. In closing, the book discusses modern management and administration methods, opportunities for cooperation between municipalities, co-creative service delivery, and other measures that could improve the efficiency of public service provision.

The book tackles a key issue for the European Union: Fiscal Federalism. It evaluates the applicability of this theoretical perspective for the EU. Conversely, it pinpoints ways in which the diversity of existing fiscal settings and organisations, both at national and European levels, can throw light on the theory. The study analyses two of the most important European policies: Cohesion Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact. It compares the episode of German Unification to the 2004 European Enlargement. It pioneers a cross-country analysis of the various national fiscal settings. Finally, it highlights the close links between the dynamics of decision-making related to the main budgetary choices and the integration process. The questions raised are crucial in the current context of economic and institutional uncertainty: How should we apprehend the Cohesion Policy, the main expression of European solidarity? How can the coordination of national fiscal policies be improved? How are European countries and their regions organised in fiscal and budgetary terms? What lessons can the EU draw from its own fiscal past and from that of its Member States? Over and above the originality of the answers provided by the authors, the book suggests that it would be difficult to take the integration process further without first clarifying what Europe can, should or wants to do.