Financial Crises And Bank Liquidity Creation This Is An Old Wp That Has Been Split Into 2 Parts

Financial crises and bank liquidity creation are often connected. We examine this connection from two perspectives. First, we examine the aggregate liquidity creation of banks before, during, and after five major financial crises in the U.S. from 1984:Q1 to 2008:Q1. We uncover numerous interesting patterns, such as a significant build-up or drop-off of quot;abnormalquot; liquidity creation before each crisis, where quot;abnormalquot; is defined relative to a time trend and seasonal factors. Banking and market-related crises differ in that banking crises were preceded by abnormal positive liquidity creation, while market-related crises were generally preceded by abnormal negative liquidity creation. Bank liquidity creation has both decreased and increased during crises, likely both exacerbating and ameliorating the effects of crises. Off-balance sheet guarantees such as loan commitments moved more than on-balance sheet assets such as mortgages and business lending during banking crises.Second, we examine the effect of pre-crisis bank capital ratios on the competitive positions and profitability of individual banks during and after each crisis. The evidence suggests that high capital served large banks well around banking crises - they improved their liquidity creation market share and profitability during these crises and were able to hold on to their improved performance afterwards. In addition, high-capital listed banks enjoyed significantly higher abnormal stock returns than low-capital listed banks during banking crises. These benefits did not hold or held to a lesser degree around market-related crises and in normal times. In contrast, high capital ratios appear to have helped small banks improve their liquidity creation market share during banking crises, market-related crises, and normal times alike, and the gains in market share were sustained afterwards. Their profitability improved during two crises and subsequent to virtually every crisis. Similar results were observed during normal times for small banks.

Bank Liquidity Creation and Financial Crises delivers a consistent, logical presentation of bank liquidity creation and addresses questions of research and policy interest that can be easily understood by readers with no advanced or specialized industry knowledge. Authors Allen Berger and Christa Bouwman examine ways to measure bank liquidity creation, how much liquidity banks create in different countries, the effects of monetary policy (including interest rate policy, lender of last resort, and quantitative easing), the effects of capital, the effects of regulatory interventions, the effects of bailouts, and much more. They also analyze bank liquidity creation in the US over the past three decades during both normal times and financial crises. Narrowing the gap between the "academic world" (focused on theories) and the "practitioner world" (dedicated to solving real-world problems), this book is a helpful new tool for evaluating a bank's performance over time and comparing it to its peer group. Explains that bank liquidity creation is a more comprehensive measure of a bank's output than traditional measures and can also be used to measure bank liquidity Describes how high levels of bank liquidity creation may cause or predict future financial crises Addresses questions of research and policy interest related to bank liquidity creation around the world and provides links to websites with data and other materials to address these questions Includes such hot-button topics as the effects of monetary policy (including interest rate policy, lender of last resort, and quantitative easing), the effects of capital, the effects of regulatory interventions, and the effects of bailouts

One important cause of the 2007-2009 crisis was illiquidity combined with exposure of many financial institutions to liquidity needs. But what is liquidity and why is it so important for financial institutions to command enough liquidity? This book brings together classic articles and recent contributions to this important field.

This paper develops a model that focuses on the interaction of liquidity creation by financial intermediaries with capital flows and exchange rate collapses. The intermediaries’ role of transforming maturities is shown to result in larger movements of capital and a higher probability of crisis. These movements resemble the observed cycle in capital flows: large inflows, crisis and abrupt outflows. The model highlights how adverse productivity and international interest rate shocks may trigger a sudden outflow of capital and an exchange collapse. The initial shock is magnified by the behavior of individual foreign investors linked through their deposits in the intermediaries. The expectation of an eventual exchange rate crisis links investors’ behavior even further.

The interventions of crisis management during the 2007 to 2011 financial crisis were not simply responses to a set of given developments in markets, banking or neo-liberal capitalism. Nor can those interventions be adequately explained as the actions of sovereign state officials and institutions. Instead, Langley argues, processes of crisis governance are shown to have established six principal technical problems to be acted upon: liquidity, toxicity, solvency, risk, regulation, and debt and that the governance of these technical problems, is shown to have been strategically assembled in order to secure the continuation of a particular, financialized way of life that depends upon global financial circulations. Contributing to interdisciplinary debates in cultural economy and the social studies of finance, and grounded in extensive empirical research, this book offers an innovative analysis of how the contemporary global financial crisis was governed. Through an exploration of the interventions made by central banks, treasuries, and regulatory authorities in the Anglo-American heartland of the crisis between 2007 and 2011, experimental and strategic apparatuses of crisis governance are shown to have emerged. These discrete apparatuses established the six technical problems to be acted upon, but also shared certain proclivities and preferences. Crisis governance assembled discourses and devices of economy in relation with sovereign monetary, fiscal, and regulatory techniques, and elicited an affective atmosphere of confidence. It also sought to secure the financialized way of life which turns on the opportunities ostensibly afforded by uncertain financial circulations, and gave rise to post-crisis technical fixes designed to advance the resilience of banking and the macro-prudential regulation of financial stability. Thus, the consensus that prevails across economics, political economy, and beyond - wherein sovereign state institutions are cast as coming to the rescue of the markets, banking, or neo-liberal capitalism - conceals a great deal more than it reveals about the governance of the global financial crisis.

One of the lessons learned from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–9 is that minimum capital requirements are a necessary but inadequate safeguard for the stability of an intermediary. Despite the high levels of capitalization of many banks before the crisis, they too experienced serious difficulties due to insufficient liquidity buffers. Thus, for the first time, after the GFC regulators realized that liquidity risk can jeopardize the orderly functioning of a bank and, in some cases, its survival. Previously, the risk did not receive the same attention by regulators at the international level as other types of risk including credit, market, and operational risks. The GFC promoted liquidity risk to a significant place in regulatory reform, introducing uniform international rules and best practices. The literature has studied the potential effects of the new liquidity rules on the behaviour of banks, the financial system, and the economy as a whole. This book provides a comprehensive understanding of the bank liquidity crisis that occurred during the GFC, of the liquidity regulatory reform introduced by the Basel Committee with the Basel III Accord, and its implications both at the micro and macroeconomic levels. Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore contributed to the funding of this research project and its publication.

In the ongoing financial crisis, policy makers have for the most part appeared to be reactive, formulating emergency solutions as events unfold. However, in contrast to their performance during the Great Depression, central banks around the world, led by the Federal Reserve, acted decisively following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and provided huge injections of liquidity into the financial markets, thereby preventing a far worse outcome. International Liquidity and the Financial Crisis compares the 2008 crisis with the disaster of 1931 and explores the similarities and differences. It considers the lasting effects of the crisis on international liquidity, the possibilities for an international lender of last resort, and the enlargement of the International Monetary Fund after the crisis. It shows that there is no clear demarcation between monetary and macro-prudential policies, and discusses how central banks need to adapt to a new environment in which global liquidity is much scarcer.

The banking crises in 2007-10 are not exceptional. There have been many such crises in the past in both developed countries and emerging economies. A banking crisis can be related to solvency or liquidity (or both). This book focuses on banking crisis and liquidity. This book starts from basics and gradually builds up with very few technicalities. Though the analysis is primarily theoretical, we provide a historical background, a macroeconomic perspective, and policy implications for both closed and open economies.

This book analyses the logic of applying the American Post-Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) to the financial crisis of 2007–08. Arguing that most theories of financial crisis, including Minsky’s own, only describe events, but do not actually explain them, the book surveys theories of financial crisis that have been developed to describe instability in the post-WW2 US financial system and analyses them in their historical context. The book argues that explanation of the financial crisis of 2007–08 should involve interpretation of the concept of 'risk', which guides the construction and pricing of contemporary financial products such as derivatives and asset backed securities, as a form of 'liquidity', the concept that Minsky sought to explain the financial crises of the 1970s and 1980s with. The book highlights the continuing relevance of Minsky’s theory of liquidity crisis as "immanent", in a historical sense, to the products and trading practices of modern finance, because these products were developed to obviate the crisis dynamics that Minsky described. Minsky's FIH can therefore inform historical understanding of the crisis of 2007–08 but is not directly explanatory itself. The book explores explanation of the financial crisis of 2007–08 interpreting 'liquidity', in practical historical terms, as involving a process of development out of prior crisis dynamics. Seeking to contribute to debates over the causes of the financial crisis of 2007–08 by blending a discussion of historicizing philosophy, economic theory and contemporary financial banking and trading practices this work will be of great interest to scholars of international political economy, heterodox economics and critical theory.