Filibusters And Cloture In The Senate

The filibuster is widely viewed as one of the Senate's most characteristic procedural features. Filibustering includes any use of dilatory or obstructive tactics to block a measure by preventing it from coming to a vote. The possibility of filibusters exists because Senate rules place few limits on Senators' rights and opportunities in the legislative process. In particular, a Senator who seeks recognition usually has a right to the floor if no other Senator is speaking, and then that Senator may speak for as long as he or she wishes. Also, there is no motion by which a simple majority of the Senate can stop a debate and allow itself to vote in favor of an amendment, a bill or resolution, or most other debatable questions. Most bills, indeed, are potentially subject to at least two filibusters before the Senate votes on final passage: first, a filibuster on a motion to proceed to the bill's consideration and, second, after the Senate agrees to this motion, a filibuster on the bill itself. Senate Rule XXII, however, known as the cloture rule, enables Senators to end a filibuster on any debatable matter the Senate is considering. Sixteen Senators initiate this process by presenting a motion to end the debate. In most circumstances, the Senate does not vote on this cloture motion until the second day of session after the motion is made. Then, it requires the votes of at least three-fifths of all Senators (normally 60 votes) to invoke cloture. (Invoking cloture on a proposal to amend the Senate's standing rules requires the support of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting, whereas cloture on nominations other than to the U.S. Supreme Court requires a numerical majority.) The primary effect of invoking cloture on most questions is to impose a maximum of 30 additional hours for considering that question. This 30-hour period for consideration encompasses all time consumed by roll call votes, quorum calls, and other actions, as well as the time used for debate. Under cloture, as well, the only amendments Senators can offer are ones that are germane and were submitted in writing before the cloture vote took place. Finally, the presiding officer also enjoys certain additional powers under cloture such as, for example, the power to count to determine whether a quorum is present and to rule amendments, motions, and other actions out of order on the grounds that they are dilatory. The ability of Senators to engage in filibusters has a profound and pervasive effect on how the Senate conducts its business on the floor. In the face of a threatened filibuster, for example, the majority leader may decide not to call a bill up for floor consideration or to defer calling it up if there are other, equally important bills the Senate can consider and pass with less delay. Similarly, the prospect of a filibuster can persuade a bill's proponents to accept changes in the bill that they do not support but that are necessary to prevent an actual filibuster. This report concentrates on the operation of cloture under the general provisions of Senate Rule XXII, paragraph 2. It identifies modifications (including temporary ones) in rules governing debate agreed to at the beginning of the 113th Congress, but the detailed provisions of these changes are addressed in CRS Report R42996, Changes to Senate Procedures at the Start of the 113th Congress Affecting the Operation of Cloture (S.Res. 15 and S.Res. 16), by Elizabeth Rybicki. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents: (1) Right to Debate: Right to Recognition; Right to Speak at Length and the Two-Speech Rule; Motion to Table; (2) Conduct of Filibusters (FB): Germaneness of Debate; Yielding the Floor and Yielding for Questions; Quorums and Quorum Calls; Roll Call Voting; Scheduling FB; (3) Invoking Cloture (CL): When CL May be Invoked: Timing of CL Motions; (4) Effects of Invoking CL: Time for Consid¿n. and Debate; Offering Amend. and Motions: Germane Amend. Only; Amend. in Writing; Multiple Amend.; Dilatory Amend. and Motions; Reading and Division of Amend.; Authority of the Presiding Officer; Bus. on the Senate Floor; (5) Impact of FB: Impact on the Time for Consid¿n.; Prospect of a FB: Holds; Linkage and Leverage; Consensus. Ill.

The filibuster is widely viewed as one of the Senate's most characteristic procedural features. Filibustering includes any use of dilatory or obstructive tactics to block a measure by preventing it from coming to a vote. The possibility of filibusters exists because Senate rules place few limits on Senators' rights and opportunities in the legislative process. In particular, a Senator who seeks recognition usually has a right to the floor if no other Senator is speaking, and then that Senator may speak for as long as he or she wishes. Also, there is no motion by which a simple majority of the Senate can stop a debate and allow itself to vote in favor of an amendment, a bill or resolution, or most other debatable questions. Most bills, indeed, are potentially subject to at least two filibusters before the Senate votes on final passage: first, a filibuster on a motion to proceed to the bill's consideration and, second, after the Senate agrees to this motion, a filibuster on the bill itself. Senate Rule XXII, however, known as the cloture rule, enables Senators to end a filibuster on any debatable matter the Senate is considering. Sixteen Senators initiate this process by presenting a motion to end the debate. In most circumstances, the Senate does not vote on this cloture motion until the second day of session after the motion is made. Then, it requires the votes of at least three-fifths of all Senators, i.e. 60 votes, to invoke cloture. Invoking cloture on a proposal to amend the Senate's standing rules requires the support of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting, whereas cloture on nominations requires a numerical majority. The primary effect of invoking cloture on most questions is to impose a maximum of 30 additional hours for considering that question. This 30-hour period for consideration encompasses all time consumed by roll call votes, quorum calls, and other actions, as well as the time used for debate. Under cloture, as well, the only amendments Senators can offer are ones that are germane and were submitted in writing before the cloture vote took place. Finally, the presiding officer also enjoys certain additional powers under cloture such as, for example, the power to count to determine whether a quorum is present and to rule amendments, motions, and other actions out of order on the grounds that they are dilatory. The ability of Senators to engage in filibusters has a profound and pervasive effect on how the Senate conducts its business on the floor. In the face of a threatened filibuster, for example, the majority leader may decide not to call a bill up for floor consideration or may defer calling it up if there are other, equally important bills the Senate can consider and pass with less delay. Similarly, the prospect of a filibuster can persuade a bill's proponents to accept changes in the bill that they do not support but that are necessary to prevent an actual filibuster. This report concentrates on the operation of cloture under the general provisions of Senate Rule XXII, paragraph 2, though it also identifies key modifications to its application in recent years. This report will be updated as events warrant.

The right of Senators to speak on the floor at great lengthâ€"and so to filibusterâ€"is the single most defining characteristic of the Senate as a legislative body. The possibility of filibusters derives from the absence of any effective Senate rules that limit the number or length of floor speeches. The Senate's rules provide that, in most cases, a Senator who seeks recognition has a right to the floor if no other Senator is speaking, and that Senator then may speak for as long as he or she wishes. There is no motion by which a simple majority of the Senate can stop a debate and allow the Senate to vote in favor of an amendment, a bill or resolution, or any other debatable question. Almost every bill actually is subject to two potential filibusters before the Senate votes on whether to pass it: first, a filibuster on a motion to proceed to the bill's consideration; and second, after the Senate agrees to this motion, a filibuster on the bill itself. Senate Rule XXII enables Senators to end a filibuster by invoking cloture on whatever debatable matter it is considering. Sixteen Senators initiate this process by presenting a motion to end the debate. The Senate does not vote on this cloture motion until the second day after the day on which the motion is made. Then it usually requires the votes of at least three-fifths of all Senators, or at least 60 votes, to invoke cloture. Invoking cloture on a proposal to amend the Senate's standing rules requires the support of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting. The primary effect of invoking cloture on a question is to impose a maximum of 30 additional hours for considering that question. This 30-hour period for consideration encompasses all time consumed by rollcall votes, quorum calls, and other actions, as well as the time used for debate. During this 30-hour period, each Senator may speak for no more than one hour apiece (although several Senators can have additional time yielded to them). Under cloture, the only amendments that Senators can offer are amendments that are germane and that were submitted in writing before the cloture vote took place. The presiding officer also enjoys certain additional powers under cloture: for example, to count to determine whether a quorum is present, and to rule amendments, motions, and other actions out of order on the grounds that they are dilatory. The ability of Senators to engage in filibusters has a profound and pervasive effect on how the Senate conducts its business on the floor. In the face of a threatened filibuster, for example, the majority leader may decide not to call a bill up for floor consideration, or to defer calling it up if there are other, equally important bills that the Senate can consider and pass without undue delay. Similarly, the prospect of a filibuster can persuade a bill's proponents to accept changes in the bill that they do not support but that are necessary to prevent the threat of a filibuster from becoming a reality. In January 2001, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 8, adjusting the Senate's organization and procedures during the 107th Congress. Discussions of pertinent provisions of this resolution appear in italics.

In the modern Congress, one of the highest hurdles for major bills or nominations is gaining the sixty votes necessary to shut off a filibuster in the Senate. But this wasn’t always the case. Both citizens and scholars tend to think of the legislative process as a game played by the rules in which votes are the critical commodity—the side that has the most votes wins. In this comprehensive volume,Gregory Koger shows, on the contrary, that filibustering is a game with slippery rules in which legislators who think fast and try hard can triumph over superior numbers. Filibustering explains how and why obstruction has been institutionalized in the U.S. Senate over the last fifty years, and how this transformation affects politics and policymaking. Koger also traces the lively history of filibustering in the U.S. House during the nineteenth century and measures the effects of filibustering—bills killed, compromises struck, and new issues raised by obstruction. Unparalleled in the depth of its theory and its combination of historical and political analysis, Filibustering will be the definitive study of its subject for years to come.

Report that discusses major aspects of Senate procedure related to filibusters and cloture.

Special rules enable the Senate to act despite the filibuster. Sometimes. Most people believe that, in today's partisan environment, the filibuster prevents the Senate from acting on all but the least controversial matters. But this is not exactly correct. In fact, the Senate since the 1970s has created a series of special rules—described by Molly Reynolds as “majoritarian exceptions”—that limit debate on a wide range of measures on the Senate floor. The details of these exemptions might sound arcane and technical, but in practice they have enabled the Senate to act even when it otherwise seemed paralyzed. Important examples include procedures used to pass the annual congressional budget resolution, enact budget reconciliation bills, review proposals to close military bases, attempt to prevent arms sales, ratify trade agreements, and reconsider regulations promulgated by the executive branch. Reynolds argues that these procedures represent a key instrument of majority party power in the Senate. They allow the majority—even if it does not have the sixty votes needed to block a filibuster—to produce policies that will improve its future electoral prospects, and thus increase the chances it remains the majority party. As a case study, Exceptions to the Rule examines the Senate's role in the budget reconciliation process, in which particular congressional committees are charged with developing procedurally protected proposals to alter certain federal programs in their jurisdictions. Created as a way of helping Congress work through tricky budget issues, the reconciliation process has become a powerful tool for the majority party to bypass the minority and adopt policy changes in hopes that it will benefit in the next election cycle.

The filibuster is widely viewed as one of the Senate's most characteristic procedural features. Filibustering includes any use of dilatory or obstructive tactics to block a measure by preventing it from coming to a vote. The possibility of filibusters exists because Senate rules place few limits on Senators' rights and opportunities in the legislative process. In particular, a Senator who seeks recognition usually has a right to the floor if no other Senator is speaking, and then may speak for as long as he or she wishes. Also, there is no motion by which a simple majority of the Senate can stop a debate and allow the Senate to vote in favor of an amendment, a bill or resolution, or any other debatable question. Almost every bill actually is subject to two potential filibusters before the Senate votes on whether to pass it: first, a filibuster on a motion to proceed to the bill's consideration; and second, after the Senate agrees to this motion, a filibuster on the bill itself....

Is American democracy being derailed by the United States Senate filibuster? Is the filibuster an important right that improves the political process or an increasingly partisan tool that delays legislation and thwarts the will of the majority? Are century-old procedures in the Senate hampering the institution from fulfilling its role on the eve of the 21st century? The filibuster has achieved almost mythic proportions in the history of American politics, but it has escaped a careful, critical assessment for more than 50 years. In this book, Sarah Binder and Steven Smith provide such an assessment as they address the problems and conventional wisdom associated with the Senate's long-standing tradition of extended debate. The authors examine the evolution of the rules governing Senate debate, analyze the consequences of these rules, and evaluate reform proposals. They argue that in an era of unprecedented filibustering and related obstructionism, old habits are indeed undermining the Senate's ability to meet its responsibilities. Binder and Smith scrutinize conventional wisdom about the filibuster—and show that very little of it is true. They focus on five major myths: that unlimited debate is a fundamental right to differentiate the Senate from the House of Representatives; that the Senate's tradition as a deliberative body requires unlimited debate; that the filibuster is reserved for a few issues of the utmost national importance; that few measures are actually killed by the filibuster; and that senators resist changing the rules because of a principled commitment to deliberation. In revising conventional wisdom about the filibuster, Binder and Smith contribute to ongoing debates about the dynamics of institutional change in the American political system. The authors conclude by suggesting reforms intended to enhance the power of determined majorities while preserving the rights of chamber minorities. They advocate, for example, lowering the