Executive Remuneration The Tate Lyle Plc Case Study

Doctoral Thesis / Dissertation from the year 2014 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 72%, Aston University (Business School), course: MSc in Accounting and Finance, language: English, abstract: This report provides an analysis and evaluation over the executive remuneration issues. The basic issues in this report raised the public debate and the academic literature findings over the misalignment between the pay and performance and the level of executives’ emoluments. In order to provide a more specific and practical perspective of the issues raised, this project used a case study of Tate & Lyle plc. and its main competitor Associated British Foods plc. Methods of analysis include the review over the UK corporate governance evolution on executive remuneration matters. The second part of the review is based on the academic literature review. Furthermore, the internal structure of both companies and the level of salaries in the hierarchy give an explanation over the level of the executive emoluments. Moreover, the structure of the executive remuneration is approved in both companies by the majority of the shareholders and there is evidence that the short-term and long-term performance of the companies have an important effect on executives’ salary. Last but not least, there is evidence that the executive remuneration is almost the same across the same industry even if the performance between two companies is different. The report finds that both companies are in line with UK corporate governance code guidelines and aligned pay with performance. However, there are not adequate case studies through different industries in order to have a more precise information over the relationship between pay and performance of other companies. The major area of weakness on the academic literature is the lack of case studies which can provide more detailed information of practical implementations of the Code and academic literature. Moreover, the institutions and most of the academic research is based on using average figures based on the FTSE100, FTSE250 and FTSE350 Indexes. The report also investigates the fact that the analysis conducted has limitations. Some of the limitations include the lack of ABF’s annual report for 2014. In order to overpass this difficulty, this project used the annual report of 2013 for both companies. Another limitation was the lack of case studies over the executive remuneration issues based on certain companies rather than the average trend of an Index. Last but not least, there was no other case study of a company over the executive remuneration issues in order to use the methodology.

The compensation packages of a growing proportion of firms include pay schemes that are linked to employee or company performance, yet little is known about the patterns of performance related pay. This book compares US and European CEOs to investigate the evolution of executive compensation, its controversies, and its resulting regulations.

After the Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom debacles, we all know what can happen when executives go wild. Creative accounting, inflated pay, runaway perks-and a downward spiral of the companies they run.

A definitive road map to help companies assess and refine their executive reward strategies. Responsible pay has become inextricably linked with corporate governance and long-term shareholder value creation. Responsible Executive Compensation for a New Era of Accountability shows you how to revamp your executive compensation programs to drive shareholder value creation while adhering to the high standards of the new corporate governance environment. Packed with case studies, diagnostics, and contributions from world-renowned experts in executive compensation, this vital resource offers a comprehensive overview of the critical issues affecting executive compensation practice and theory during this new era. Order your copy today!

The numerous incentive approaches and combinations and their implications can be dizzying even to the compensation professional. Pay for Results provides a road map for developing and implementing executive incentives that drive business needs and strategy. It is filled with specific analytic tools, including tables, exhibits, forms, checklists. In addition, it uncovers myths in performance measurement strategy and design. Timely and thorough, this book expertly shows businesses how to drive their specific needs and strategy. Human resources and compensation officers will discover how to apply performance metrics that align with shareholder investment.

Executive pay remains a contentious topic for many organizations. Unfortunately for company executives, much of the writing about it is either sensationalist or highly academic; none of it much help to the reader looking for a balanced and informed view of the subject. Sandy Pepper provides company executives, investors, and advisers with a summary of the main theories (from economics, game theory and the behavioural sciences) and best practices (in corporate governance, tax, accounting, compliance and so on) that relate to the compensation of senior executives. He also reviews the current state of corporate governance as it affects executive reward in Europe and the US. And he backs the text up with case study examples. Senior Executive Reward is an intelligent, practical and balanced explanation of the basis on which modern executives are compensated - and why. It is must-have reading for anyone who is interested in the complex and often controversial topic of executive pay, particularly remuneration committee members, professional advisers and senior executives anxious to understand for themselves (and explain to others) the basis on which they are rewarded.

Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.

ïBased on extensive interviews with those directly involved in the executive pay setting process _ executives themselves, remuneration committee members, remuneration consultants, and institutional investors _ this excellent study finally explains how, despite repeated regulation over the past twenty years in both the UK and Australia, limits on the amount executives get paid, and a clear relationship between pay and performance remain as elusive as ever. Dr. SheehanÍs study suggests that by targeting the pay setting process rather than pay itself, regulation may have contributed, albeit unintentionally, to the endless upward ratcheting of absolute levels of executive pay.Í _ John Roberts, University of Sydney, Australia ïFor those that believe executive remuneration in the UK and Australia is too high and poorly aligned with company performance, this book provides an excellent analytical framework and strong arguments in favor of greater shareholder oversight of remuneration practices and pay levels. It is well-written, carefully argued and persuasive in its treatment of the subject. I wholeheartedly recommend it.Í _ Randall S. Thomas, Vanderbilt University Law School, US In this timely book, Kym Sheehan examines the regulatory technique known as ïsay on payÍ _ where shareholders vote on executive compensation in an annual, advisory vote on the remuneration report. Using the model of the regulated remuneration cycle, and drawing upon evidence of its operation from interviews, voting data and remuneration reports from UK and Australian companies, the book demonstrates whether say on pay can operate successfully to both constrain executive greed and ensure accountability exists for company performance and decision-making. The Regulation of Executive Compensation is essential reading for corporate governance academics, remuneration consultants, company directors, regulators, pension and superannuation fund trustees and unions. Politicians and their policy advisers, lawyers, accountants and anyone concerned about the corporate governance of listed companies will find much to interest them in this detailed study.