Exchange Rate Based Stabilization In Western Europe

This paper compares the experience with exchange-rate–based stabilization (ERBS) of four Western European countries with that of high-inflation developing countries. In general, the behavior of key macroeconomic variables—inflation, output, demand, the real exchange rate and the current account—in the four countries examined did not correspond to the pattern observed in developing countries, although some resemblance to this pattern could be found in Italy in 1987–92 and Greece in 1994–96. The experience with ERBS in Western Europe highlights the importance of incomes policy as an ingredient of a successful stabilization program and shows that the adoption of a looser anchor does not necessarily reduce the output cost of disinflation.

This paper compares the experience with exchange-rate-based stabilization (ERBS) of four Western European countries with that of high-inflation developing countries. In general, the behavior of key macroeconomic variables inflation, output, demand, the real exchange rate and the current account in the four countries examined did not correspond to the pattern observed in developing countries, although some resemblance to this pattern could be found in Italy in 1987-92 and Greece in 1994-96. The experience with ERBS in Western Europe highlights the importance of incomes policy as an ingredient of a successful stabilization program and shows that the adoption of a looser anchor does not necessarily reduce the output cost of disinflation.

In high inflation economies exchange- rate- based stabilizations typically start with a boom, with the recession coming later. In contrast, in similar programs in the moderate inflation European economies, the recession generally appears upfront. When such programs result in a boom, it is driven by different forces than in the high inflation economies.

Emerging Europe was particularly hard hit by the global financial crisis, but a concerted effort by local policymakers and the international community staved off impending financial meltdown and laid the foundations for renewed convergence with western Europe. This book, written by staff of the IMF's European Department that worked on the region at the time, provides a unique account of events: the origins of the crisis and the precrisis policy setting; the crisis trigger and the scramble to avoid the worst; the stabilization and recovery; the remaining challenges; and the lessons for the future. Five regional chapters provide the analytics to put events into perspective. Dedicated chapters for all 19 countries of the region dig deeper into the idiosyncrasies of each economy and provide extensive economic data. A final chapter distills the lessons from the overall regional experience and the wide intraregional diversity. Taken together, they make this book an indispensible reference for economic scholars of the region and beyond.

This is the first history of finance - broadly defined to include money, banking, capital markets, public and private finance, international transfers etc. - that covers Western Europe (with an occasional glance at the western hemisphere) and half a millennium. Charles Kindleberger highlights the development of financial institutions to meet emerging needs, and the similarities and contrasts in the handling of financial problems such as transferring resources from one country to another, stimulating investment, or financing war and cleaning up the resulting monetary mess. The first half of the book covers money, banking and finance from 1450 to 1913; the second deals in considerably finer detail with the twentieth century. This major work casts current issues in historical perspective and throws light on the fascinating, and far from orderly, evolution of financial institutions and the management of financial problems. Comprehensive, critical and cosmopolitan, this book is both an outstanding work of reference and essential reading for all those involved in the study and practice of finance, be they economic historians, financial experts, scholarly bankers or students of money and banking. This groundbreaking work was first published in 1984.

Do exchange-rate-based stabilizations generate distinctive economic dynamics? To address this question, this paper identifies stabilization episodes using criteria that differ from those in previous empirical studies of exchange-rate-based stabilizations. We find that, while some differences can be detected between exchange-rate-based stabilizations and stabilizations where the exchange rate is not the anchor, the behavior of important variables does not appear to differ—especially output growth, which is good in both cases. There is also no evidence that fiscal discipline is enhanced by adopting an exchange-rate anchor, or that there are any systematic differences in the success records of stabilizations that use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor and those that do not.

Revised and updated throughout, this brilliant survey of European financial history from the earliest times to the present by internationally renowned scholar and author Charles P. Kindleberger offers a comprehensive account of the evolution of money in Western Europe, bimetallism and theemergence of the gold standard, the banking systems of the Continent and the British Isles, and overviews of foreign investment, regional and global financial integration, and private and public finance in Western Europe. The new edition features expanded coverage of the sixteenth and seventeenthcenturies and important new material on recent developments in European monetary integration.