Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Eelv Program

In 1994, the National Space Transportation Policy laid the framework for appropriate government agencies to maintain strong launch systems and infrastructure while modernizing space transportation capabilities and encouraging cost reductions. More than a decade later, through combined Department of Defense (DoD) and industrial investment, the two Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) families of U.S. rockets (Atlas V and Delta IV) have proved to be maturing, reliable state-of-the-art technologies. In 2004, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a panel of experts with extensive space launch and operations background to address the future National Security Space launch requirements and the means of meeting those requirements. DoD selected RAND to facilitate and support this panel in its deliberations between May 2005 and May 2006. This report analyzes the National Security Space (NSS) Launch Requirements Panel's major findings and recommendations. In short, the Panel concludes that, because basic rocketry principles, use of chemically derived thrust, and multiple expendable stages seem certain to remain the design of choice for operational space launch vehicles, the EELV can satisfy all known and projected NSS requirements through 2020.

The EIS was prepared to analyze the potential environmental consequences of the Proposed Action and No-Action Alternative. The Proposed Action is to allow the addition of up to five strap-on solid rocket motors (SRMs) to the Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC) Atlas V Launch vehicle and to allow the use of larger SRMs on the Boeing Delta IV launch vehicle, both of which are part of the EELV program. The launch locations for the Atlas V and Delta IV systems are Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Brevard County, Florida, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, in Santa Barbara County, California. For the analysis of the FSEIS, each contractor is assumed to launch approximately 50 percent of EELV flights involving SRMs (approximately 30 launches per year total). The No-Action Alternative is the previously approved implementation of the EELV program that was analyzed in the 1998 FEIS.

The EIS was prepared to analyze the potential environmental consequences of the Proposed Action and No-Action Alternative. The Proposed Action is the development, deployment, and operation of EELV systems. EELV systems would replace current Atlas 2A, Delta 2, and Titan 4B launch systems and are intended to meet the requirements of the U.S. Government National Executable Mission Model (NMM), both medium and heavy lift, at a lower launch cost than the present expendable launch systems. The launch locations for the program are Cape Canaveral Air Station, Brevard County, Florida, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Santa Barbara County, California. Under the Proposed Action, three concepts were examined. Concepts A and B depict each of the two EELV contractor concepts. The number of launches analyzed for each concept includes the government NMM, plus 16 commercial launches per year. Under Concept A/B, it is assumed that both contractors would complete development and operate EELV systems. For the analysis, each contractor is assumed to launch 50 percent of the combined total of EELV flights. The No-Action Alternative would be a decision not to proceed with the EELV program and continue with Atlas 2A, Delta 2, and Titan 4B launches to meet the requirements of the NMM.

The Department of Defense's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program is the primary provider of launch vehicles for U. S. military and intelligence satellites, as well as some civil and commercial satellites. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) plan to spend about $15 billion to acquire launch services from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2017; however, the life-cycle costs for the program are unknown. In 2009, the Commander Air Force Space Command and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) determined that the current approach for acquiring EELV launch vehicles was likely not the best business model and decided that a new acquisition strategy needed to be developed. In March 2011, the Secretary of the Air Force created a new executive position, the Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Space Launch, responsible for, among other things, spearheading the effort to finalize the new EELV acquisition strategy. To inform the strategy, DOD conducted or commissioned various studies to evaluate alternatives to the current program structure, assessing the U. S. government's access to space, analyzing options to leverage commercial and foreign capabilities, identifying possible cost reductions in the program, and evaluating the current business model. The new PEO for Space Launch states he is leading several recent and ongoing efforts to gain additional knowledge to inform the new acquisition strategy. Given anticipated changes in the acquisition strategy and potential changes in the broader launch landscape, we were asked to report on 1) whether DOD has the knowledge it needs to develop a new EELV acquisition strategy and 2) issues that could benefit future launch acquisitions. To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed information contained in five recent launch studies, and interviewed study leaders or participants in three of the five studies; we analyzed historical launch data and expected launch vehicle demand, and reviewed pas launch industry studies of the U. S. industrial base. We assess a supplier survey conducted by the EELV prime contractor of its subcontractors. The survey was used by the government to gauge the health of the U.S. industrial base. We reviewed the survey questionnaire, comparing methods to GAO sound survey development practices, comparing summary data to the questions asked, and interviewing and obtaining information and summary data from the surveyors. We also interviewed or obtained perspectives from launch officials in various military, intelligence, and civilian government agencies, as well as the EELV prime contractor and two commercial launch companies. Through our review of DOD launch studies and other relevant government and industry reports, our interviews with DOD, NASA, and contractor officials, and information obtained from NRO, we identified issues that may be important to current and future government launch acquisitions. We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to September 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOD began the EELV program in 1995 to provide a new generation of launch vehicles to ensure affordable access to space for government satellites. It resulted in two families of commercially owned and operated launch vehicles Boeing's Delta IV and Lockheed Martin's Atlas V.

The DoD plans to spend $27 billion acquiring launch services through the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program over the next 12 years. It uses 2 families of commercially owned and operated vehicles to launch satellites. The EELV program has undergone significant changes, including: adoption of a new acquisition strategy that sought to ensure the viability of the two EELV launch vehicle providers, Boeing and Lockheed Martin; the subsequent decision by those two co. to form a joint venture, the ULA; and a 10-year increase in the life of the program. This report: determines what uncertainties DoD faces in the EELV program and in the transition to ULA; and assesses how DoD is positioned to manage and oversee the effort. Illustrations.