Evaluation Of Selected Features Of Us Nuclear Nonproliferation Law And Policy

Evaluation of Selected Features of U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Law and Policy

Recent changes in U.S. nuclear nonproliferation law and policy focus heavily on curbing the capability of nations to produce nuclear weapons. The 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act attempts to provide a balance of controls and incentives directed toward discouraging other nations from developing fuel-cycle capabilities that would provide independent access to plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the two indispensable ingredients of nuclear weapons. With the emergence of foreign enrichment capabilities, U.S. reliance on its uranium enrichment capability as a nonproliferation tool has become an outdated idea. The United States is committed to being a reliable supplier of enrichment services to nations adhering to effective nonproliferation policies. Foreign concerns over U.S. reliability as a nuclear trading partner center around the delays and uncertainties associated with the nuclear export control system. There is substantial opposition to requirements of the nonproliferation law which would extend U.S. rights to approve foreign processing of U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel. U.S. reprocessing approval rights have been a factor in influencing countries not to purchase U.S. supplies and services. It is not apparent that the construction of a new enrichment plant is justified at this time. The Department of Energy (DOE) has not fully and objectively considered options that would allow it to meet demand and delay the current construction program until more is known about advanced enrichment technologies under development.

The 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has proven the most complicated and controversial of all arms control treaties, both in principle and in practice. Statements of nuclear-weapon States from the Cold War to the present, led by the United States, show a disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty, and an unwarranted underprioritization of the civilian energy development and disarmament pillars of the treaty. This book argues that the way in which nuclear-weapon States have interpreted the Treaty has laid the legal foundation for a number of policies related to trade in civilian nuclear energy technologies and nuclear weapons disarmament. These policies circumscribe the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States under Article IV of the Treaty by imposing conditions on the supply of civilian nuclear technologies. They also provide for the renewal and maintaintenance, and in some cases further development of the nuclear weapons arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. The book provides a legal analysis of this trend in treaty interpretation by nuclear-weapon States and the policies for which it has provided legal justification. It argues, through a close and systematic examination of the Treaty by reference to the rules of treaty interpretation found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that this disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty leads to erroneous legal interpretations in light of the original balance of principles underlying the Treaty, prejudicing the legitimate legal interests of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Contains an inventory of evaluation reports produced by and for selected Federal agencies, including GAO evaluation reports that relate to the programs of those agencies.

Catalog of reports, decisions and opinions, testimonies and speeches.