European Union And The Non Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons

Much of the literature on the emerging role of the EU as a non-proliferation actor has only a minimal engagement with theory. This collection aims to rectify this by placing the role of the EU in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons within an analytical framework inspired by emerging literature on the performance of international organisations.

This second Volume in the book Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law discusses the legal interpretation and implementation of verification and compliance with the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968; the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, 1996; and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), 1957. It specifically examines the question, contested in recent academic writings, whether the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is competent to verify not only the correctness, but also the completeness of national declarations. Topical legal issues of verification and its technical and political limits as well as peaceful settlement of disputes and countermeasures are discussed in-depth. The Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law provides scholarly research articles with critical commentaries on relevant treaty law, best practice and legal developments, thus offering an academic analysis and information on practical legal and diplomatic developments both globally and regionally. It sets a basis for a further constructive discourse on the topic at both national and international levels. A Third Volume, to be published in Autumn 2016, will focus on legal issues of safety and security of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Professor of International Law, Royal Holloway University of London; a Member of Wolfson College, Oxford; Chairman of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); Honorary President, International Society for Military Law and the Law of War; Rapporteur of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Prolife ration and Contemporary International Law.

Since the fall of the Berlin wall, the two sides of the Atlantic have struggled to identify a new common project and create the tools and institutions needed to address common challenges. To their credit, they have transformed their militaries, integrated new members into Western institutions such as the European Union and NATO, deepened economic ties, developed new partnerships, and acquired new capabilities. But they have also had a number of ugly and public disputes over the nature and severity of the threats they face as well as the means necessary to combat such threats. Now, several years after the dark days of 2002 and 2003, the transatlantic partners are working toward renewal. Although Iraq remains a stain on their relationship, Europe and the United States have come to realize that, however vast their differences might be, they remain indispensible partners to each other. The question before the two partners today, particularly in light of the change in administration in Washington, is how to capitalize on their comparative strengths to address a long list of common challenges--one of the most pressing of which is nuclear proliferation. In an effort to shed light on the issues, CSIS commissioned a series of essays on European perspectives on nonproliferation. This new report offers a starting point for a new, shared understanding of the threat. It begins not with a look at the official positions of states with regard to nonproliferation initiatives, but instead aims to help experts and interested observers understand some of the underlying historical, political, and cultural bases on which national views in Europe on nuclear threats are founded. These papers help reveal a range of views on nuclear weapons and proliferation and shed light on some of the attitudes that underpin national policies on key issues.

Since the adoption of its Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU has raised its profile in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. However, the current crisis of arms control, which has recently seen the demise of key agreements like the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INT), represents a dual challenge for the EU: while its territory is most directly affected py the dismantlement of arms control treaties, it is not a party to them. Moreover, traditional divisions over disarmament among EU member states have been exacerbated by disagreements over the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This Chaillot Paper suggests that the EU can prevent the deepening of such divisions and mitigate global polarisation in order to promote a successful outcome of the upcoming Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To this end, it can make use of its access to both advocates and detractors of the TPNW in order to foster dialogue, acting as a bridge-builder between both camps while preparing for a new arms control system to replace the agreements that are progressively being abandoned.

The recent controversy over Iran's nuclear programme represents an early and important test for a distinctively European approach to addressing concerns about suspected programmes for the development of weapons of mass destruction. Against this background, the report brings together European and Iranian perspectives on a range of security- and proliferation-related issues that have a bearing on diplomatic efforts to resolve the controversy. The contributors describe the discussions under way between Europe, Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency aimed at clarifying the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear activities. They examine the development of the European Union's strategy to combat the spread of WMD; Iran's evolving security and defence structures and policies, including Iranian thinking about deterrence-based defence strategies and the requirements for credibly implementing them; and the internal dynamics of security policy decision making in Iran. The report highlights some of the problems and possibilities inherent in the EU's efforts to implement a more targeted, multifunctional strategy to prevent WMD proliferation.

The European Union has identified the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a key threat to its security, and considers the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a cornerstone of its strategy of fighting the spread of WMD. A successful outcome of the NPT Review Conference in May 2005 is thus of essential interest to the Union. However, the chances of achieving this objective are rather slim: the unresolved question of Iran, the unclear status of North Korea, a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Nuclear Weapons States for further steps towards disarmament, limited progress in the conclusion and implementation of the IAEA's Additional Protocol - to name only a few - are all obstacles to a successful conference. In this situation the EU, as the main protagonist of a multilateral, treaty-based approach to the fight against proliferation, has a particular responsibility to avoid the Review Conference becoming a failure. To achieve the EU's objective, member states have to overcome their traditional divergences on nuclear issues and put forward innovative proposals. This Chaillot Paper demonstrates that there is enough common ground to do so: four distinguished experts assess the main challenges currently facing the NPT regime and develop ideas for the EU's contribution to a successful conference.

This paper gives an assessment of European policy on nuclear proliferation and suggests some avenues that the CFSP might follow.