Essays In Political Economy And Voting Behaviour

This thesis explores how political preferences are shaped by institutions, economic conditions, and personality. Each chapter is a distinct contribution and provides a different perspective on the formation of political preferences and, ultimately, voting behaviour. These different approaches relate to the fields of comparative political economy, behavioural economics, and political psychology. Methodologically, this thesis is empirically applied and the results of these separate enquiries into political preferences are grounded in statistical analysis. A first substantive chapter introduces a median voter data set that provides insight into the ideological position of the electoral centre in over 50 democracies. A second chapter uses this new data and studies cross-national voting behaviour in 18 Western democracies over 1960-2003. It is found that electoral behaviour is closely related to the salience of the following economic institutions: labour organization, skill specificity, and public sector employment. This research shows that political preferences are endogenous to economic institutions and implies the existence of institutional advantages to partisan politics. A third substantive chapter focuses on ideological change in the United States and tests the proposition that voters advance a more liberal agenda in prosperous times and shift towards being more conservative in dire economic times. A reference-dependent utility model relates income growth to political preferences by way of the demand for public goods and the optimal tax rate. This work thus links voting behaviour to economic business cycles and shows that ideological change is endogenous to income growth rates. Finally, a fourth chapter presents the largest study to date of the influence of the big five personality traits on political ideology. In line with prior research in political psychology, it is found that openness to experience strongly predicts liberal ideology and that conscientiousness strongly predicts conservative ideology. A variety of childhood experiences are also studied that may have a differential effect on political ideology based on an individual's personality profile. The findings of this final chapter provide new evidence for the idea that differences in political preferences are deeply intertwined with variation in the nature and nurture of individual personalities. Generally, this thesis provides some new insights into the complex world of political preference formation and does so by exploring the influential role of institutions, economic conditions, and personality.

This dissertation consists of three chapters that underscore the importance of viewing decision makers as boundedly rational (Kahneman 2003; Simon 1955, 1979). Each study highlights the fact that behavioral decision theory and social psychology can help scholars understand choices made by important political and economic actors. My first two studies focus on an important group of political actors -- voters. I find that voters act in an environment where optimal decision theory does not always provide a compelling account of voting behaviors that are observed empirically. Behavioral theories regarding affect and conscious versus unconscious attitudes are drawn upon to reconsider retrospective voting and the consequences of a candidate's ascriptive characteristics (e.g., gender and race) in elections, respectively. The third project focuses on individuals as economic agents, and seeks to apply behavioral decision theory to understand an important public policy problem -- human trafficking vulnerability. Motivated to understand why some individuals are more vulnerable to being exploited than others, I draw upon an aspiration-based framework and empirically test my predictions with original field data collected in Nepal, a country heavily affected by human trafficking. My first chapter reconsiders models of rational behavior that posit that people behave in a careful and reasoned manner, basing their voting decisions on relevant data such as evaluations of incumbent performance or reasoned consideration of candidate stances on policy issues. We ask the following: does information and events irrelevant to government performance, yet still consequential to an individual's sense of well-being, af- fect the decisions that voters make in the polling booth? Does information irrelevant to government performance affect voting behavior? If so, how does this help us understand the mecha- nisms underlying voters' retrospective assessments of candidates' performance in office? To precisely test for the effects of irrelevant information, we explore the electoral impact of local college football games just before an election, irrelevant events that government has nothing to do with and for which no government response would be expected. We find that a win in the 10 days before Election Day causes the incumbent to receive an additional 1.61 percentage points of the vote in Senate, gubernatorial, and presidential elections, with the effect being larger for teams with stronger fan support. In addition to conducting placebo tests based on post-election games, we demonstrate these effects by using the betting market's estimate of a team's probability of winning the game before it occurs to isolate the surprise component of game outcomes. We corroborate these aggregate-level results with a survey that we conducted during the 2009 NCAA men's college basketball tournament, where we find that surprising wins and losses affect presidential approval. An experiment embedded within the survey also indicates that personal well-being may influence voting decisions on a subconscious level. We find that making people more aware of the reasons for their current state of mind reduces the effect that irrelevant events have on their opinions. These findings underscore the subtle power of irrelevant events in shaping important real-world decisions and suggest ways in which decision making can be improved. My second chapter builds on work of researchers in cognitive psychology, who have proposed that there are two distinct cognitive systems underlying reasoning. Dual process theories of the mind find that both automatic and unconscious type 1 processing that results in "implicit" attitudes, and controlled and effortful type 2 processing that results in "explicit" attitudes can be active concurrently, and the two cognitive operations compete for the control of overt responses. In this project, I ask what are the consequences of "two minds" in the judgment of voters? Dual process theories of the mind suggest that ignoring implicit attitudes in the study of vote choice largely underestimates the relationship between attitudes on ascriptive characteristics and the judgment of voters, and overlooks the possibility that socially undesirable forms of prejudice can be overridden in certain contexts. Empirical tests of the consequence of dual cognitive processes on voting behavior are conducted by analyzing the relationship between explicit and implicit measures of gender attitudes on vote choice using an original survey experiment (study 1). The implications of a "two minds" hypothesis are tested in a second domain of prejudice by studying the effects of explicit and implicit racial attitudes on the 2008 Presidential election between Barack Obama and John McCain using a nationally representative sample (study 2). In both cases, the predictions of dual process theories of the mind hold. Both explicit and implicit attitudes of ascriptive characteristics (e.g., gender and race) are non-redundant consequential predictors of vote choice. Further, when an individual is motivated and capable of overriding implicit attitudes, the effects of implicit attitudes on vote choice are largely overridden by the effortful and reflective explicit attitude. The two studies jointly point to the significance of a dual process account of reasoning in understanding the manifestation of voter prejudice in the ballot box. My third chapter studies vulnerability to being trafficked, which often stems from a willingness to acquiesce to dangerous economic opportunities (e.g., having one's child migrate far away from home without his/her family for work). In this research project, my claim is the following: an increased salience in relative deprivation can lead individuals to be more risk-seeking, putting themselves and their children at risk for modern forms of slavery. I hypothesize that the mechanism by which this occurs is as follows. Drawing on prospect theory and the theory of reference groups, I posit that information regarding others' relative wealth partitions the space of outcomes into a positive and negative region. When relative wealth is made salient, one's reference point is no longer their status quo endowment. Rather their aspiration or reference point is the higher or lower endowment held by others within their cognitive window -- those in their socio-economic and spatial neighborhood. It is then possible for expected utility from economic opportunities to be below one's reference point. One's perceived relative deprivation can then place a person in the domain of bad (below-aspirations) payoffs, and according to the prospect theory value function, this individual would be more likely to exhibit risk-seeking behavior as a result. Using a controlled survey experiment conducted in trafficking-prone areas of Nepal with a subject pool representing the target population, I find that perceived relative deprivation, a sense that one's wealth falls below some salient point of reference, induces more risk-seeking behavior with regards to economic opportunities. Additionally, using nationally-representative district-level data from Nepal on relative deprivation and trafficking incidence, I find macro-level evidence that is consistent with my micro-level evidence of perceived relative poverty explaining variation in vulnerability.

Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing.

In this book voter behavior is analyzed from an economist's point of view. The influence of an economy on voter behavior is investigated and this behavior is analyzed in the perspective commonly used by economists. Econom(etr)ic tools are applied in the analyses. The book contains empirical analyses linking demographic variables to voter turnout and party choice using cross-section data for the Netherlands. Attention is focused on whether turnout and party choice decisions are taken sequentially or simultaneously by voters. An empirical test supports the former. Using these results, behavioral models of party choice and voter turnout are developed. Existing econometric analyses of voting behavior are put on a more solid theoretical footing. In both models a group perspective is used, in line with increased attention for this perspective in economics and political science. Empirical applications of the party choice model allow for an estimation of relative preferences for public goods, using the revealed preference mechanism provided by voting (intention). An alternative method for detecting these preferences, a new survey design, is discussed as well. In the turnout model, attention is fo- cused on the role of "civic duty" in a group context.

The first chapter of this dissertation analyzes voting behavior across multiple elections. The voting literature has largely analyzed voter turnout and voter behavior separately, focusing on individual elections. I present a model of voter turnout and behavior in multiple elections. The assumptions are consistent with individual election preferences and decision is derived from utility maximization. Additionally, I provide necessary moment conditions for identification. The framework is applied to the 2008 California elections. The exit polls made national headlines by linking the historic turnout of African-Americans for Presidential candidate Obama in helping pass Proposition 8. The results show that the African-American turnout and voting share for Proposition 8 was lower than indicated by the exit polls. As a counterfactual, I look at the turnout and outcome of Proposition 8, without the presidential race on the ballot. As predicted, there is lower voter turnout: on par with midterm elections. I also find a lower share of Yes votes on Proposition 8 - enough that the referendum would not have passed.

In the third chapter, "Polling Place Location and the Costs of Voting", co-authored with Gaurav Bagwe and Juan Margitic, we study how the distance to a polling place affects voting behavior. The distance between voters and their polling place may be an important determinant in the overall cost of voting, turnout, and election and policy outcomes. We first collect a dataset on distance to polling places for all 8.7 million registered voters in Pennsylvania. We find a small and negative effect on average of distance to polling place on turnout in 2012, 2016, and 2018 elections. The negative effects are much larger, however, among younger voters and among those who walk to work.

This thesis consists of three chapters in political economics. The central theme spanning all chapters is the analysis of voter turnout. This first chapter studies voter turnout and candidates' strategies in a spatial model of political competition. The framework combines citizens' ethical motivation to vote with abstention due to indifference and alienation, i.e. from voters equally close to the competing candidates or too far from all of them. In contrast to a median voter result, candidates diverge from the center if voters are polarized and prone to alienation, by proposing radical policies as a mobilization strategy to increase their supporters' turnout. The analysis of participation at the individual level sheds light on how ethical supporters can share the costs of voting for their candidate, depending on the intensity of their preference. Comparative statics results are in line with the empirical evidence on electoral participation and polarization of voters and candidates. The second chapter is motivated by the evidence of bandwagon effects in voting experiments, driven by higher turnout rates among the members of the majority group. This evidence is, however, in contrast with a standard pivotal voter model of electoral participation, which predicts that minority supporters should participate at a higher rate, given the higher probability of casting a pivotal vote. The model reconciles this discrepancy by showing that a bandwagon effect can be generated within the pivotal voter model by concavity in the voters' utility function, which makes electoral participation more costly for the expected loser supporters. Given the strict relationship between concavity and risk aversion, the paper establishes the role of risk aversion as a determinant of bandwagon. The third chapter studies a model of costly voting in which citizens care about the legitimate mandate of the government formed by the winning group. Such a measure of mandate depends on both the margin of victory and the total turnout rate. The main result highlights that the supposed positive relationship between turnout and mandate can be reversed in equilibrium: an increase in the relative importance of turnout for the mandate can decrease the former but increase the latter, moving the two variables in opposite directions. The mechanism at play is a shift in the relative participation of the competing groups, which yields a higher margin of victory for the majority group. The model offers an additional reason for a bandwagon effect, due to the lower participation of minority voters who do not want to increase an opposing government's mandate.

Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing.

Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing.

My thesis is centred on the question of how information asymmetries affect elections. In particular, I am interested in how electoral concerns shape policy choices and in the consequences of institutional arrangements aimed to providing voters with information on politicians. In the first chapter I model a primary election, i.e. an election to choose a candidate. I show that if party members do not know the quality of candidates, high quality candidates distinguish themselves by proposing more extreme policies. As a result, introducing primary elections increases the quality of candidates but it might lead to policy polarization. The second chapter, which is my job market paper, develops a model in which a politician takes a repeated action over an issue and is evaluated by a voter through an election. I show that politicians who flip-flop, i.e. change their decision on the issue, are penalized by voters, because flip-flopping signals incompetence. As a result, politicians have an incentive to protect their reputation by inefficiently sticking to their initial policy choice. This decreases the quality of both policy and electoral choices. The paper also discusses how changes in transparency and term limits can discipline the behaviour of politicians. My third and final chapter describes a media market in which a set of news outlets compete to break a news concerning a politician in office; after receiving a signal of whether the politician is corrupt, media outlets can either fact-check and learn the truth, or publish the news immediately. We show that increasing the number of outlets competing in the market results in less fact-checking and more fake corruption scandals being published. By making the re-election of honest incumbents more difficult, the increase in competition might therefore be detrimental to social welfare.