Epistemic Injustice And Violence

In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.

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In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space thatis epistemic injustice.The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a newway, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.

The practice of philosophy has led to both emancipation and exclusion in society. Questions around how philosophy should be practiced, who should engage in it, and with which issues philosophy should deal are subject to debate and controversy. This volume is dedicated to the special role of epistemic injustice and violence in philosophy. By shedding light on the inherent unjust structures of academic philosophy, the contributors to this volume help to better understand this powerful tool that impacts the academic landscape as well as individual and collective ways of being. From graphic novel to philosophical essay, they design a concept of transformative philosophy and offer various entry points to the conversation.

This outstanding reference source to epistemic injustice is the first collection of its kind. Over thirty chapters address topics such as testimonial and hermeneutic injustice and virtue epistemology, objectivity and objectification, implicit bias, gender and race.

This book explores the epistemic side of racial and sexual oppression. It elucidates how social insensitivities and imposed silences prevent members of different groups from listening to each other.

This volume draws together cutting edge research from the social sciences to find ways of overcoming the unconscious prejusice that is present in our everyday decisions, a phenomenon coined by the philosopher Miranda Fricker as 'epistemic injustice'.

Offering a wide variety of philosophical approaches to the neglected philosophical problem of ignorance, this groundbreaking collection builds on Charles Mills's claim that racism involves an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance. Contributors explore how different forms of ignorance linked to race are produced and sustained and what role they play in promoting racism and white privilege. They argue that the ignorance that underpins racism is not a simple gap in knowledge, the accidental result of an epistemological oversight. In the case of racial oppression, ignorance often is actively produced for purposes of domination and exploitation. But as these essays demonstrate, ignorance is not simply a tool of oppression wielded by the powerful. It can also be a strategy for survival, an important tool for people of color to wield against white privilege and white supremacy. The book concludes that understanding ignorance and the politics of such ignorance should be a key element of epistemological and social/political analyses, for it has the potential to reveal the role of power in the construction of what is known and provide a lens for the political values at work in knowledge practices.

This book presents novel approaches and perspectives to scholarship on epistemic injustice and particularly, testimonial injustice and their connections with public trust. Drawing from different philosophical schools of thought and approaches, the book provides a comprehensive analysis of the conditions, mechanisms and normative implications of testimonial injustice, a term most prominently introduced by Fricker (2007), and the role that trust can play in fostering testimonial justice. Through the application of theories of epistemic injustice, and testimonial injustice, to new contexts and cases, including gendered violence, disability, indigenous knowledge, genocide, vaccine hesitancy and the COVID-19 pandemic, the book sheds light on the real-world significance of these philosophical concepts. Testimonial Injustice and Trust introduces new directions for further research and will appeal to scholars and students in (critical) social and political epistemology, normative ethics as well as social and political philosophy more generally. The chapters in this book were originally published in the International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Social Epistemology and Educational Philosophy and Theory.

For many decades, race and racism have been common areas of study in departments of sociology, history, political science, English, and anthropology. Much more recently, as the historical concept of race and racial categories have faced significant scientific and political challenges, philosophers have become more interested in these areas. This changing understanding of the ontology of race has invited inquiry from researchers in moral philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and aesthetics. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Race offers in one comprehensive volume newly written articles on race from the world’s leading analytic and continental philosophers. It is, however, accessible to a readership beyond philosophy as well, providing a cohesive reference for a wide student and academic readership. The Companion synthesizes current philosophical understandings of race, providing 37 chapters on the history of philosophy and race as well as how race might be investigated in the usual frameworks of contemporary philosophy. The volume concludes with a section on philosophical approaches to some topics with broad interest outside of philosophy, like colonialism, affirmative action, eugenics, immigration, race and disability, and post-racialism. By clearly explaining and carefully organizing the leading current philosophical thinking on race, this timely collection will help define the subject and bring renewed understanding of race to students and researchers in the humanities, social science, and sciences.