Eliminating Trade Barriers Through Preferential Trade Agreements

Since time immemorial, trade has substantially influenced human life. Trade enthused intercontinental movements of the Asiatic people, Phoenicians, Egyptians, and other ancient societies. From the ancient “Silk Route” to today's electronic “Silk Road,” rise in intercontinental trade has coincided with the increase in globalization's pace.3 Scholars mark the evolution of the modern trade regime primarily by three eras: first, the introduction of mutually binding tariff reductions; second, the institutionalization of international trade; and third, the expansion of traditional trade obligations to include various new requirements, including a more indirect relationship to trade, and streamlined and effective dispute resolution. Several important elements, such as non-discrimination and multilateralism, characterize global trade governance. Yet it is not a static phenomenon and is certainly not limited to the principles of Most-Favored Nation and National Treatment, or reducing tariff barriers. Multilateralism remains an important stimulant in addressing contemporary challenges, such as reducing trade barriers as a means to stem mercantilist tendencies and further global trade governance. Preferential trade agreements have added a desirable wing to competitive trade liberalization through which more than 50% of today's international trade transpires. Notably, the multilevel global trade governance under the auspices of WTO experienced a gradual increase in its complexity as it evolved. In contrast, deeper and easier integration has been witnessed at regional levels. For example, South Asian countries experimented with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to create regional ripples that parallel bilateral and multilateral currents in an effort to further harness the fruits of participatory governance and trade liberalization. South Asia houses a population of roughly 1.67 billion people, including 40% of the world's poor. Yet, it remains one of the least integrated regions. The conundrums of trade barriers have become vital in global trade governance. The study of eliminating trade barriers in a South Asian milieu illustrates the shortcomings as well as lessons to learn and amend.

Draws on both theory and evaluations of several major Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) to discuss the constraints to achieving liberalisation in PTAs and key problems facing negotiators trying to achieve the best outcomes within given political economy constraints, such as choice of rules of origin and dispute settlement procedures.

Deep trade agreements (DTAs) cover not just trade but additional policy areas, such as international flows of investment and labor and the protection of intellectual property rights and the environment. Their goal is integration beyond trade or deep integration. These agreements matter for economic development. Their rules influence how countries (and hence, the people and firms that live and operate within them) transact, invest, work, and ultimately, develop. Trade and investment regimes determine the extent of economic integration, competition rules affect economic efficiency, intellectual property rights matter for innovation, and environmental and labor rules contribute to environmental and social outcomes. This Handbook provides the tools and data needed to analyze these new dimensions of integration and to assess the content and consequences of DTAs. The Handbook and the accompanying database are the result of collaboration between experts in different policy areas from academia and other international organizations, including the International Trade Centre (ITC), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and World Trade Organization (WTO).

The dark side of preferential trade agreements, Rules of Origin (RoO) are used to determine the eligibility of goods to preferential treatment. Ostensibly meant to prevent the trans-shipment of imported products across Free Trade Agreement borders after superficial screwdriver assembly, they act in reality as complex and opaque trade barriers. This book provides evidence strongly suggesting that they do so by intent rather than accidentally—-in other words, that RoOs are policy. Part one draws insights about the effects of RoOs on cross-border trade and outsourcing from recent economic theory. Part two reviews the evidence on RoOs in preferential agreements around the world, putting together the most comprehensive dataset on RoOs to date. Part three explores their "political economy"—-how special interests have shaped them and continue to do so. Part four provides econometric evidence on their costs for exporters and consequent effects on trade flows. Finally, part five explores how they affect trade in the developing world where they spread rapidly and have the potential to do most harm. Beyond the collection of new evidence and its interpretation in light of recent theory, the book's overall message for the policy community is that RoOs are a potentially powerful and new barrier to trade. Rather than being relegated to closed-door technical meetings, their design should hold center-stage in trade negotiations.

Jagdish Bhagwati, the internationally renowned economist who uniquely combines a reputation as the leading scholar of international trade with a substantial presence in public policy on the important issues of the day, shines here a critical light on Preferential Trade Agreements, revealing how the rapid spread of PTAs endangers the world trading system. Numbering by now well over 300, and rapidly increasing, these preferential trade agreements, many taking the form of Free Trade Agreements, have re-created the unhappy situation of the 1930s, when world trade was undermined by discriminatory practices. Whereas this was the result of protectionism in those days, ironically it is a result of misdirected pursuit of free trade via PTAs today. The world trading system is at risk again, the author argues, and the danger is palpable. Writing with his customary wit, panache and elegance, Bhagwati documents the growth of these PTAs, the reasons for their proliferation, and their deplorable consequences which include the near-destruction of the non-discrimination which was at the heart of the postwar trade architecture and its replacement by what he has called the spaghetti bowl of a maze of preferences. Bhagwati also documents how PTAs have undermined the prospects for multilateral freeing of trade, serving as stumbling blocks, instead of building blocks, for the objective of reaching multilateral free trade. In short, Bhagwati cogently demonstrates why PTAs are Termites in the Trading System.

"This is one of 10 studies for the Copenhagen Consensus Project that sought to evaluate the most feasible opportunities to improve welfare globally and alleviate poverty in developing countries. Anderson argues that phasing out distortionary government subsidies and barriers to international trade will yield an extraordinarily high benefit-cost ratio. A survey is provided of recent estimates using global economywide simulation models of the benefits of doing that by way of the current Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. Even if adjustment costs are several times as large as suggested by available estimates, the benefit-cost ratio from seizing this opportunity exceeds 20. That is much higher than the rewards from regional or bilateral trade agreements or from providing preferential access for least-developed countries' exports to high-income countries. Such reform would simultaneously contribute to alleviating several of the other key challenges reflected in the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals"--Abstract.

Abstract: May 1999 - Preferential trade agreements that are limited to the elimination of tariffs for merchandise trade flows are of limited value at best and may be as easily welfare-reducing as welfare-enhancing. It is important that preferential trade agreements go beyond eliminating tariffs and quotas to eliminating regulatory and red tape costs and opening up service markets to foreign competition. Deep integration-explicit government actions to reduce the market-segmenting effect of domestic regulatory policies through coordination and cooperation-is becoming a major dimension of some regional integration agreements, led by the European Union. Health and safety regulations, competition laws, licensing and certification regimes, and administrative procedures such as customs clearance can affect trade (in ways analogous to nontariff barriers) even though their underlying intent may not be to discriminate against foreign suppliers of goods and services. Whether preferential trade agreements (PTAs) can be justified in a multilateral trading system depends on the extent to which formal intergovernmental agreements are technically necessary to achieve the deep integration needed to make markets more contestable. The more need for formal cooperation, the stronger the case for regional integration. Whether PTAs are justified regionally also depends on whether efforts to reduce market segmentation are applied on a nondiscriminatory basis. If innovations to reduce transaction or market access costs extend to both members and nonmembers of a PTA, regionalism as an instrument of trade and investment becomes more attractive. Using a standard competitive general equilibrium model of the Egyptian economy, Hoekman and Konan find that the static welfare impact of a deep free trade agreement is far greater than the impact that can be expected from a classic shallow agreement. Under some scenarios, welfare may increase by more than 10 percent of GDP, compared with close to zero under a shallow agreement. Given Egypt's highly diversified trading patterns, a shallow PTA with the European Union could be merely diversionary, leading to a small decline in welfare. Egypt already has duty-free access to the European Union for manufactures, so the loss in tariff revenues incurred would outweigh any new trade created. Large gains in welfare from the PTA are conditional on eliminating regulatory barriers and red tape-in which case welfare gains may be substantial: 4 to 20 percent growth in real GNP. This paper-a product of the Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze regional integration agreements. The authors may be contacted at bhoekman@@worldbank.org or konan@@hawaii.edu.

The author investigates the effects of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on bilateral trade flows using a comprehensive database of PTAs in force and a detailed matrix of world trade. He shows that total trade between PTA partners is a poor proxy for preferential trade (trade in tariff lines where preferences are likely to matter): while the former amounted to one-third of global trade in 2000-02, the latter was between one-sixth and one-tenth of world trade. His gravity model estimates indicate that using total rather than preferential trade to assess the impact of PTAs leads to a significant downward bias in the PTA coefficient. The author finds that product exclusions and long phase-in periods significantly limit preferential trade, and their removal could more than double trade in tariff lines above 3 percent of most-favored-nation (MFN) duties. He also shows that the effects of PTAs on trade vary by type of agreement and are increasing in the incomes of PTA partners.

Bachelor Thesis from the year 2011 in the subject Business economics - Trade and Distribution, grade: B+, Stanford University, language: English, abstract: A trade bloc is a preferential trade agreement between a range of nations, aimed at significantly reducing or removing trade barriers within the member states. Regional trade blocs are formed by neighbouring countries or countries that are in close proximity to each other. The two key features of a trade bloc is that (1) it involves a cutback or abolition of obstacles to trade, and (2) the trade liberalisation that is attained through the trade bloc is discriminatory in purview of the fact that it is applicable only to the member states of the trade bloc and non-member countries are shown prejudice in their dealings with members of the trade bloc. The first aspect of trade blocs above is in line with the mission of the World trade Organisation (WTO) and its antecedent, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The principle of Non-discrimination under the GATT stipulates that no member state shall show prejudice between GATT members during the operations of world trade. In the same magnitude, the WTO offers an environment for negotiating agreements that are focused on reducing barriers to international trade and making sure that trade is carried out on a basis of openness, thus contributing to economic growth as well as development. Notably, although trade blocs have different structures, they are premised on the same objective, that is, to lessen trade barriers among member states. The second aspect of trade blocs however seems to be in conflict with the motive of the GATT/WTO system. The preamble of the GATT is very clear on promoting non-discrimination in international trade by reinforcing the need for reciprocal and equally advantageous arrangements focused on substantial cutbacks in tariffs and other obstacles to trade and to the abolition of discriminatory treatment in international trade. Equally, under the WTO as well as under its predecessor, the GATT, trade discrimination is promoted through the use of the principles of the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) that requires treatment of other people equally as pertains to trade and the principle of National Treatment which stipulates that foreigners and locals should be treated equally in trade matters. The above overview of regional trading blocs implies that different opinions can be stated regarding how trading blocs affect liberalisation of trade. [...]