Eight Years Of Us Airline Deregulation

Continues the research of an earlier paper by Spencer and Cassell (1985) that pointed out that although U.S. airline deregulation initially spawned more competition in fares and in number of competitors, the quality of service and the returns to labour decreased. Proves the analysis, the trend towards consolidation would continue, and result in an oligopoly under which prices would stabilize and move upward, and services would become more uniform and labour would recover some wage and benefit concessions that had been made in the early days of deregulation.

Airline deregulation is a failure, conclude Professors Dempsey and Goetz. They assault the conventional wisdom in this provocative book, finding that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, championed by a profound political movement which also advocated the deregulation of the bus, trucking, rail, and pipeline industries, failed to achieve the promises of its proponents. Only now is the full impact of deregulation being felt. Airline deregulation has resulted in unprecedented industry concentration, miserable service, a deterioration in labor-management relations, a narrower margin of safety, and higher prices for the consumer. This comprehensive book begins by exploring the strategy, tactics, and egos of the major airline robber barons, including Frank Lorenzo and Carl Icahn. In separate chapters, the strengths, weaknesses, and corporate cultures of each of the major airlines are evaluated. Part Two assesses the political, economic, and social justifications for New Deal regulation of aviation, and its deregulation in the late 1970s. Part Three then addresses the major consequences of deregulation in chapters on concentration, pricing, service, and safety, and Part Four advances a legislative agenda for solving the problems that have emerged. Professors Dempsey and Goetz advocate a middle course of responsible government supervision between the dead hand of regulation of the 1930s and the contemporary evil of market Darwinism. The book will be of particular interest to airline and airport industry executives, government officials, and students and scholars in public policy, economics, business, political science, and transportation.

In 1938 the U.S. Government took under its wing an infant airline industry. Government agencies assumed responsibility not only for airline safety but for setting fares and determining how individual markets would be served. Forty years later, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 set in motion the economic deregulation of the industry and opened it to market competition. This study by Steven Morrison and Clifford Winston analyzes the effects of deregulation on both travelers and the airline industry. The authors find that lower fares and better service have netted travelers some $6 billion in annual benefits, while airline earnings have increased by $2.5 billion a year. Morrison and Winston expect still greater benefits once the industry has had time to adjust its capital structure to the unregulated marketplace, and they recommend specific public polices to ensure healthy competition.

1. 1 A Brief History of U. S. Commercial Aviation Regulation and Deregulation The U. S. commercial aviation industry was regulated by the government for a period of 40 years, beginning in 1938 with. the passing of the Federal Aviation Act, and ending in October 1978 when President Carter signed into law the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA). There were 16 airlines in existence when the Federal Aviation Act was passed in 1938 (the so-called 'trunk lines'). The Act established the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) as the industry's regulatory body. The Act was passed principally because it was felt that the free market, if allowed to continue unregulated for much longer, would put many of these firms into bankruptcy. It is possible therefore to view the CAA of 1938 (re-organized into the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in 1940) as a response to a potential market failure at the time. In the 1930s, few air traffic markets could have efficiently"supported more than one airline operating in the market [Panzar (1980)]. Competition among the carriers was cut-throat, and it was felt that the near bankruptcy of the airlines in the period was caused principally by the competitive bidding system used by the Post Office in allotting airmail subsidies [Keeler (1972), Caves (1962)].

The purpose of this dissertation is to assess whether the consumers are receiving a greater range and more frequent airline services since the U.S. airline industry was deregulated. Are the consumers better off since deregulation? Are the airlines providing more and better services? The questions mentioned above are examined and answered in this dissertation and based on the literature available and on numerous reports and published papers, many conclusions are drawn. These conclusions can help the readers in both comprehending the complicated issue of airline deregulation and assessing whether consumers are better off since deregulation. Initially an analysis of the airline deregulation is carried out based on the literature available. Information is provided regarding when did it happen and why did it happen. Moreover a comparison of the pre and post-deregulation era is conducted. Information is also provided about the airline deregulation effects on the U.S. airline industry s structure and competition. Strategic alliances which constitute a consequence of the airline deregulation effects are also examined. After the description of both the effects of airline deregulation and strategic alliances is carried out, an analysis of them is initiated. The analysis is aiming at proving whether airline deregulation has increased the range and frequency of airline services. For this analysis, the information presented before is used and it is analysed via the use of certain management models. Through a thorough research and study on the above issues, It has become apparent to me that the opinions about the range and frequency of services offered to the customers before and after deregulation are contradictory. The conclusions that I have made are based on my own perception on those issues and are a result of an objective analysis of contradicting theories and opinions. The airline deregulation issue is very opportune in the U.S. because the airline industry is currently undergoing through a very crucial stage. Many are those who praise the airline deregulation decision, taken in the late 1970s but many are those who recollect the days of the pre-deregulation period. My own ideas are expressed through out this thesis in a way that they allow the reader to form his/her own opinion on the issue.

Commercial aviation was one of the first industries affected by the controversial regulatory reforms that began in the 1970s. Beginning in 1975, administrative reforms of the Civil Aeronautics Board gave carriers greater freedom in discounting prices and serving new markets. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 removed restrictions on entry, pricing, and routes. Still unresolved in policy and practice, however, is the question of the appropriate role of government. In the interest of informing the public debate about deregulation, the Executive Committee of the Transportation Research Board convened a committee of 15 experts to review air passenger service and safety since deregulation. The findings of the committee and its recommendations are presented in this report.

Since the enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, questions that had been at the heart of the ongoing debate about the industry for eighty years gained a new intensity: Is there enough competition among airlines to ensure that passengers do not pay excessive fares? Can an unregulated airline industry be profitable? Is air travel safe? While economic regulation provided a certain stability for both passengers and the industry, deregulation changed everything. A new fare structure emerged; travelers faced a variety of fares and travel restrictions; and the offerings changed frequently. In the last fifteen years, the airline industry's earnings have fluctuated wildly. New carriers entered the industry, but several declared bankruptcy, and Eastern, Pan Am, and Midway were liquidated. As financial pressures mounted, fears have arisen that air safety is being compromised by carriers who cut costs by skimping on maintenance and hiring inexperienced pilots. Deregulation itself became an issue with many critics calling for a return to some form of regulation. In this book, Steven A. Morrison and Clifford Winston assert that all too often public discussion of the issues of airline competition, profitability, and safety take place without a firm understanding of the facts. The policy recommendations that emerge frequently ignore the long-run evolution of the industry and its capacity to solve its own problems. This book provides a comprehensive profile of the industry as it has evolved, both before and since deregulation. The authors identify the problems the industry faces, assess their severity and their underlying causes, and indicate whether government policy can play an effective role in improving performance. They also develop a basis for understanding the industry's evolution and how the industry will eventually adapt to the unregulated economic environment. Morrison and Winston maintain that although the airline industry has not rea

In 1938 the U.S. Government took under its wing an infant airline industry. Government agencies assumed responsibility not only for airline safety but for setting fares and determining how individual markets would be served. Forty years later, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 set in motion the economic deregulation of the industry and opened it to market competition. This study by Steven Morrison and Clifford Winston analyzes the effects of deregulation on both travelers and the airline industry. The authors find that lower fares and better service have netted travelers some $6 billion in annual benefits, while airline earnings have increased by $2.5 billion a year. Morrison and Winston expect still greater benefits once the industry has had time to adjust its capital structure to the unregulated marketplace, and they recommend specific public polices to ensure healthy competition.