Economic And Legal Problems Of Transition To Market Economy

On cover & title page: Collection

March 1996 The government's ability to act fast and with determination is more important to radical economic reform than technical perfection in designing new policy instruments. Political consent to reform measures lasts a short time, so it should be used in full. If the window of opportunity is ignored, the next one may be a long time coming. In 1989, the former communist countries embarked on a transition from centrally planned command economies to market economies (and from repressive dictatorships to Western-style democracies). In addressing the question, What is the optimal strategy for this transformation? Dabrowski revisits the controversy about how quickly and radically the new market rules and their components should be adopted in the former communist countries and discusses the economic and political problems associated with different strategies. Among his conclusions: * Generally, the faster and more comprehensive the economic reform, the more chance there is to minimize its economic, social, and political costs, and to avoid chronic macroeconomic mismanagement. A more radical and disciplined path of transition is all the more important when initial conditions are less favorable and negative external shocks are greater. Only countries such as Hungary -- which had made some progress in market-oriented reform before communism's collapse and which experienced less macroeconomic disequilibrium -- could go more slowly. * Political liberalization and democratization helps the economic transition succeed mainly because it helps weaken the political positions of the traditional communist oligarchy (nomenclatura), which is interested mainly in rent-seeking. * Unless stabilization and liberalization are achieved quickly, microeconomic restructuring cannot be expected to progress quickly, even if privatization does (as it has in Russia). Other aspects of the transition may take more time. For privatization to succeed, for example, a legal base and organizational infrastructure must be created. But even with privatization, a rapid transition is less risky for restructuring and for complex institutional reform than a slow transition. * There is no way to avoid a relatively large decline in output, especially of industrial production in the state sector. * Granting concessions to, and bargaining with, various pressure groups does not produce the expected political results or increase social acceptance of reform. * Governments should not be afraid of aiming too high in embarking on a stabilization program or any other component of transformation. Most post-communist governments do the opposite: dilute the program so much it becomes ineffective. This paper -- a product of the Transition Economics Division, Policy Research Department -- is part of a larger effort in the department to look at progress on macroeconomic reforms in former communist countries as they move to a market economy.

This paper proposes an operational interpretation of the concept of economic governance. It argues that the capacity of governments to credibly ensure a secure economic environment provides an important benchmark against which governance can be evaluated. Such an environment—which is essential for sustained growth in a market economy—can be established through a rules–based system which ensures freedom of entry into the market, access to information, and sanctity of contracts. Since creating a secure economic environment involves profound, far–reaching social change, it has historically been a complex and lengthy process in most societies. However, basing policy prescriptions on this benchmark helps avoid possible conflicts between different social and moral values.

In the last decade, market-centered economic reforms have been implemented in a wide range of developing and transitional countries under the auspices of the international financial institutions. Whether or not they deliver the promised prosperity, they appear to be associated with widening economic inequality as well as disadvantage for particular social groups, among them women and workers. Recharacterizing Restructuring argues that such effects are neither temporary nor accidental. Instead, efforts to promote growth through greater efficiency inevitably engage distributive concerns. Change in the status of different groups is connected to the process of legal and institutional reform. Part I analyzes the place of law and institutional reform in current economic restructuring policies. Through post-realist legal analysis and institutional economics, it discusses the role of background legal rules in the allocation of resources and power among different groups. Part II traces how disadvantage might result for women in the course of economic reform, through an analysis of the World Bank's proposals for states in transition from plan to market economies. It considers such foundational issues as the place of unpaid work in economic activity, as well as the gendered nature of proposals to re-organize productive activity and the role of the state.

Government and Markets is the first book to tackle systematically and in a multidisciplinary fashion the role of democratic governments during and after the transition from plan to market. The role of governments during the transformation is important for eliminating the obstacles and putting into place the conditions for the emergence of a viable market economy. Moreover, governments need to play a key role in establishing a political-legal order that promotes political liberties and economic freedom. In contrast to other literature on the transformation process in formerly planned systems, this volume focuses also on the creation of autonomous and accountable governments as part of the liberal economic order. Finally, the volume analyzes the role of the legal state in creating a competitive market economy. Government and Markets addresses itself to scholars, politicians policy makers interested in the establishment of a democratic, competitive order in formerly planned political economic systems.

This paper outlines the main characteristics and the development of the centrally planned economic sysetm in Romania before the beginnings of the transition to a market eonomy it then presents the design, objectives, and implementation of the reform program.

This title was first published in 2001. This volume of essays studies the problem of transition in economics from a historical perspective. It uses historical ideas and theories in a modern context to examine economic thought. It aims to show that social and historical context are important when considering economic transitions.