Dynamic Competition And Public Policy

Scholars explore antitrust issues as these relate to dynamic industry competition and public policy.

A proposal for moving from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy, reviewing theory and available evidence on economic incentives for innovation. Competition policy and antitrust enforcement have traditionally focused on prices rather than innovation. Economic theory shows the ways that price competition benefits consumers, and courts, antitrust agencies, and economists have developed tools for the quantitative evaluation of price impacts. Antitrust law does not preclude interventions to encourage innovation, but over time the interpretation of the laws has raised obstacles to enforcement policies for innovation. In this book, economist Richard Gilbert proposes a shift from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy. Antitrust enforcement should be concerned with protecting incentives for innovation and preserving opportunities for dynamic, rather than static, competition. In a high-technology economy, Gilbert argues, innovation matters.

Die Wharton Business School ist die älteste Institution ihrer Art in Amerika und eine der bestangesehenen der Welt. Ein Expertenteam aus fünf verschiedenen Fachgebieten in Wharton diskutiert hier eine der wichtigsten Fragen für ein Unternehmen der Gegenwart - die Sicherung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Neueste Konzepte kreativer Strategien werden vorgestellt.

World population and the number of city dwellers are steadily growing. Globalization and digitalization lead to an increased competition for skilled and creative labor and other economic resources. This is true not only for firms, but increasingly also for cities. The book elaborates on resulting challenges and opportunities for urban management from the European perspective, and discusses theories, methods and tools from business economics to cope with them. Contributions in this volume come from scholars and practitioners of economics, business administration and urban management, and cover aspects ranging from urban dynamics to city marketing. They draw on experiences from several European cities and regions, and discuss strategies to improve city performance including Open Government, Smart City, cooperation and innovation. The book project was initiated and carried out by the Center for Advanced Studies in Management (CASiM), the interdisciplinary research center of HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management. It is addressed to scholars and managers in Europe and beyond, who will benefit from the scientific rigor and useful practical insights of the book.

This 2000 text applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real-world markets operate. These results have particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy. Analyses indicate that picking the most competitive framework in the short run may be detrimental to competition and welfare in the long run, concentrating the attention of policy makers on the impact on the long-run market structure. This book provides essential reading for graduate students of industrial and managerial economics as well as researchers and policy makers.

This cohesive collection brings together David J. Teece's most important work on the nexus of innovation and competition policy. He was one of the first to flag the importance of innovation issues to competition policy 25 years ago. He has also pioneered the application of economic and organizational principles to issues in the management of innovation. Throughout these essays, Professor Teece shows how technological advances, the advent of the Internet and other recent shifts in the global business landscape have placed businesses in a radically altered situation from even just a few decades ago. He clearly elucidates the need for both businesses and policymakers to adapt to this rapidly evolving landscape by embracing and fostering next-generation competition policies. Topics discussed include antitrust policy, technology strategies, competition policy, market power and intellectual property issues. Students and professors of business and management, innovation studies, intellectual property and competition lawyers will find this volume a critical asset to their work. Policymakers and regulators will also benefit immensely from this lucid and comprehensive collection.

While there is general agreement among economists that the new economy has helped stimulate innovation and growth, there is a vigorous debate about when to intervene on behalf of consumers. The basic conundrum that antitrust authorities face is that scale economies in production and consumption provide an economic justification for having a single firm dominate a market. This article characterizes the debate on antitrust and the new economy, using the Microsoft case as a key example. Antitrust policy is critical because it helps determine the rules of the road by which firms can compete and merge. Policy proposals for regulating the new economy fall loosely into two camps - those that advocate intervention in some of these markets and those that generally advocate not intervening in these markets. The interventionists focus on possible barriers to entry that could be imposed by a dominant new economy firm. The non-interventionists highlight the self-corrective nature of new economy markets, and assert that the costs of taking action on the part of government is high compared to the cost of doing nothing. Noninterventionists also question the extent to which surgical antitrust interventions are feasible or appropriate. The paper offers six recommendations for improving policy. These include: recognizing the slow speed of antitrust policy relative to the new economy; evaluating new economy antitrust issues on a case-by-case basis; using a framework that highlights dynamic competition for new economy antitrust issues; erring on the side of caution in regulating new economy markets; reducing political rent seeking opportunities in these markets; and learning more about how these markets actually function.

In the United States, the express purpose of regulation is, according to a 1993 executive order, to "protect or improve the health and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of the American people." However well intentioned, all human action carries with it the potential for secondary, sometimes negative, consequences. In the case of regulation, these consequences may cause harm-by exacerbating poverty, increasing opportunity inequality, raising prices, or reducing economic growth. The late Jerry Ellig-economist, teacher, writer-argued that before imposing regulations on individuals and their activities, policymakers must conduct the kind of economic analysis that can deliver rational regulation. This process requires asking: How significant is the problem the regulation seeks to address? What is the root cause of the problem? Are there alternative ways to address the cause, and how effective might they be? What are the benefits and costs to society of each alternative? These are the questions Ellig sought to answer-whether conducting research at the George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center, serving as chief economist at the Federal Communications Commission, delivering testimony at a congressional hearing, or teaching students at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. As this memorial collection shows, improvements in the regulatory process can foster the life-enhancing innovation and dynamic competition on which future prosperity depends.