Dual Process Theories Of Numerical Cognition

This book presents a philosophical interpretation to numerical cognition based on dual process theories and heuristics. It shows how investigations in cognitive science can shed light on issues traditionally raised by philosophers of mathematics. The analysis will also help readers to better understand the relationship between current neuroscientific research and the philosophical reflection on mathematics. The author seeks to explain the acquisition of mathematical concepts. To accomplish this, he needs to answer two questions. How can the concepts of approximate numerosity become an object of thought that is so accessible to our consciousness? How are these concepts refined and specified in such a way as to become numbers? Unfortunately, there is currently no model that can truly demonstrate the role of language in the development of numerical skills starting from approximate pre-verbal skills. However, the author details a solution to this problem: dual process theories. It is an approach widely used by theorists focusing on reasoning, decision making, social cognition, and consciousness. Here, he applies this approach to the studies on mathematical knowledge. He details the results brought about by psychological and neuroscientific studies conducted on numerical cognition by key neuroscientists. In the process, he develops the foundations of a new, potential philosophical explanation on mathematical knowledge.

This handbook provides a comprehensive review of social cognition, ranging from its history and core research areas to its relationships with other fields. The 43 chapters included are written by eminent researchers in the field of social cognition, and are designed to be understandable and informative to readers with a wide range of backgrounds.

This informative volume presents the first comprehensive review of research and theory on dual-process models of social information processing. These models distinguish between qualitatively different modes of information processing in making decisions and solving problems (e.g., associative versus rule-based, controlled versus uncontrolled, and affective versus cognitive modes). Leading contributors review the basic assumptions of these approaches and review the ways they have been applied and tested in such areas as attitudes, stereotyping, person perception, memory, and judgment. Also examined are the relationships between different sets of processing modes, the factors that determine their utilization, and how they work in combination to affect responses to social information.

Dual Process Theory 2.0 provides a comprehensive overview of the new directions in which dual process research is heading. Human thinking is often characterized as an interplay between intuition and deliberation and this two-headed, dual process view of human thinking has been very influential in the cognitive sciences and popular media. However, despite the popularity of the dual process framework it faces multiple challenges. Recent advances indicate that there is a strong need to re-think some of the fundamental assumptions of the original dual process model. With chapters written by leading scholars who have been actively involved in the development of an upgraded ‘Dual Process Theory 2.0’, this edited volume presents an accessible overview of the latest empirical findings and theoretical ideas.. With cutting edge insights on the interaction between intuition and deliberation, Dual Process Theory 2.0 should be of interest to psychologists, philosophers, and economists who are using dual process models.

Hypothetical thought involves the imagination of possibilities and the exploration of their consequences by a process of mental simulation. In this Classic Edition, Jonathan St B T Evans’ presents his pioneering Hypothetical Thinking Theory; an integrated theoretical account of a wide range of psychological studies on hypothesis testing, reasoning, judgement and decision making. Hypothetical Thinking Theory is built on three key principles and implemented in a version of Evans' well-known heuristic–analytic theory of reasoning. The central claim of this book is that this theory can provide an integrated account of apparently diverse phenomena including confirmation bias in hypothesis testing, acceptance of fallacies in deductive reasoning, belief biases in reasoning and judgement, biases of statistical judgement and numerous characteristic findings in the study of decision making. Featuring a reflective and insightful new introduction to the book, this classic edition discusses contemporary theory on cognitive biases, human rationality and dual-process theories of higher cognition. It will be of great interest to researchers, post graduates as well as advanced undergraduate students.

The idea of one's memory "filling up" is a humorous misconception of how memory in general is thought to work; it actually has no capacity limit. However, the idea of a "full brain" makes more sense with reference to working memory, which is the limited amount of information a person can hold temporarily in an especially accessible form for use in the completion of almost any challenging cognitive task. This groundbreaking book explains the evidence supporting Cowan's theoretical proposal about working memory capacity, and compares it to competing perspectives. Cognitive psychologists profoundly disagree on how working memory is limited: whether by the number of units that can be retained (and, if so, what kind of units and how many), the types of interfering material, the time that has elapsed, some combination of these mechanisms, or none of them. The book assesses these hypotheses and examines explanations of why capacity limits occur, including vivid biological, cognitive, and evolutionary accounts. The book concludes with a discussion of the practical importance of capacity limits in daily life. This 10th anniversary Classic Edition will continue to be accessible to a wide range of readers and serve as an invaluable reference for all memory researchers.

This book explores the idea that we have two minds - one that is automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to dual processs theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within the former, processes are held to be innate and to use heuristics which evolved to solve specific adaptive problems. In the latter, processes are taken to be learned, flexible, and responsive to rational norms. Despite the attention these theories are attracting, there is still poor communication between dual-process theorists themselves, and the substantial bodies of work on dual processes in cognitive psychology and social psychology remain isolated from each other. This book brings together leading researchers on dual-processes to summarize the state of the art, highlight key issues, present different perspectives, explore implications, and provide a stimulus to further work. It includes new ideas about the human mind both by contemporary philosophers interested in broad theoretical questions about mental architecture and by psychologists specialising in traditionally distinct and isolated fields. For all those in the cognitive sciences, this is a book that will advance dual-process theorizing, promote interdisciplinary communication, and encourage further applications of dual-process approaches.

The past 40 years have seen an enormous amount of research aimed at investigating human reasoning and decision-making abilities. This research has led to an extended debate about the extent to which humans meet the standards of normative theories of rationality. Recently, it has been proposed that dual-process theories, which posit that there are two distinct types of cognitive systems, offer a way to resolve this debate over human rationality. I will propose that the two systems of dual-process theories are best understood as investigative kinds. I will then examine recent empirical research from the cognitive neuroscience of decision-making that lends empirical support to the theoretical claims of dual-process theorists. I will lastly argue that dual-process theories not only offer an explanation for much of the conflicting data seen in decision-making and reasoning research, but that they ultimately offer reason to be optimistic about the prospects of human rationality.

How do we understand numbers? Do animals and babies have numerical abilities? Why do some people fail to grasp numbers, and how we can improve numerical understanding? Numbers are vital to so many areas of life: in science, economics, sports, education, and many aspects of everyday life from infancy onwards. Numerical cognition is a vibrant area that brings together scientists from different and diverse research areas (e.g., neuropsychology, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, comparative psychology, anthropology, education, and neuroscience) using different methodological approaches (e.g., behavioral studies of healthy children and adults and of patients; electrophysiology and brain imaging studies in humans; single-cell neurophysiology in non-human primates, habituation studies in human infants and animals, and computer modeling). While the study of numerical cognition had been relatively neglected for a long time, during the last decade there has been an explosion of studies and new findings. This has resulted in an enormous advance in our understanding of the neural and cognitive mechanisms of numerical cognition. In addition, there has recently been increasing interest and concern about pupils' mathematical achievement in many countries, resulting in attempts to use research to guide mathematics instruction in schools, and to develop interventions for children with mathematical difficulties. This handbook brings together the different research areas that make up the field of numerical cognition in one comprehensive and authoritative volume. The chapters provide a broad and extensive review that is written in an accessible form for scholars and students, as well as educationalists, clinicians, and policy makers. The book covers the most important aspects of research on numerical cognition from the areas of development psychology, cognitive psychology, neuropsychology and rehabilitation, learning disabilities, human and animal cognition and neuroscience, computational modeling, education and individual differences, and philosophy. Containing more than 60 chapters by leading specialists in their fields, the Oxford Handbook of Numerical Cognition is a state-of-the-art review of the current literature.