Disguised Weapons

Written by an NYPD officer who has seen it all, this book highlights a sobering array of covert weapons, from beeper guns to credit card knives to pen stun guns. Police and security agents will find this an indispensable guide to the search and recovery of these hidden threats.

Shot on location in breathtaking Lake Chelan, Washington, during the 2001 Wind and Rock camp, this second volume of the Wind and Rock series features noted instructor and Inside Kung Fu magazine columnist Burton Richardson. Richardson takes you step by step through the various phases of his highly regarded Jeet Kune Do Unlimited curriculum and shows you how to flow effortlessly from kicking to punching to trapping to grappling. At long range, he teaches you the secrets of the boxing blast (an improved version of the jeet kune do straight blast) and a universal cover move that will allow you to easily absorb the hardest punches. Moving in to the clinch, he reveals little-known tricks from Thai boxing that will enable you to control and punish your opponent while remaining virtually immune from his attacks. Finally, Richardson shows you his interpretation of some of the newest techniques of Brazilian jujitsu and takes you through a crash course in jeet kune do groundfighting. Don't miss this rare opportunity to train with one of today's best-known martial arts instructors. For information purposes only.

In his Foreword, Professor Jones writes 'Mr Collier takes the opportunity to review the contributions of all forms of Intelligence, and the use and misuse that was made of them, in all the major phases of World War II. His task has required very wide reading of the great volume of original documents and derivative literature now available, and I admire the judgement that is evident throughout the book. Within the limits of treating the widest aspects of Intelligence in World War II in a small compass, Mr Collier has told the whole truth, fortunately without it turning out to be very unfavorable; and in the lessons to be drawn from it we indeed have one element of security if properly applied'.Basil Collier throws fresh light on the low priority given to Intelligence between the wars; the tendency of ministers and senior officials to rely less on intelligence reports than their own individual hunches; the failure to foresee the invasion of Norway; why, even with the aid of Enigma it was impossible to turn the scales in Crete, and why the Americans, though privy to some of Japans most closely guarded secrets, allowed the Pearl Harbor attack to take them by surprise.

The author of this text, Tim Trevan, was a key British participant (1992-1995) in UNSCOM's investigation of Iraqi chemical and biological sites. In his narrative, he shows how UNSCOM dealt with Iraq's devious, despotic regime: the early frustrations encountered because of Iraq's lying and obstruction; the techniques and technologies inspectors employed; the personal difficulties and dangers of the job; and their ingenuity in tackling problems. The book also shows how the Commission maintained support in a divided UN Security Council long enough to achieve success, despite the ceaseless stream of international crises unleashed by Iraq to try and break the Commission.

In his Foreword, Professor Jones writes 'Mr Collier takes the opportunity to review the contributions of all forms of Intelligence, and the use and misuse that was made of them, in all the major phases of World War II. His task has required very wide reading of the great volume of original documents and derivative literature now available, and I admire the judgement that is evident throughout the book. Within the limits of treating the widest aspects of Intelligence in World War II in a small compass, Mr Collier has told the whole truth, fortunately without it turning out to be very unfavorable; and in the lessons to be drawn from it we indeed have one element of security if properly applied'.Basil Collier throws fresh light on the low priority given to Intelligence between the wars; the tendency of ministers and senior officials to rely less on intelligence reports than their own individual hunches; the failure to foresee the invasion of Norway; why, even with the aid of Enigma it was impossible to turn the scales in Crete, and why the Americans, though privy to some of Japans most closely guarded secrets, allowed the Pearl Harbor attack to take them by surprise.