Decision Making For Defense

When President Kennedy appointed Robert McNamara Secretary of Defense in January, 1961 and McNamara called on Charles Hitch to join him, a new era of defense policy leadership was clearly at hand. Great problems of organization had emerged along with vast increases in American responsibility for the security of the free world in the post-war era of rapidly changing military technology. Defense department unification and other controversial questions of organization of the defense establishment assumed new dimensions with the advent of the new techniques of planning and analysis. Hitch discusses, from the rare perspective of an analytically gifted insider, how the Department of Defense achieved balanced programs and more effective forces through the firm application of the new management techniques without sweeping changes of organization structure. Important challenges still lie ahead. As Hitch says: "The objectives, the organization, and the management techniques of national defense are all interrelated. Organization and procedures must be adapted to our changing nationaal policies and objectives as well as to changes in the character of our resources and technologies. It will take all our ingenuity and skill to make these necessary adaptations so that we can continue to provide unified management of so great an enterprise as our present military establishment. At the beginning of our Constitutional history the building of three frigates and the management of a few companies to fight Indians were considered too great a task for the War Department alone." Management of the American defense establishment has been a subject of fascination, concern and occasional despair to generation of Presidents, legislators, military leaders, and informed citizens. Hitch provides historical perspective on these tasks of decision-making for national security, and he explains clearly and succinctly the contemporary problems of fitting together strategic alternatives, weapons technology, and economic resources to achieve a rational pattern of defense management. The modern tools for this task are new techniques of planning, programming, and budgeting, and, for evaluating complex situations, the methods of systems analysis, all of which are discussed in detail. Hitch was involved both in the origination of these management techniques while at the RAND Corporation and in the tremendous task of putting them to consistent, far reaching, and practical use in the Department of Defense. President Johnson termed Hitch "a principal architect of America's modern defense establishment . . . It is largely as a result of [his] efforts that this country now possesses the most balanced, flexible, combat-ready defense force in history and management system to maintain our superior military posture and use it with precision." This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1965.

Operations Research (OR) emerged in an effort to improve the effectiveness of newly inducted weapons and equipment during World War II. While rapid growth ofOR led to its becoming an important aid to decision making in all sectors including defense, its contribution in defense remained largely confined to classified reports. Very few books dealing with applications of quantitative decision making techniques in military have been published presumably due to limited availability ofrelevant information. The situation changed rapidly during the last few years. The recognition of the subject of Military Operations Research (MOR) gave tremendous boost to its development. Books and journals on MOR started appearing. The number of sessions on MOR at national and international conferences also registered an increase. The volume of teaching, training and research activities in the field of MOR at military schools and non-military schools enhanced considerably. Military executives and commanders started taking increasing interest in getting scientific answers to questions pertaining to weapon acquisition, threat perception and quantification, assessment of damage or casualties, evaluation of chance of winning a battle, force mix, deployment and targeting of weapons against enemy targets, war games and scenario evaluation. Most of these problems were being tackled on the basis of intuition, judgment and experience or analysis under very simple assumptions. In an increasingly sophisticated and complex defense scenario resulting in advances in equipment and communications, the need for supplementing these practices by scientific research in MOR became imperative.

It is still easy to underestimate how much the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War?--and then the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001?--transformed the task of American foreign and defense policymaking. In place of predictability (if a sometimes terrifying predictability), the world is now very unpredictable. In place of a single overriding threat and benchmark by which all else could be measured, a number of possible threats have arisen, not all of them states. In place of force-on-force engagements, U.S. defense planners have to assume "asymmetric" threats?--ways not to defeat U.S. power but to render it irrelevant. This book frames the challenges for defense policy that the transformed world engenders, and it sketches new tools for dealing with those challenges?--from new techniques in modeling and gaming, to planning based on capabilities rather than threats, to personnel planning and making use of "best practices" from the private sector.

Techniques of decision making have received increasing interest since WW II and have evolved into some more or less sophisticated applications in government and industry. The Defense Department continues to seek better decision techniques particularly in the operations environment. This study examines current DOD activities in advanced research. Applications in major European commands and within Marine Corps research activities are explored. Problems impairing research and the implementation of successful procedures are discussed as well. General comments on decision analysis in DOD are provided. The study also suggests ways to improve decision making instruction at the Army War College. The study is not technical and is most useful to those interested or involved in seeking innovative ways to improve Defense decision making. To the author's knowledge this is the only comprehensive report on the Defense research applications examined. Extensive footnotes and bibliography. (Author).