Decentralisation And The Management Of Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic inequalities in divided societies can exacerbate social divisions and lead to conflict. Reducing these inequalities could have a de-escalating effect, yet there is little consensus on how this can be achieved most effectively and sustainably. Decentralisation is held to improve inter-ethnic relations in multi-ethnic states by allowing territorially concentrated groups greater autonomy over their own affairs, and the case of the Republic of Macedonia offers an example of the successes and failings of decentralisation. Decentralisation and the Management of Ethnic Conflict offers new insight into the dynamics of conflict management through decentralisation, using an in-depth case study of decentralisation in the Republic of Macedonia between 2005 and 2012. Guided by the concept of horizontal inequalities, the volume identifies the factors which influenced the decision to devolve responsibilities to the municipalities after 2001.Taking an integrative approach to studying the political, administrative, and fiscal dimensions of decentralisation and its implementation, the book investigates whether these institutional reforms have indeed contributed to the reduction of inequalities between Macedonia’s ethnic groups, and what the obstacles were in those areas in which decentralisation has not reached its full potential. The key lesson of the Macedonian case is that attempts to solve internal self-determination conflicts through decentralisation will fail if local self-governance exists only in form but not in substance. This book contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the challenges facing different forms of decentralisation in the long term, and as such represents a significant contribution to Conflict Studies, Development Studies and Political Science more generally.

Why does political decentralization reduce intrastate conflict more in some countries than in others? Can political institutions be designed to engender peace? If so, how? Addressing these questions, Dawn Brancati's Peace by Design advances the current debate on decentralization beyond a discussion of whether or not decentralization is effective in reducing conflict, to when and under what conditions it is successful. The book bridges opposing views while offering an original one, arguing that decentralization's ability to reduce conflict hinges on the electoral strength of regional parties, which, in turn, varies according to different institutional features of decentralization. Various aspects of political systems likewise affect the extent to which regional parties stimulate conflict and conversely, the degree to which statewide parties mitigate it. Rich in scholarly as well as policymaking insights, and grounded in extensive qualitative and quantitative research, Peace by Design illuminates the exigent issue of how to design political institutions in order to promote peace. Dawn Brancati is an Assistant Professor at Washington University in St. Louis. Previously, she taught at Harvard University and held fellowships from the Harvard-MIT Data Center and the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University. List of Figures List of Tables 1. Introduction Part I: Theory Development 2. Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Intrastate Conflict? Part II: Case Study Analysis 3. Czechoslovakia 4. Spain 5. India Part III: Quantitative Analysis 6. Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism 7. Regional Parties 8. Conclusion References Endnotes Index

The object of this book is to look at the manner in which states attempt to cope with ethnic conflict through territorial approaches. This revised edition has new chapters covering Northern Ireland, South Africa and Yugoslavia.

This topic guide provides practical guidance for designing, implementing and evaluating decentralisation reforms and local government practices to ensure they are as effective as possible. It includes summaries of key texts and provides links to cutting edge research and recent case studies.

This volume offers a major tour de force in bringing together for the first time key scholars, journalists, and policymakers from a variety of discipline perspectives to fully explore the wide range of issues involved in ethnic conflict and to offer concrete resolutions. The authors focus on prevention, intervention, and institutional regulation, but through it all, they bring a realistic perspective to bear on what is happening and what can be done. The wrenching circumstances of ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Bosnia, Chechnya, or South Africa must never be forgotten or borne again, and the authors in this monumental work remind us-graphically, but groundedly-why. Visit our website for sample chapters! Published in co-operation with the Center for Development Research, University of Bonn.

Decentralization, particularly federalism, is often presented as an institutional solution for ethnic conflict. Yet, the literature on decentralization and conflict is inconclusive; some scholars argue that decentralization contains conflict, others argue that it exacerbates conflict, and more recent studies shed light on decentralization’s varying impact on ethnic conflict. After identifying conceptual inconsistencies throughout this research, this dissertation presents the Deconstructed Decentralization Model (DDM), a comprehensive framework for assessing decentralization. This framework disaggregates decentralization into three dimensions: political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization. Additionally, the DDM incorporates two subregional levels of decentralization: the subregional state level and the local, municipal level. Using the DDM and a time-series cross-national dataset spanning 52 countries, a statistical analysis of the relationship between deconstructed decentralization and ethnic conflict is presented. This analysis yields a nuanced set of findings regarding the relationships between regional and local levels of political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization and disaggregated ethnic conflict. Importantly, this study sheds light on the potential of local-level administrative decentralization for containing violent ethnic conflict for countries of varying democracy levels, a timely finding in light of the increasing global appeal of administrative decentralization. This study concludes with a qualitative analysis of deconstructed decentralization in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which reveals challenges to the authentic implementation of decentralization. These findings shed light on possible factors to consider in order to continue refining the conceptualization, measure, and impact of decentralization.

There is no one-size-fits-all decentralized fix to deeply divided and conflict-ridden states. One of the hotly debated policy prescriptions for states facing self-determination demands is some form of decentralized governance - including regional autonomy arrangements and federalism - which grants minority groups a degree of self-rule. Yet the track record of existing decentralized states suggests that these have widely divergent capacity to contain conflicts within their borders. Through in-depth case studies of Chechnya, Punjab and Québec, as well as a statistical cross-country analysis, this book argues that while policy, fiscal approach, and political decentralization can, indeed, be peace-preserving at times, the effects of these institutions are conditioned by traits of the societies they (are meant to) govern. Decentralization may help preserve peace in one country or in one region, but it may have just the opposite effect in a country or region with different ethnic and economic characteristics.