De Smiths Judicial Review

"The new edition deals with domestic grounds of review, challenges under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the use of European Community law in judicial review. It: provides solutions to the most complex legal problems relating to judicial review; analyses both the theoretical foundations of the subject and its practice; supplies comprehensive guidance on what to do at every stage of an action for judicial review; explains the impact of the latest case law and procedural developments; sets judicial review in the context of the fast-changing administrative justice system (including 'proportionate dispute resolution', the new tribunal system, recourse to ombudsmen); and draws on relevant experience from other Commonwealth jurisdictions, especially Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand and South Africa."--

This revised edition updates the standard textbook on all aspects of judicial review. It covers the constitutional importance of judicial review and which bodies and decisions are subject to it.

This book grounds judicial review in its deepest foundations: the function, authority, and objectivity of a legal system as a whole.

In countries and supranational entities around the globe, constitutional reform has transferred an unprecedented amount of power from representative institutions to judiciaries. The constitutionalization of rights and the establishment of judicial review are widely believed to have benevolent and progressive origins, and significant redistributive, power-diffusing consequences. Ran Hirschl challenges this conventional wisdom. Drawing upon a comprehensive comparative inquiry into the political origins and legal consequences of the recent constitutional revolutions in Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and South Africa, Hirschl shows that the trend toward constitutionalization is hardly driven by politicians' genuine commitment to democracy, social justice, or universal rights. Rather, it is best understood as the product of a strategic interplay among hegemonic yet threatened political elites, influential economic stakeholders, and judicial leaders. This self-interested coalition of legal innovators determines the timing, extent, and nature of constitutional reforms. Hirschl demonstrates that whereas judicial empowerment through constitutionalization has a limited impact on advancing progressive notions of distributive justice, it has a transformative effect on political discourse. The global trend toward juristocracy, Hirschl argues, is part of a broader process whereby political and economic elites, while they profess support for democracy and sustained development, attempt to insulate policymaking from the vicissitudes of democratic politics.

Judicial Review: A Practical Guide is a handbook which aims to be a first port of call in all matters concerning judicial review applications, whether in civil or criminal proceedings. This new edition has been significantly amended to take account of the following developments in law and practice, including: * Development of the Unified Tribunal system with transfers of judicial reviews * Regionalisation of Administrative Court * Clear development of mistake of fact as a mistake of law * Increasing understanding of the impact of the Human Rights Act * Limitations upon judicial review in the context of immigration * Ongoing case-law developments * Changes to Appeals (CPR Pt 52) * Developments in costs and funding In addition to the authors' commentary, Judicial Review: A Practical Guide contains over 20 precedents covering all aspects of the litigation process, together with all the main legislative and judicial materials.

This powerfully argued appraisal of judicial review may change the face of American law. Written for layman and scholar alike, the book addresses one of the most important issues facing Americans today: within what guidelines shall the Supreme Court apply the strictures of the Constitution to the complexities of modern life? Until now legal experts have proposed two basic approaches to the Constitution. The first, “interpretivism,” maintains that we should stick as closely as possible to what is explicit in the document itself. The second, predominant in recent academic theorizing, argues that the courts should be guided by what they see as the fundamental values of American society. John Hart Ely demonstrates that both of these approaches are inherently incomplete and inadequate. Democracy and Distrust sets forth a new and persuasive basis for determining the role of the Supreme Court today. Ely’s proposal is centered on the view that the Court should devote itself to assuring majority governance while protecting minority rights. “The Constitution,” he writes, “has proceeded from the sensible assumption that an effective majority will not unreasonably threaten its own rights, and has sought to assure that such a majority not systematically treat others less well than it treats itself. It has done so by structuring decision processes at all levels in an attempt to ensure, first, that everyone’s interests will be represented when decisions are made, and second, that the application of those decisions will not be manipulated so as to reintroduce in practice the sort of discrimination that is impermissible in theory.” Thus, Ely’s emphasis is on the procedural side of due process, on the preservation of governmental structure rather than on the recognition of elusive social values. At the same time, his approach is free of interpretivism’s rigidity because it is fully responsive to the changing wishes of a popular majority. Consequently, his book will have a profound impact on legal opinion at all levels—from experts in constitutional law, to lawyers with general practices, to concerned citizens watching the bewildering changes in American law.