Cynical Suspicions And Platonist Pretentions

In Cynical Suspicions and Platonist Pretensions, John McGuire offers a critique of recent trends in contemporary political theory, specifically concerning the ‘dangers’ of cynicism and the contamination of public reason. In the view of many theorists and pundits, cynicism remains one of the gravest ills to befall any democratic society, injecting a virulent estrangement which leaves sufferers unable to trust elected representatives and unwilling to participate in collective action. Starting with a reconstruction of the performative and rhetorical tactics of the ‘first’ Cynic, Diogenes of Sinope (c. 323 BCE), John McGuire aims to demonstrate how cynicism’s non-defeatist, relentlessly sceptical ethos provides an important counterweight to the self-aggrandising designs of moralists and policymakers alike.

Analysing international law through the prism of “cynicism” makes it possible to look beyond overt disregard for international law, currently discussed in terms of a backlash or crisis. The concept allows to analyse and criticise structural features and specific uses of international law that seem detrimental to international law in a more subtle way. Unlike its ancient predecessor, cynicism nowadays refers not to a bold critique of power but to uses and abuses of international law that pursue one-sided interests tacitly disregarding the legal structure applied. From this point of view, the contributions critically reflect on the theoretical foundations of international law, in particular its relationship to power, actors such as the International Law Commission and international judges, and specific fields, including international human rights, humanitarian, criminal, tax and investment law.

In Plato on Democracy and Political technē Sørensen argues that the question of democracy’s ‘epistemic potential’ was one that Plato took more seriously than is usually assumed. While he famously rejected democracy on the basis of its inherent inability to accommodate political expertise (technē), he did not think that this failure on democracy’s part was necessarily inevitable but a concept that required further examination. Sørensen shows that in a number of his most important dialogues (Republic, Gorgias, Statesman, Protagoras, Theaetetus), Plato was ready to take up the question of democracy’s epistemic potential and to enter into strikingly technical and sophisticated discussions of what both rule by technē and rule by the people would have to look like in order for the two things to be compatible.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1997.

. Renewal of Life by Transmission. The most notable distinction between living and inanimate things is that the former maintain themselves by renewal. A stone when struck resists. If its resistance is greater than the force of the blow struck, it remains outwardly unchanged. Otherwise, it is shattered into smaller bits. Never does the stone attempt to react in such a way that it may maintain itself against the blow, much less so as to render the blow a contributing factor to its own continued action. While the living thing may easily be crushed by superior force, it none the less tries to turn the energies which act upon it into means of its own further existence. If it cannot do so, it does not just split into smaller pieces (at least in the higher forms of life), but loses its identity as a living thing. As long as it endures, it struggles to use surrounding energies in its own behalf. It uses light, air, moisture, and the material of soil. To say that it uses them is to say that it turns them into means of its own conservation. As long as it is growing, the energy it expends in thus turning the environment to account is more than compensated for by the return it gets: it grows. Understanding the word "control" in this sense, it may be said that a living being is one that subjugates and controls for its own continued activity the energies that would otherwise use it up. Life is a self-renewing process through action upon the environment.

Plato's frontal attack on poetry has always been a problem for sympathetic students, who have often minimized or avoided it. Beginning with the premise that the attack must be taken seriously, Eric Havelock shows that Plato's hostility is explained by the continued domination of the poetic tradition in contemporary Greek thought. The reason for the dominance of this tradition was technological. In a nonliterate culture, stored experience necessary to cultural stability had to be preserved as poetry in order to be memorized. Plato attacks poets, particularly Homer, as the sole source of Greek moral and technical instruction-Mr. Havelock shows how the Iliad acted as an oral encyclopedia. Under the label of mimesis, Plato condemns the poetic process of emotional identification and the necessity of presenting content as a series of specific images in a continued narrative. The second part of the book discusses the Platonic Forms as an aspect of an increasingly rational culture. Literate Greece demanded, instead of poetic discourse, a vocabulary and a sentence structure both abstract and explicit in which experience could be described normatively and analytically: in short a language of ethics and science.

menaced by the silent violence of technology and the imperatorial tones of a false voluntaristic god - a deity who never seeks to persuade but kills those he cannot frighten. Today, it is increasingly clear that Athens and Jerusalem must combine forces and march to the relief of civilization from the joint assault of these barbarisms - old and new. It is only fitting then, that the West should return to its Socratic origins at this crucial kairos." --Book Jacket.

Utopia is a work of fiction and socio-political satire by Thomas More published in 1516 in Latin. The book is a frame narrative primarily depicting a fictional island society and its religious, social and political customs. Many aspects of More's description of Utopia are reminiscent of life in monasteries.

A HISTORY OF CYNICISM- From Diogenes to the 6 th Century A. D. by DONALD R. DUDLEY. Contents include: INTRODUCTION ix I ANTISTHENES. NO DIRECT CONNEXION WITH CYNICS. HIS ETHICS I II DIOGENES AND HIS ASSOCIATES 17 a DIOGENES IN LITERARY TRADITIONLIFE THOUGHT b ONESICRATUS 39 c MONIMUS 40 d CRATES LIFE WRITINGS CRATES AND HIPPARCHIA 42 III 9 CYNICISM IN THE THIRD CENTURY B. C. 59 a BION 62 b MENIPPUS 69 c CERCIDAS 74 d TELES 84 e CYNIC EDUCATIONAL THEORY, ETC. 87 IV CYNICISM AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS IN THE THIRD CENTURY 95 a THE MEGARIANS 95 b ZENO 96 c ARISTON IOO d HEDONISTS IO3 e EPICUREANS I O6 TIMON 107 V CYNIC INFLUENCE ON HELLENISTIC LITERATURE IIO VI CYNICISM IN THE SECOND AND FIRST CENTURIES B. C. 117 VII DEMETRIUS. THE PHILOSOPHIC OPPOSITION IN THE FIRST CENTURY A. D. 125 vii viii A HISTORY OF CYNICISM CHAP. PAGf VIII CYNICISM IN THE SECOND CENTURY A. D. 143 a GENERAL CHARACTER 143 b DIG CHRYSOSTOM 148 c DEMONAX 158 d OENOMAUS l62 e PEREGRINUS 170 MINOR FIGURES 1 82 IX CYNICISM AND THE PHILOSOPHIC SCHOOLS IN THE FIRST AND SECOND CENTURIES A. D. 1 86 a PHILO b CYNICS AND STOICS OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE c FAVORINUS d MAXIMUS X CYNICISM FROM THE THIRD TO THE SIXTH CENTURIES A. D. 2, Q2 a JULIAN AND THE CYNICS b MAXIMUS c ASTERIUS d SALLUSTIUS EPILOGUE 209 APPENDICES 215 INDEX 223. INTRODUCTION: THE Emperor Julian, speaking of the Cynic philosophy, says that it has been practised in all ages ... it does not need any special study, one need only hearken to the god of Delphi when he enjoins the precepts know thyself and alter the currency . In claiming the Delphic god as the founder of Cynicism Julian is guilty of an obvious anachronism for Cynicism cannot be shown to antedate Diogenes of Sinope. But from the fourth century B. C. Cynicism endured to the last days of the ancient world Cynics were common in the days of Augustine they may have been known in the Empire of Byzantium. Long life is not of itself a criterion of worth and it cannot be denied that Cynicism survived when much of immeasurably greater intellectual value perished. To the student of ancient philosophy there is in Cynicism scarcely more than a rudimentary and debased version of the ethics of Socrates, which exaggerates his austerity to a fanatic asceticism, hardens his irony to sardonic laughter at the follies of man kind, and affords no parallel to his genuine love of knowledge. Well might Plato have said of the first and greatest Cynic, That man is Socrates gone mad. But to the student of social history, and of ancient thought as distinct from philosophy, there is much of interest in Cynicism...