Credibility And Exchange Rate Management In Developing Countries

The paper examines the role of credibility in the conduct of exchange rate policy in developing countries, The analysis is based on a model in which policymakers are concerned about inflation and external competitiveness. Price setters in the nontraded goods sector of the economy adjust prices in reaction to anticipated fluctuations in the domestic price of tradable goods. This type of model is showm to generate a “devaluation bias” which undermines the credibility of a fixed exchange rate. The effect of reputational factors, signaling considerations, and joining a currency union as possible solutions to this bias is examined.

The paper examines the role of credibility in the conduct of exchange rate policy in developing countries. The analysis is based on a model in which policymakers are concerned about inflation and external competitiveness. Price setters in the nontraded goods sector of the economy adjust prices in reaction to anticipated fluctuations in the domestic price of tradable goods. This type of model is shown to generate a quot;devaluation biasquot; which undermines the credibility of a fixed exchange rate. The effect of reputational factors, signaling considerations, and joining a currency union as possible solutions to this bias is examined.

External sector policies and exchange rate policy are central to a country's economic performance and to the IMF's surveillance functions. The papers in this book, edited by Richard Barth and Chorng-Huey Wong, were presented at a seminar on Exchange Rate Policy in Developing and Transition Economies held by the IMF Institute. They analyze choices of exchange rate regimes, issues affecting management of exchange regimes, and specific types of regimes, including case studies from the former Soviet Union, Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

This paper addresses analytical aspects of exchange rate policy and emphasizes the relationship among exchange rate flexibility, financial discipline, and international competitiveness.

We analyze coordination of monetary and exchange rate policy in a two-sector model of a small open economy featuring imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign financial assets. Our central finding is that management of the exchange rate greatly enhances the efficacy of inflation targeting. In a flexible exchange rate system, inflation targeting incurs a high risk of indeterminacy where macroeconomic fluctuations can be driven by self-fulfilling expectations. Moreover, small inflation shocks may escalate into much larger increases in inflation ex post. Both problems disappear when the central bank leans heavily against the wind in a managed float.

According to many economists, the increasing mobility of capital across borders has made it more costly to peg exchange rates. This phenomenon has contributed to some of the more famous examples of exchange rate crises in recent times, such as the Mexican peso crisis in 1994 and the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Yet despite the increasing costs of pegging in today's accelerated financial markets, some developing countries try to maintain a peg for as long as they can. This work is the first to theorize the role of bankers as a domestic interest group involved in exchange rate policy. It adds to our understanding of how interest groups affect economic policy in developing countries and explains why some of the largest and fastest growing economies in the developing world were the most prone to crisis. The volume also refines our understanding of the 'hollowing-out thesis', the argument that increasing capital mobility is forcing states to abandon pegging.

A growing number of countries are adopting flexible exchange rate regimes because flexibility offers more protection against external shocks and greater monetary independence. Other countries have made the transition under disorderly conditions, with the sharp depreciation of their currency during a crisis. Regardless of the reason for adopting a flexible exchange rate, a successful transition depends on the effective management of a number of institutional and operational issues. The authors of this Economic Issue describe the necessary ingredients for moving to a flexible regime, as well as the optimal pace and sequencing under different conditions.

Using recent advances in the classification of exchange rate regimes, this paper finds no support for the popular bipolar view that countries will tend over time to move to the polar extremes of free float or rigid peg. Rather, intermediate regimes have shown remarkable durability. The analysis suggests that as economies mature, the value of exchange rate flexibility rises. For countries at a relatively early stage of financial development and integration, fixed or relatively rigid regimes appear to offer some anti-inflation credibility gain without compromising growth objectives. As countries develop economically and institutionally, there appear to be considerable benefits to more flexible regimes. For developed countries that are not in a currency union, relatively flexible exchange rate regimes appear to offer higher growth without any cost in credibility.

This book considers the issue of exchange rate policymaking from a political economy perspective. It illustrates both theoretically and empirically how domestic political and institutional incentives shape exchange rate policies in developing countries. Empirical analysis is based on a panel survey of 47 countries and thereby provides insights on how political and institutional conditions typically affect exchange rate policy.

This paper reviews recent experience with the choice of floating or fixed (“anchor”) exchange regimes in industrial and developing countries. It concludes that desirable differences between the two sets of regimes have narrowed, owing to the useful operational role of exchange rate margins and unavoidable medium-term rate adjustments in the context of fixed regimes. A survey of recent empirical cross-country literature also suggests little unambiguous association of the choice of exchange regime with macroeconomic performance, inflation in particular. Stability of the exchange rate has generally been a by-product of other policy choices. Even announcement effects of the regime on inflation-fighting credibility depend on the country-specific assignments of policy instruments to more than one institution--central bank, government, or regional and multilateral institutions.