Corruption Governmental Activities And Markets

Paper discusses the factors that contribute to the spread of corruption as well as the implications of corruption for markets and for public sector activities. It is argued that corruption can be contained mainly by a scaling down of the public sector activities that stimulate its growth.

Paper discusses the factors that contribute to the spread of corruption as well as the implications of corruption for markets and for public sector activities. It is argued that corruption can be contained mainly by a scaling down of the public sector activities that stimulate its growth.

Much of the devastation caused by the recent earthquake in Turkey was the result of widespread corruption between the construction industry and government officials. Corruption is part of everyday public life and we tend to take it for granted. However, preventing corruption helps to raise city revenues, improve service delivery, stimulate public confidence and participation, and win elections. This book is designed to help citizens and public officials diagnose, investigate and prevent various kinds of corrupt and illicit behaviour. It focuses on systematic corruption rather than the free-lance activity of a few law-breakers, and emphasises practical preventive measures rather than purely punitive or moralistic campaigns.

Corruption, particularly political or “grand” corruption, distorts the entire decision-making process connected with public investment projects. The degree of distortions is higher with weaker auditing institutions. The evidence presented shows that higher corruption is associated with (i) higher public investment; (ii) lower government revenues; (iii) lower expenditures on operations and maintenance; and (iv) lower quality of public infrastructure. The evidence also shows that corruption increases public investment while reducing its productivity. These are five channels through which corruption lowers growth. An implication is that economists should be more restrained in their praise of high public sector investment, especially in countries with high corruption.

The current state of research in the international public finance field is elucidated in the fifteen papers collected in this volume, selected from among the more than 200 that were presented at the 53rd Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance held in Kyoto, Japan, in August 1997. The collection assembled here is not intended to comprise a proceedings of the Congress but, rather, presents the ideas of eminent scholars in seven areas of current research in the international public finance field: The Welfare State, Public Investment and Economic Growth, Inter-Governmental Relations, Tax Competition and Foreign Direct Investment, Foreign Investment in Transitional Economies-Russia and China, and Equalization Transfer Systems in Japan and Australia. The highlight of the Congress was the brilliant debate between two of the greatest authorities in the area of public finance, James M. Buchanan and Richard A. Musgrave, whose papers form the opening section of the volume.

Corruption: A Study in Political Economy focuses on the problem of corruptions in political economy and functional bribery. This book is organized into four parts encompassing 11 chapters. Chapters 2 to 4 deal with the fundamental relationship among voters, legislators, and interest groups, as well as the role of the government bureaucracy in shaping legislative choices. Chapters 5 illustrates the basic relationships with an analysis of a monopolistic government official charged with allocating a benefit through a queuing system, while Chapter 6 retains the assumption of a single official with monopoly power but moves beyond the queuing model to consider alternative sanctioning strategies, a wider variety of bureaucratic tasks, and bribers who may be competitively or monopolisticly organized. Chapters 7 and 8 explore the potential of a system where officials are permitted to compete with one another in processing applications for governmental benefits. Under this system, an individual or firm rejected by one official can seek the benefit from other bureaucrats. Chapter 9 introduces a final administrative variable into the analysis, while Chapter 10 discusses the governmental corruption to analogous corrupt activities entirely within the private sector. Lastly, Chapter 11 looks into the relation between corruption and democratic theory, the possibility of reforming corrupt bureaucracies, and the link between economics and morality. This book will be of value to public servants, legislators, economists, sociologists, and researchers.

This new edition of a 1999 classic shows how institutionalized corruption can be fought through sophisticated political-economic reform.

This paper discusses the possible causes and consequences of corruption. It provides a synthetic review of recent studies that analyze this phenomenon empirically. In addition, it presents further results on the effects of corruption on growth and investment, and new cross-country evidence on the link between corruption and the composition of government expenditure.

The OECD Public Integrity Handbook provides guidance to government, business and civil society on implementing the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity. The Handbook clarifies what the Recommendation’s thirteen principles mean in practice and identifies challenges in implementing them.