Corporate Governance In Modern Financial Capitalism

This insightful book focuses upon corporate governance processes, and explores the conditions required for effective corporate governance and control in 21st century globalized and financialized economies. In presenting a comprehensive study of a cross-border hostile corporate take-over process, describing the actors, institutions and events involved, this book examines and questions the current forms of corporate governance and control both from a national and a global perspective. Using Old Mutual s takeover of Skandia as a case study, the authors address corporate governance theory, and highlight its two fundamental dimensions: financial and operational flows. An important conclusion of the book is that the motives and theories of contemporary financial markets appear to have gained in importance at the expense of the corresponding operational considerations, something that has dramatically changed the rationales of different types of actors. The book critically questions these transformations, calling for the reconsideration and redesign of regulating institutions and corporate governance processes. This critical investigation of the competition for corporate control in the era of modern financial capitalism will prove a fascinating read for students, academics and researchers in the fields of corporate governance, finance and international business. It will also appeal to policymakers and practitioners within the realms of corporate finance, banking and the wider financial services industry.

The shift from managerial capitalism to investor capitalism, dominated by the finance industry and finance capital accumulation, is jointly caused by a variety of institutional, legal, political, and ideological changes, beginning with the 1970s’ downturn of the global economy. This book traces how the incorporation of businesses within the realm of the state leads to both certain benefits, characteristic of competitive capitalism, and to the emergence of new corporate governance problems emerges. Contrasting economic, legal, and managerial views of corporate governance practices in contemporary capitalism, the author examines how corporate governance has been understood and advocated differently during the New Deal era, the post-World War II economic boom, and the after 1980 in the era of free market advocacy.

In Public Law and Private Power, John W. Cioffi argues that the highly politicized reform of corporate governance law has reshaped power relations within the public corporation in favor of financial interests, contributed to the profound crises of contemporary capitalism, and eroded its political foundations. Analyzing the origins of pro-shareholder and pro-financial market reforms in the United States and Germany during the past two decades, Cioffi unravels a double paradox: the expansion of law and the regulatory state at the core of the financially driven neoliberal economic model and the surprising role of Center Left parties in championing the interests of shareholders and the financial sector. Since the early 1990s, changes in law to alter the structure of the corporation and financial markets—two institutional pillars of modern capitalism—highlight the contentious regulatory politics that reshaped the legal architecture of national corporate governance regimes and thus the distribution of power and wealth among managers, investors, and labor. Center Left parties embraced reforms that strengthened shareholder rights as part of a strategy to cultivate the support of the financial sector, promote market-driven firm-level economic adjustment, and appeal to popular outrage over recurrent corporate financial scandals. The reforms played a role in fostering an increasingly unstable financially driven economic order; their implication in the global financial crisis in turn poses a threat to center-left parties and the legitimacy of contemporary finance capitalism.

This book develops a new framework - the stakeholder model - that helps to understand corporate finance and governance in modern society, where the sources of people’s happiness have shifted from monetary to non-monetary factors. The book takes a more comprehensive approach than is typically found in the standard economics and finance literature, by explicitly incorporating both the monetary and non-monetary interests of stakeholders and by examining the value creation of corporations from a much broader perspective. Specifically, the book addresses contemporary issues concerning corporate finance and governance worldwide, including: How should we define corporate value in stakeholder society? What is the role of modern corporations? What are the principles underlying corporate financing decisions? To what extent should shareholder rights be enhanced? What determines the effectiveness of a company’s board of directors? What missions do firms set out and what is the role of mission statements? How can we understand the diversity of financial and governance systems among different countries? What legal and institutional reforms enhance or diminish corporate value in stakeholder society? The book will answer these questions theoretically and empirically.

The globalization of capital markets since the 1980s has been accompanied by a vigorous debate over the convergence of corporate governance standards around the world towards the shareholder model. But even before the financial and economic crisis of 2008/2009, the dominance of the shareholder model was challenged with regard to persisting divergences and national differences in corporate law, labor law and industrial relations. This collection explores this debate at an important crossroads, echoing Karl Polanyi's famous observation in 1944 of the disembeddedness of the market from society. Drawing on pertinent insights from scholars, practitioners and regulators in corporate and labor law, securities regulation as well as economic sociology and management theory, the contributions shed important light on the empirical effects on the economy of the shift to shareholder primacy, in light of a comprehensive reconsideration of the global context, policy goals and regulatory forms which characterize market governance today.

Nearly seventy years after the last great stock market bubble and crash, another bubble emerged and burst, despite a thick layer of regulation designed since the 1930s to prevent such things. This time the bubble was enormous, reflecting nearly twenty years of double-digit stock market growth, and its bursting had painful consequence. The search for culprits soon began, and many were discovered, including not only a number of overreaching corporations, but also their auditors, investment bankers, lawyers and indeed, their investors. In Governing the Modern Corporation, Smith and Walter analyze the structure of market capitalism to see what went wrong.They begin by examining the developments that have made modern financial markets--now capitalized globally at about $70 trillion--so enormous, so volatile and such a source of wealth (and temptation) for all players. Then they report on the evolving role and function of the business corporation, the duties of its officers and directors and the power of its Chief Executive Officer who seeks to manage the company to achieve as favorable a stock price as possible.They next turn to the investing market itself, which comprises mainly financial institutions that own about two-thirds of all American stocks and trade about 90% of these stocks. These investors are well informed, highly trained professionals capable of making intelligent investment decisions on behalf of their clients, yet the best and brightest ultimately succumbed to the bubble and failed to carry out an appropriate governance role.In what follows, the roles and business practices of the principal financial intermediaries--notably auditors and bankers--are examined in detail. All, corporations, investors and intermediaries, are found to have been infected by deep-seated conflicts of interest, which add significant agency costs to the free-market system. The imperfect, politicized role of the regulators is also explored, with disappointing results. The entire system is seen to have been compromised by a variety of bacteria that crept in, little by little, over the years and were virtually invisible during the bubble years.These issues are now being addressed, in part by new regulation, in part by prosecutions and class action lawsuits, and in part by market forces responding to revelations of misconduct. But the authors note that all of the market's professional players--executives, investors, experts and intermediaries themselves--carry fiduciary obligations to the shareholders, clients, and investors whom they represent. More has to be done to find ways for these fiduciaries to be held accountable for the correct discharge of their duties.

Despite the influence corporations wield over all aspects of everyday life, there has been a remarkable absence of critical inquiry into the social constitution of this power. In analysing the complex relationship between corporate power and the widespread phenomenon of share ownership, this book seeks to map and define the nature of resistance and domination in contemporary capitalism. Drawing on a Marxist-informed framework, this book reconnects the social constitution of corporate power and changing forms of shareholder activism. In contrast to other texts that deal with corporate governance, this study examines a diverse and comprehensive set of themes, from socially responsible investing to labour-led shareholder activism and its limitations. Through this ambitious and critical study, author Susanne Soederberg demonstrates how the corporate governance doctrine represents an inherent feature of neoliberal rule, effectively disembedding and depoliticising relations of domination and resistance from the wider power and paradoxes of capitalism. Examining corporate governance and shareholder activism in a number of different contexts that include the United States and the global South, this important book will be of interest to students and scholars of international political economy, international relations and development studies. It will also be of relevance to a wider range of disciplines including finance, economics, and business and management studies. Winner of the Davidson/Studies in Political Economy Award.

With global financial markets having become more integrated, the book pays particular attention to the role of corporate governance in emerging-market economies and international capital flows. Rich in facts and ideas, the book is for anyone interested in financial crises, international risk management and global competitiveness.

Traces the rise of public and private pension funds, which now control as much as 50 percent of the equity in American corporations, and argues that shareholders in those funds could use their power to make corporations more responsive to social needs.

This book is specifically aimed at addressing a gap in the study of the evolution of corporate governance in Britain. In particular its key theme, the relationship between corporate governance and personal capitalism in British manufacturing in the first half of the twentieth century, provides the means for a systematic and critical examination of the dominant Chandlerian paradigm that the long-running persistence of personal capitalism shaped the governance of British manufacturing firms well into the twentieth century and acted to erode their competitive performance. The book helps to identify those aspects of corporate governance that have undergone change, with some critical observations on the magnitude of change and those aspects which have displayed characteristics of continuity. The empirical spine of this book is set out in a series of case studies which provide the basis for the examination of corporate governance in Britain during the period c. 1900 to 1950. By focusing particularly on the responses of a range of businesses to the turbulent environment of the inter-war years, this volume offers an insight into a much neglected, yet vital, area of business and economic history.