Corporate Autonomy And Government Control

Stevens examines institutional frameworks for Crown corporations in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba between the early 1970s and the mid 1980s, showing how each framework establishes different practices and offers distinct strategic advantages. Organizational approaches in Alberta most closely approximated what the author calls a "self-contained" design, in which corporate actors had the advantage and were most able to achieve their own objectives. In Manitoba, where "vertical information systems" prevailed, central bureaucratic monitoring agents tended, to some extent, to wield influence over the corporations. Saskatchewan practice was akin to a "lateral relations" pattern, with an equilibrium between corporate and bureaucratic goals. Stevens's comparison of Crown corporation organization designs suggests that, while no one form is inherently more efficient than another, each leads to qualitatively different outcomes. He concludes that the most important issue in problems of organization design is who is winning the Crown corporation "game" -- a finding of considerable interest to all students of government enterprise.

Managers vs. Owners: The Struggle for Corporate Control in American Democracy deals with a subject of profound importance: understanding the place of the modern corporation in a democratic society. This latest volume in the acclaimed Ruffin Series in Business Ethics describes how the balance between corporate power and government regulation has changed with the interests of society as a whole. The first section examines the debates over the rules that individuals or organized groups would agree to follow in their interactions to accrue social advantages. The second section looks at management's point of view and tells how law promotes the need for managerial collective action and provides a vocabulary for articulating management as a profession. The authors conclude by looking at the impact of collective investor action - especially institutional investors - on the efforts by managers to preserve their autonomy. This examination of the inherent conflicts between the interests of corporate owners, the interests of the larger society, and the interests of managers who run corporations will be essential reading for students, scholars, and professionals concerned with the place of the large corporation in a democratic society.

Deep and detailed research into the workings of corporate enables Professor Herman to throw considerable light on how the board of directors operates, how important outside directors are, how new members are selected, and how multiple directorships interlock the large corporations. Throughout the book the author contrasts the power of the managers with that of other interest groups - bankers, family - and he concludes that power lies with the managers. But this has not changed the basic objectives of the corporation - the pursuit of growth and profits - nor has it enhanced social responsibility. After thorough investigation Edward Herman concludes that government regulation has done surprisingly little to reduce the autonomy of the corporation. Just as the influence of bankers and investors has been resisted, so has the effect of regulation. Improved communications and controls, geographic dispersion, and the enhanced adaptability and mobility of the large corporation have all played a part in maintaining corporate power and managerial control. Corporate Control, Corporate Power will be essential reading for executives, policy makers, regulators, and all those concerned to make the corporation more responsible and accountable.

By comparing the autonomy, control and internal management of public organizations, this book show how New Public Management doctrines work out in three small European states with different politico-administrative regimes. Using survey data on 226 state agencies, hypotheses drawing on organization theory and neo-institutional schools are tested.

Governance of Public Sector Organizations a nalyzes recent changes in government administration by focusing on organizational forms and their effects. Contributors to this edited volume demonstrate how generations of reform result in increased complexity of government organizations, and explain this layering process with multiple theories.

This book focuses on regulatory reforms and the autonomization and agencification of public sector organizations across Europe, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. The central argument of the book is that regulation and agencification occur and perform in tandem. Comparative analysis on the processes, effects and implications of regulatory reform and the establishment of semi-independent agencies are undertaken, and the practice of trade-offs between political control and agency autonomy is explored. The contributors also discuss the challenges of fragmentation, coordination, 'joined-up' government and other government initiatives in the aftermath of the New Public Management movement and its focus on agencification. Finally, the complexity of deregulation/re-regulation, new emergent forms of regulation, control and auditing as well as reassertion of the centre are examined. Until now, there has been little attempt to link the study on regulation and regulatory reforms with that of autonomous central agencies. In this book the two fields are brought together. Autonomy and Regulation will find its audience amongst scholars and researchers working in the areas of political science, public administration and public management, organization theory, institutional analyses and comparative administration. It will also appeal to scholars and those directly involved in public sector and regulatory reforms including politicians and managers.