Coordination Without Command

Over the past decade, the Command and Control (C2) field has been making a transformation from top-down, directive command to Network Centric Operations (NCO), peer-to-peer negation, self-synchronization, and agility. As the terms NCO and NEC suggest, C2 systems are regarded as networks, rather than a hierarchy. Accordingly, it is appropriate to view the C2 process and C2 systems through the lens of network theory. Network Topology in Command and Control: Organization, Operation, and Evolution aims to connect the fields of C2 and network science. Featuring timely research on topics pertaining to the C2 network evolution, security, and modeling, this publication is ideal for reference use by students, academicians, and security professionals in the fields of C2 and network science.

How far can we stretch the scope of spontaneous order? Gordon Tullock's important work on the economics of non-human societies shows how these societies are able to coordinate without command despite features economists typically see as limiting the scope of spontaneous order. Using Tullock's insights, I search for the "human ant nest" - spontaneous institutional arrangements that create human cooperation despite the presence of these obstacles. I find two significant examples of this, both in precolonial Africa. The first demonstrates the effectiveness of spontaneous order in the face of threats of violent theft. The second shows the effectiveness of spontaneous order in the face of social heterogeneity. These cases suggest a broader scope for spontaneous order than conventional wisdom permits.

Falling between the “War of Movement” in 1914 and the major attrition battles of 1916, 1915 was a critical year in the First World War. As France failed in ever-larger offensives to break through the German trenches, Britain shifted its strategy from defence of empire to total commitment to the continental war. In the second of three planned volumes, Roy Prete analyzes the political and military policies and strategies of Britain and France and their joint command relationship on the Western Front in 1915. The opposing strategies of the two governments proved to be the main determinant in the sometimes ragged relations between the French commander-in-chief, Joseph Joffre, and his British counterpart, Sir John French, as they sought to drive the German army out of France and to aid their hard-pressed Russian ally. With an impressive marshalling of evidence, Strategy and Command demonstrates that the increased British commitment to the continental war, manifested in sending Kitchener’s New Armies to France in 1915, was largely due to the disastrous situation of the Russian army on the Eastern Front and the perceived weakness of the French government. Based on extensive research in French and British political and military archives, this new in-depth study of Anglo-French military relations on the Western Front in 1915 fills a major gap in the unfolding drama of the First World War.

The Nature and command of the available forces; inter-organizational coordination; coherence between politics, strategy, operations and tactics; and finally, time. Wellington, Spínola and Petraeus led the effort of vast civilian and military teams that, at different periods of history and in distinct geographical settings, had the opportunity to apply a holistic command using, to varying degrees, the above four dimensions. What they achieved from the experiences they led, and the doctrines they used, from what the reality on the ground showed to them and from the concurrent political decisions that were imposed on them, limiting their own political and strategic action, is all an important part of this comprehensive study. By studying the applicability in the situations of Wellington, Spínola and Petraeus, it was possible to extrapolate a general theory about the holistic command of war. One that is masterfully presented for discussion in this work.