Controlling Stockholders And The Disciplinary Role Of Corporate Payout Policy

The Times Mirror Company, a NYSE-listed Fortune 500 firm controlled for 100 years by the Chandler family, hired an industry outsider as CEO in 1995 following an extended period of poor operating and stock price performance under non-family management. This change was apparently an unintended consequence of actions taken by old management to fund its capital expansion plans while satisfying the family's desire for dividends. Specifically, in 1994 old management agreed to (1) sell TM's cable business and reinvest most of the $1.3 billion proceeds in new technology, and (2) maintain the Chandlers' dividends while radically cutting those to minority stockholders. While Wall Street reacted favorably to the cable sale, it punished TM's stock when it later learned about management's reinvestment plans. Shortly thereafter TM's board brought in a noted financial disciplinarian, who as CEO substantially increased stockholder value by terminating low return investments and distributing free cash flow. While pressure to pay dividends and monitoring by large block stockholders ultimately improved TM's performance, the path to this outcome was slow and circuitous, so that these disciplinary forces were weaker than theory typically implies.

Corporate Payout Policy synthesizes the academic research on payout policy and explains "how much, when, and how". That is (i) the overall value of payouts over the life of the enterprise, (ii) the time profile of a firm's payouts across periods, and (iii) the form of those payouts. The authors conclude that today's theory does a good job of explaining the general features of corporate payout policies, but some important gaps remain. So while our emphasis is to clarify "what we know" about payout policy, the authors also identify a number of interesting unresolved questions for future research. Corporate Payout Policy discusses potential influences on corporate payout policy including managerial use of payouts to signal future earnings to outside investors, individuals' behavioral biases that lead to sentiment-based demands for distributions, the desire of large block stockholders to maintain corporate control, and personal tax incentives to defer payouts. The authors highlight four important "carry-away" points: the literature's focus on whether repurchases will (or should) drive out dividends is misplaced because it implicitly assumes that a single payout vehicle is optimal; extant empirical evidence is strongly incompatible with the notion that the primary purpose of dividends is to signal managers' views of future earnings to outside investors; over-confidence on the part of managers is potentially a first-order determinant of payout policy because it induces them to over-retain resources to invest in dubious projects and so behavioral biases may, in fact, turn out to be more important than agency costs in explaining why investors pressure firms to accelerate payouts; the influence of controlling stockholders on payout policy --- particularly in non-U.S. firms, where controlling stockholders are common --- is a promising area for future research. Corporate Payout Policy is required reading for both researchers and practitioners interested in understanding this central topic in corporate finance and governance.

This paper studies the impact of the concentration of control, the type of controlling shareholder and the dividend tax preference of the controlling shareholder on dividend policy for a panel of 220 German firms over 1984-2005. In line with the agency model, we find a negative relation between family control and dividend payouts at low and high levels of control. We also find evidence of reduced speed of adjustment of dividends at intermediate levels of family control. We further document that corporate control is associated with higher dividend payouts if an industrial or commercial corporation is the majority shareholder of the company. Finally, the results do not provide evidence that the tax preference of the largest shareholder matters for dividend payout decisions.

Bringing together developments from the past 30years in contingent valuation, this book examines the relative value of securities in a corporation's capital structure, including debt of different priorities, convertible debt, common stock, and warrants.

Around the world (with the U.S. and U.K. as exceptions) concentrated ownership structures and controlling shareholders are predominant even among listed firms. We provide novel empirical evidence how such controlling shareholders, in particular founding families, affect payout policy decisions. Thereby, we use a unique panel dataset of 660 listed firms in the 1995 to 2006 period from Germany, an economy that is traditionally characterized by concentrated ownership structures and strong family capitalism. We find that family firms exhibit a higher propensity and level for both dividend payments and total payouts. This result is driven by family ownership rather than family management. Conflicts between the founding family and non-family controlling shareholders and tensions within the founding family are important determinants of payout policy. While family blockholder increase the propensity for a payout to shareholders, outside blockholder have an opposing effect. Finally, we find that common action problems and conflicts among a multitude of family members and/or generations in "real family firms" lead to a higher "taste for dividend payments" if compared to firms dominated by the founder ("founder-controlled firms"). Our results prove to be stable against a battery of robustness tests including a matching estimator technique to demonstrate causal effects. Overall, our paper contributes to two strands of literature: the emerging literature on family firms and the more mature literature on corporate payout policy. -- Family firms ; founding family ; family ownership ; family management ; controlling shareholders ; agency costs ; payout policy ; dividends ; share repurchases ; corporate governance

Dividends And Dividend Policy As part of the Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance, Dividends and Dividend Policy aims to be the essential guide to dividends and their impact on shareholder value. Issues concerning dividends and dividend policy have always posed challenges to both academics and professionals. While all the pieces to the dividend puzzle may not be in place yet, the information found here can help you gain a firm understanding of this dynamic discipline. Comprising twenty-eight chapters—contributed by both top academics and financial experts in the field—this well-rounded resource discusses everything from corporate dividend decisions to the role behavioral finance plays in dividend policy. Along the way, you'll gain valuable insights into the history, trends, and determinants of dividends and dividend policy, and discover the different approaches firms are taking when it comes to dividends. Whether you're a seasoned financial professional or just beginning your journey in the world of finance, having a firm understanding of the issues surrounding dividends and dividend policy is now more important than ever. With this book as your guide, you'll be prepared to make the most informed dividend-related decisions possible—even in the most challenging economic conditions. The Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance is an unparalleled source of information dedicated to the most important issues in modern finance. Each book focuses on a specific topic in the field of finance and contains contributed chapters from both respected academics and experienced financial professionals.

In 2000, after the Tribune Company acquired Times Mirror Corporation, it comprised the most powerful collection of newspapers in the world. How then did Tribune nosedive into bankruptcy and public scandal? In The Deal From Hell, veteran Tribune and Los Angeles Times editor James O'Shea takes us behind the scenes of the decisions that led to disaster in boardrooms and newsrooms from coast to coast, based on access to key players, court testimony, and sworn depositions. The Deal From Hell is a riveting narrative that chronicles how news industry executives and editors--convinced they were acting in the best interests of their publications--made a series of flawed decisions that endangered journalistic credibility and drove the newspapers, already confronting a perfect storm of political, technological, economic, and social turmoil, to the brink of extinction.

ÔThis book provides a thorough review and compendium of important family business research. It should be in the personal library of every family business scholar and graduate student involved in this vital field of study.Õ Ð Michael A. Hitt, Texas A&M University, US ÔA systematic review of the field and an incredibly useful reference book for anyone involved in studying or teaching family business.Õ Ð Sara Carter OBE FRSE, Strathclyde Business School, UK ÔThis book offers a succinct but thorough overview of how our understanding of significant issues in family business has evolved through rigorous research. This annotated bibliography of the 215 top-cited family business studies provides the empirical evidence and the basis for insightful comments from the authors on topics which will benefit from further scholarly debate and research. The authors are to be congratulated for making accessible those research contributions which have the potential to make a meaningful difference to the practice of family business.Õ Ð Jill Thomas, The University of Adelaide Business School, Australia ÔI highly recommend the annoted bibliography by De Massis, Sharma, Chua, and Chrisman to experienced scholars as well as to incoming researchers. The authors selected carefully (and in a transparent manner) relevant papers and summarized them in a way that provides a helpful basis for future research. Well done!Õ Ð Sabine B. Rau, WHUÐOtto Beisheim School of Management, Germany ÔA welcome addition to the field of family business studies! Offers an update and thorough compendium of relevant research conducted within the last 15 years. A most useful reference for doctoral students, established scholars and thoughtful practitioners. Importantly, the first three chapters offer critical commentary and synthesis that go well beyond what one typically finds in an annotated bibliography. Overall, this book offers a solid foundation for moving the study of family business forward.Õ Ð Lloyd Steier, University of Alberta, Canada ÔIf I had been asked to suggest the currently most-needed editorial endeavor for advancing family business studies, I would have answered with no hesitation: an up-to-date annotated bibliography. The fieldÕs growth over the past 15 years has been so intense, that even experts who devote most of their research efforts to family business Ð not to mention younger scholars approaching the field Ð will significantly benefit from De Massis, Sharma, Chua, and ChrismanÕs indispensable work.Õ Ð Carlo Salvato, Bocconi University, Italy and Associate Editor, Family Business Review This book catalogues the 215 most-cited empirical, theoretical, and practical articles on family business published in 33 journals since 1996. Researchers, students, and practicing managers will find it indispensable as a quick reference and guide to what we have learned about family firms. Annotations for the articles consist of: summary of key findings, research questions, contributions, and research implications. They also include a detailed description of the methodologies, empirical data, definitions, and conceptual models used. In addition, the book features chapters that review the literature, discuss how family businesses have been defined, present recent trends in family business empirical research, and provide an agenda for future research. Scholars, researchers and PhD students in the fields of family business, entrepreneurship, organization theory, management, economics, finance, anthropology, sociology and business history will find this compendium insightful. The topics covered in the book will also prove to be essential to practitioners Ð both advisors and operators of family enterprises Ð as it will provide evidence-based knowledge on the issues and dilemmas faced by them in everyday life.

Family-owned businesses account for many of the small and medium-sized enterprises that exist around the world in various industries. Due to their unique make up, these firms are often heavily influenced by family dynamics that must be reconciled by family and non-family workers alike in order to ensure the sustainability of the business. As smaller businesses competing against an increasingly globalized economy and more directly impacted by economic instability, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, these businesses must continue to improve their practices and processes in order to not only survive but thrive. The Research Anthology on Strategies for Maintaining Successful Family Firms discusses the strategies, sustainability, and human aspects of family firms in order to understand what sets them apart from other businesses and how they can survive and compete in a globalized economy. This book discusses the unique dynamic brought by family firms that offers both opportunities and challenges for a growing business. Covering topics such as corporate venturing, the family unit, and business ethics, this text is an essential resource for family firms, entrepreneurs, managers, business students, business professors, researchers, and academicians.

This book investigates the institutional characteristics of state-linked firms in Vietnam to draw lessons for investors/MNCs targeting Vietnam and other emerging markets in the region. Vietnam and many other ASEAN countries have gone through a period of privatization and equitization of wholly controlled SOEs, with the State retaining partial ownership in many privatized businesses. This book explains the dynamic relationships between the State, BODs, shareholders, and regulators and their influence on corporate governance and SOE performance. This book differs from other publications in that it extrapolates the findings from our study to a broader context on how the defined internal mechanisms implicate the local economy and global supply chains/markets. This book investigates robust theoretical foundations, and rigorous applied empirical research underpin the role of the State in SOEs. It differs from other studies in terms of qualitative and empirical research to provide the contextual setting to elucidate how to successfully navigate emerging market business with the State as an "owner-participant." This book explains the theoretical constructs of corporate governance in SOEs, applies empirical research methodologies, and draws results to validate inferences to (1) investigate the link between the board of directors and ownership attributes and agency cost levels using Vietnamese listed firms for the period from 2006 to 2013, (2) evaluate the effectiveness of State's corporate initiatives and monitoring through its sovereign wealth fund known as the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC), and (3) infer and explain the motivation of the State as a shareholder. This book takes cognizance of Vietnam's idiosyncratic institutional (using its sovereign wealth fund as an investment vehicle and management proxy), economic, regulatory, and corporate environments and the realities for developing an effective and sustainable business model, vis-à-vis the ownership structure, board of directors' composition and corporate governance, for better business performance. While the focus is on Vietnam, the content is also relevant to the role of the State in other emerging markets as a player in shaping the business strategy, model, and direction of SOEs.