Container Security Initiative

Approximately 95 percent of the world's trade moves by containers, primarily on large ships, but also on trains, trucks, and barges. The system is efficient and economical, but vulnerable. Until recently, theft and misuse have been as accepted as a cost of doing business. However, the rise of terrorism and the possibility that a container could be used to transport or actually be the delivery vehicle for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or high explosives have made it imperative that the security of the shipping container system be greatly improved. Aside from the direct effects of an attack, the economic, social, and political consequences of a significant disruption in the transport chain would be staggering. In response to recent terrorist attacks the United States, the European Union, and international organizations and industry have instituted new measures to improve security in the shipping trade, including some procedures on containers. These include bilateral agreements involved in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). These measures are useful, but shipping containers remain vulnerable. The authors, building on work done by the National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy that formed the basis for the CSI, recommend a comprehensive multilateral agreement on the use of containers in international trade rather than numerous bilateral agreements. Such a comprehensive solution requires a worldwide approach, including improved tools, better information, and cooperation among all stakeholders. Key components of the system that need improving include th e bill of lading, seals, controls and sensors at borders, ports, and other transfer points, and the verification and sharing of information. The key objective must be to verify more reliably the contents of containers, in particular the absence of WMD, as well as their travel history This paper recommends, as a key step in this approach, the development and adoption of a comprehensive Code of Conduct that would be globally recognized and enforced for such an important component of global commerce. The implementation measures should provide incentives for the industry involved to comply with the obligations of the Code. The G8 and China, or the World Customs Organization, could take the lead in negotiating a global agreement on container security. A draft outline of such a Code is presented in the Annex to this Report.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been much discussion of the security of borders and ports of entry in the United States and around the world. Ports of entry, particularly sea ports, are viewed as one of the most defenceless targets for a terrorist attack. In response to this perceived vulnerability, a number of port security initiatives have been implemented both on both a domestic and international level. This timely project investigates a number of issues surrounding the container security issue. It examines the scope of containerized freight security, analyzes cooperation between agents in the United States and abroad, explores the politics of port security, and provides an assessment of 17 of the world's sea ports. The work sheds light on the container security threat and the domestic and international responses that have emerged, as well as those steps that still must be taken.

CBP's Container Security Initiative Has Proactive Management and Oversight but Future Direction Is Uncertain

The Container Security Initiative and the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism : securing the global supply chain or Trojan horse? : hearing before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, first session, May 26, 2005.