Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress And The President

This text dissects the crucial constitutional disputes between the executive and the legislative branches of government from the Constitutional Convention to the beginning of the Bush administration. It analyzes areas of tension within a political and historical context.

When asked which branch of government protects citizens’ rights, we tend to think of the Supreme Court—stepping in to defend gay rights, for example, in the recent same-sex marriage case. But as constitutional scholar Louis Fisher reveals in his new book, this would be a mistake—and not just because a decision like the gay marriage ruling can be decided by the opinion of a single justice. Rather, we tend to judge the executive and judicial branches idealistically, while taking a more realistic view of the legislative, with its necessarily messier and more transparent workings. In Congress, Fisher highlights these biases as he measures the record of the three branches in protecting individual rights—and finds that Congress, far more than the president or the Supreme Court, has defended the rights of blacks, women, children, Native Americans, and religious liberty. After reviewing the constitutional principles that apply to all three branches of government, Fisher conducts us through a history of struggles over individual rights, showing how the court has frequently failed at many critical junctures where Congress has acted to protect rights. He identifies changes in the balance of power over time—a post–World War II transformation that has undermined the system of checks and balances the Framers designed to protect individuals in their aspiration for self-government. Without a strong, independent Congress, this book reminds us, our system would operate with two elected officers in the executive branch and none in the judiciary, a form of government best described as elitist—and one no one would deem democratic. In light of the history that unfolds here—and in view of a Congress widely decried as dysfunctional—Fisher proposes reforms that would strengthen not only the legislative branch’s role in protecting individual rights under the Constitution, but also its standing in the democracy it serves.

In the fourth of the Federalist Papers, published in 1787, John Jay warned of absolute monarchs who "will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it." More than two centuries later, are single executives making unilateral decisions any more trustworthy? And have the checks on executive power, so critical in the Founders' drafting of the Constitution, held? These are the questions Louis Fisher pursues in this book. By examining the executive actions of American presidents, particularly after World War II, Fisher reveals how the Supreme Court, through errors and abdications, has expanded presidential power in external affairs beyond constitutional boundaries—and damaged the nation's system of checks and balances. Supreme Court Expansion of Presidential Power reviews the judicial record from 1789 to the present day to show how the balance of power has shifted over time. For nearly a century and a half, the Supreme Court did not indicate a preference for which of the two elected branches should dominate in the field of external affairs. But from the mid-thirties a pattern clearly emerges, with the Court regularly supporting independent presidential power in times of "emergency," or issues linked to national security. The damage this has done to democracy and constitutional government is profound, Fisher argues. His evidence extends beyond external affairs to issues of domestic policy, such as impoundment of funds, legislative vetoes, item-veto authority, presidential immunity in the Paula Jones case, recess appointments, and the Obama administration's immigration initiatives. Fisher identifies contemporary biases that have led to an increase in presidential power—including Supreme Court misconceptions and errors, academic failings, and mistaken beliefs about "inherent powers" and "unity of office." Calling to account the forces tasked with protecting our democracy from the undue exercise of power by any single executive, his deeply informed book sounds a compelling alarm.

An analysis of the conflicts between the President and Congress in four areas of shared power--legislative power, taxing power, spending power, and the war power.

A classic and bestselling work by one of America’s top Constitutional scholars, Presidential War Power garnered the lead review in the New York Times Book Review and raised essential issues that have only become more timely, relevant, and controversial in our post-9/11 era. In this third edition, Louis Fisher updates his arguments throughout, critiques the presidential actions of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, and challenges what he views as their dangerous expansion of executive power. Spanning the life of the Republic from the Revolutionary Era to the War on Terror, the new edition covers for the first time: * Indefinite detention of civilians and non-civilians without trial * President Obama’s failed effort to close Guantánamo * NSA wiretapping and Fourth Amendment violations * Presidential decision-making relating to the wind-down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan * U.S. military operations against Libya in 2011 * Continued abuse of the state secrets privilege in national security court cases * Secret legal memos justifying the use of UAVs or drones for targeted killings overseas * Extended comparison of the expansion of executive power under George W. Bush and Barack Obama

As Congress and the president battle out the federal deficit, foreign involvements, health care, and other policies of grave national import, the underlying constitutional issue is always the separation of powers doctrine. In The Politics of Shared Power, a classic text in the field of executive-legislative relations, Louis Fisher explains clearly and perceptively the points at which congressional and presidential interests converge and diverge, the institutional patterns that persist from one administration and one Congress to another, and the partisan dimensions resulting from the two-party system. Fisher also discusses the role of the courts in reviewing cases brought to them by members of Congress, the president, agency heads, and political activists, illustrating how court decisions affect the allocation of federal funds and the development and implementation of public policy. He examines how the president participates as legislator and how Congress intervenes in administrative matters. Separate chapters on the bureaucracy, the independent regulatory commissions, and the budgetary process probe these questions from different angles. The new fourth edition addresses the line item veto and its tortuous history and prospects. A chapter on war powers and foreign affairs studies executive-legislative disputes that affect global relations, including the Iran-Contra affair, the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and American presence in conflicts such as Haiti and Bosnia. An important new discussion focuses on interbranch collisions and gridlock as they have developed since 1992.

On the campaign trail, Barack Obama spoke often about his constitutional principles. In particular, he objected to George W. Bush's claim to certain "inherent" presidential powers that could not be checked by Congress or the judiciary. After his inauguration, how did President Obama's constitutional principles fare? That is the question Louis Fisher explores in this book, a disturbing and timely study of the tension between constitutional aspirations and executive actions in the American presidency. A constitutional scholar, Fisher views Obama's two terms within the context of other presidencies, and in light of the principles set forth by the Framers. His work reveals how the basic system of checks and balances has been substantially altered by Supreme Court decisions, military initiatives, and scholarship promoting the power of the president--and by presidents progressively more inclined to wield that power. In this analysis we see the steps by which Obama, himself an expert on the Constitution, came to press his agenda more and more aggressively through executive actions: on climate change, renewable energy, the auto industry bail-out, education initiatives, and financial reform. Rather than focus on policy, Fisher examines the politics and practical concerns that drive executive overreach, as well as the impact of such expanded powers on bipartisan support, public understanding, and finally, the functioning of government. A fair but critical assessment of Obama's executive performance and legacy, this sobering book documents the erosion of constitutional principles that prepared the way for the presidency of Donald Trump.

"Although there have been some other articles and books on the "Youngstown" case, this book remains definitive. The author handles a variety of materials exceedingly well, and shows great sensitivity not only to the legal issues involved, but to the political ones as well. It is a model case study."--Melvin I. Urofsky, Virginia Commonwealth University

Federal judges, legal scholars, pundits, and reporters frequently describe the Supreme Court as the final word on the meaning of the Constitution. The historical record presents an entirely different picture. A close and revealing reading of that record, from 1789 to the present day, Reconsidering Judicial Finality reminds us of the “unalterable fact,” as Chief Justice Rehnquist once remarked, “that our judicial system, like the human beings who administer it, is fallible.” And a Court inevitably prone to miscalculation and error, as this book clearly demonstrates, cannot have the incontrovertible last word on constitutional questions. In this deeply researched, sharply reasoned work of legal myth-busting, constitutional scholar Louis Fisher explains how constitutional disputes are settled by all three branches of government, and by the general public, with the Supreme Court often playing a secondary role. The Court’s decisions have, of course, been challenged and reversed in numerous cases—involving slavery, civil rights, child labor legislation, Japanese internment during World War II, abortion, and religious liberty. What Fisher shows us on a case-by-case basis is how the elected branches, scholars, and American public regularly press policies contrary to Court rulings—and regularly prevail, although the process might sometimes take decades. From the common misreading of Marbury v. Madison, to the mistaken understanding of the Supreme Court as the trusted guardian of individual rights, to the questionable assumptions of the Court’s decision in Citizens United, Fisher’s work charts the distance and the difference between the Court as the ultimate arbiter in constitutional matters and the judgment of history. The verdict of Reconsidering Judicial Finality is clear: to treat the Supreme Court’s nine justices as democracy’s last hope or as dangerous activists undermining democracy is to vest them with undue significance. The Constitution belongs to all three branches of government—and, finally, to the American people.