Considerations In The Choice Of The Appropriate Discount Rate For Evaluating Sovereign Debt Restructurings

Assessments regarding the effectiveness of sovereign debt restructurings are often summarized by comparisons of the net present value of debt service before and after the restructuring. These calculations are inherently sensitive to the choice of discount rate. This paper explores issues that arise in selecting discount rates when evaluating sovereign debt restructurings. It suggests using a range of discount rates and centering the analysis around the internal rate of return to assess whether the debt restructuring has generated net present value savings or costs to the debtor.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.

This paper provides an overview of sovereign debt portfolio risks and discusses various liability management operations (LMOs) and instruments used by public debt managers to mitigate these risks. Debt management strategies analyzed in the context of helping reach debt portfolio targets and attain desired portfolio structures. Also, the paper outlines how LMOs could be integrated into a debt management strategy and serve as policy tools to reduce potential debt portfolio vulnerabilities. Further, the paper presents operational issues faced by debt managers, including the need to develop a risk management framework, interactions of debt management with fiscal policy, monetary policy, and financial stability, as well as efficient government bond markets.

In discussing the June 2014 paper, Executive Directors broadly supported staff’s proposal to introduce more flexibility into the Fund’s exceptional access framework to reduce unnecessary costs for the member, its creditors, and the overall system. Directors’ views varied on staff’s proposal to eliminate the systemic exemption introduced in 2010. Many Directors favored removing the exemption but some others preferred to retain it and requested staff to consult further with relevant stakeholders on possible approaches to managing contagion. This paper offers specific proposals on how the Fund’s policy framework could be changed, presents staff’s analysis on the specific issue of managing contagion, and addresses some implementation issues. No Board decision is proposed at this stage. The paper is consistent with the Executive Board’s May 2013 endorsement of a work program focused on strengthening market-based approaches to resolving sovereign debt crises.

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Since the August 2021 SDR allocation, the SDR interest rate has risen about 390 basis points through end-June 2023. This paper analyzes the impact of higher SDR interest rates on IMF members with negative net SDR Department positions. To do so, it constructs SDR forward curves at different points in time, from which the expected cost of servicing SDR obligations can be compared. Results show that the expected path of the SDR interest rate has shifted significantly upward since the 2021 allocation. Expected costs of charges (interest) in net present value terms are estimated to have more than tripled, while the grant element of SDRs has fallen to just below the IMF’s concessionality threshold. Despite this increase in cost, IMF members’ capacity to service SDR obligations remains generally adequate in both baseline and stress scenarios, though a few countries will need to carefully manage the rise in interest costs. Decisions to convert SDRs should consider interest rate risks, among other country-specific factors.

This paper studies the effect of sovereign debt restructurings with external private creditors on growth during the period 1970-2010. We find that there are bad and good (or not so bad) debt restructurings for growth. While growth generally declines in the aftermath of a sovereign debt restructuring, agreements that allow countries to exit a default spell (final restructurings) are associated with improving growth. The impact can be significant. In general, three years after restructuring, growth is about 5 percent lower compared to countries that did not face restructuring over the same period. The exception is for final restructurings, which result in positive growth in the years immediately after the restructuring. Final restructurings tend to be better for growth because they reduce countries’ debt, with the strongest effect for countries that exit restructurings with relatively low debt levels.

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