Conservative Economic Policymaking And The Birth Of Thatcherism 1964 1979

In this book, Adrian Williamson investigates the processes by which Thatcherism became established in Tory thinking, and questions to what extent the politician herself is responsible for Thatcherism within the Conservative Party.

A new politics emerged in the 1970s in response to the world recession, the exhaustion of Fordism (the theory, traced to Henry Ford, that well-paid industrial workers fuel continuous capitalist growth), and the breakdown of American hegemony. Thatcherism, one expression of this new politics, acquired its distinctive characteristics through the exceptional and deep-seated crisis of state authority that developed in Britain in the mid-1970s. By 1987, the Conservatives under Thatcher's leadership had won their third successive election victory over a divided opposition and enjoyed a degree of political and ideological dominance that led many commentators to speak of the end of the socialist era and the emergence of a new consensus in Britain. A new word--Thatcherism--had entered the political lexicon. It has come to signify a broad-ranging and distinctive program aimed at promoting economic recovery through the privatization of public enterprise and restoring the authority of the state. The Free Economy and the Strong State explores the roots of Thatcherism and its relationship to the Conservative tradition, to the economic liberal ideology of the New Right, and to the "new politics" which emerged from the recession and crisis of the world order in the mid 1970s.

In this book, Adrian Williamson investigates the processes by which Thatcherism became established in Tory thinking, and questions to what extent the politician herself is responsible for Thatcherism within the Conservative Party.

Margaret Thatcher is the only 20th-century prime minister to have given her name to a style as well as a doctrine. Although the final balance sheet of the successes and failures of Thatcherism is yet to be tallied, this book places the government of Mrs. Thatcher in the perspective of postwar British politics. Here, Kavanagh describes how a postwar political consensus--covering full employment, welfare, conciliation of the trade unions, a mixed economy with state intervention, and social engineering--was established with the support of dominant groups in the Conservative and Labour parties. He then shows how that settlement broke down in the face of economic problems, changes in policies and personnel in the main parties, and the challenge to the intellectual bases of the consensus mounted by groups on the New Right. The book concludes with an insightful analysis of the government's record, and of prospects for a new consensus. Mrs. Thatcher has cited the breaking of the consensus as one of her primary political objectives, and in this penetrating study she emerges both as the architect of the collapse of consensus and as its product.

The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s resulted in a transition to fluctuating rather than fixed currency system. This brought sterling into the turmoil of the world currency markets, and by the end of the 1970s, sterling had quietly ended its role as an international currency. Sterling-dollar diplomacy collapsed, bringing to an end what had hitherto been considered Britain's prime relationship. Britain and European Monetary Cooperation, 1964-1979 provides a unique perspective on these events, shedding light on the complexities of the historical context of British monetary diplomacy and exploring the country's attempt at a European approach to sterling in the 1960s and '70s. The book describes the political and economic approach Britain took at the turn of the 1970s, and explains how the country became restricted by the burden of the sterling balances. In this book, the author illustrates how these developments offered opportunity for both cooperation and conflict in the light of monetary diplomacy. He demonstrates how Britain's struggle to achieve exchange rate stability, twinned with controversy over European Economic Community membership, finally prompted serious reconsideration of economic policy-making. This book challenges the commonly-held perception of the decline of sterling, and explains that, although Britain's attempt at a European approach failed, the decline of the currency was more complicated than a 'managed decline'.

This book explores Britain's gradual disenchantment with both social democracy and the EEC/EU, culminating in the 2016 vote for Brexit. It offers a much-needed historical perspective to the current political crisis in Britain. 2020 CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title Award Winner Between about 1957 and 1979, British governments pursued policies loosely based on social democracy, with a strong commitment to full employment and egalitarianism. At this time, there was almost unlimited enthusiasm on the Rightof British politics for membership of the EEC. The real debate was within the British Left, and the dividing line was between socialists and social democrats. The former wished to march on towards the promised land of real socialism; the latter were broadly content with the status quo. 1975, when the nation voted by 2 to 1 to stay in the EEC, was a triumph for those who had always been passionate supporters of the European project. It was also the high water mark of the UK's commitment to social democracy. Full employment remained the central goal of macro-economic strategy, and the nation's income and wealth were more evenly distributed than ever before or since. Since thelate 1970s, social democracy in the UK has been in continuous retreat. For the Conservatives, this retreat has been headlong since the rise of Thatcherism in the mid-1970s. Under New Labour, a viable alternative model to Thatcherism was never identified. This mixture of metropolitan social liberalism and freewheeling, finance-based capitalism came unstuck in the crisis of 2007-9. The ostensibly pro-European forces thus came into the 2016 referendum campaign in a very weak state. Tories were, at best, unenthusiastic and many were hostile. Eurosceptic socialists had taken back control of Labour. The forces of social democracy, triumphant in 1975, were beleaguered. It is perhaps notsurprising that Remain lost. This book explores the nation's gradual disenchantment with both social democracy and the EEC/EU, culminating in the 2016 vote for Brexit. It tells the story of the declining fortunes of these two intertwined concepts, for which no one has yet devised any plausible successor project. ADRIAN WILLIAMSON is a QC and practicing barrister at Keating Chambers, London, an Elected Fellow of the Royal Historical Society andthe author of Conservative Economic Policymaking and the Birth of Thatcherism, 1964-1979 (Palgrave, 2015).

The premiership of Margaret Thatcher has been portrayed as uniquely ideological in its pursuit of a more market-based economy. A body of literature has been built on how a sharp turn to the right by the Conservative Party during the 1980s - inspired by the likes of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek - acted as one of the key stepping stones to the turbo-charged capitalism and globalization of our modern world. But how ‘neoliberal’ was Thatcherism? The link between ideas and the Thatcher government has frequently been over-generalized and under-specified. Existing accounts tend to characterize neoliberalism as a homogeneous, and often ill-defined, group of thinkers that exerted a broad influence over the Thatcher government. In particular, this study explores how Margaret Thatcher approached special interest groups, a core neoliberal concern. The results demonstrate a willingness to utilize the state, often in contradictory ways, to pursue apparently more market orientated policies. This book - through a combination of archival research, interviews and examination of neoliberal thought itself - defines the dominant strains of neoliberalism more clearly and explores their relationship with Thatcherism.

In late twentieth-century England, inequality was rocketing, yet some have suggested that the politics of class was declining in significance, while others argue that class identities lost little power. Neither interpretation is satisfactory: class remained important to 'ordinary' people's narratives about social change and their own identities throughout the period 1968-2000, but in changing ways. Using self-narratives drawn from a wide range of sources - the raw materials of sociological studies, transcripts from oral history projects, Mass Observation, and autobiography - the book examines class identities and narratives of social change between 1968 and 2000, showing that by the end of the period, class was often seen as an historical identity, related to background and heritage, and that many felt strict class boundaries had blurred quite profoundly since 1945. Class snobberies 'went underground', as many people from all backgrounds began to assert that what was important was authenticity, individuality, and ordinariness. In fact, Sutcliffe-Braithwaite argues that it is more useful to understand the cultural changes of these years through the lens of the decline of deference, which transformed people's attitudes towards class, and towards politics. The study also examines the claim that Thatcher and New Labour wrote class out of politics, arguing that this simple - and highly political - narrative misses important points. Thatcher was driven by political ideology and necessity to try to dismiss the importance of class, while the New Labour project was good at listening to voters - particularly swing voters in marginal seats - and echoing back what they were increasingly saying about the blurring of class lines and the importance of ordinariness. But this did not add up to an abandonment of a majoritarian project, as New Labour reoriented their political project to emphasize using the state to empower the individual.

The making of Thatcherism examines the Conservative Party’s period in opposition between 1974 and 1979, focusing on the development of key policy on issues from the economy, to immigration, to Scottish Devolution. Offering a detailed analysis of Conservative Party policy during this period, from the point at which it had last been in government to the point at which it subsequently regained power, this book helps us to understand the significance of the Conservative victory in 1979: What exactly did more than 13 million Britons vote for in May of that year? This period is typically viewed as one of dramatic change within the Conservative party; however, Begley argues that policy changes were more modest and complex than has been previously considered. Focusing on the short-term political context, Begley argues that though the roots of Thatcherism were beginning to emerge in the party, Thatcherism does not appear to have been inevitable in policy terms by 1979. Providing an overview of the intellectual, economic, and social contexts, Philip Begley examines the range of factors driving the Conservative Party’s development of policy.