Congressional Reform

For decades, advocates of congressional reforms have repeatedly attempted to clean up the House committee system, which has been called inefficient, outmoded, unaccountable, and even corrupt. Yet these efforts result in little if any change, as members of Congress who are generally satisfied with existing institutions repeatedly obstruct what could fairly be called innocuous reforms. What lies behind the House's resistance to change? Challenging recent explanations of this phenomenon, Scott Adler contends that legislators resist rearranging committee powers and jurisdictions for the same reason they cling to the current House structure—the ambition for reelection. The system's structure works to the members' advantage, helping them obtain funding (and favor) in their districts. Using extensive evidence from three major reform periods—the 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s—Adler shows that the reelection motive is still the most important underlying factor in determining the outcome of committee reforms, and he explains why committee reform in the House has never succeeded and probably never will.

Congress today is falling short. Fewer bills, worse oversight, and more dysfunction. But why? In a new volume of essays, the contributors investigate an underappreciated reason Congress is struggling: it doesn’t have the internal capacity to do what our constitutional system requires of it. Leading scholars chronicle the institutional decline of Congress and the decades-long neglect of its own internal investments in the knowledge and expertise necessary to perform as a first-rate legislature. Today’s legislators and congressional committees have fewer—and less expert and experienced—staff than the executive branch or K Street. This leaves them at the mercy of lobbyists and the administrative bureaucracy. The essays in Congress Overwhelmed assess Congress’s declining capacity and explore ways to upgrade it. Some provide broad historical scope. Others evaluate the current decay and investigate how Congress manages despite the obstacles. Collectively, they undertake the most comprehensive, sophisticated appraisal of congressional capacity to date, and they offer a new analytical frame for thinking about—and improving—our underperforming first branch of government.

The American people are disgusted with the U.S. Congress. In 2014, public approval of the first branch of government reached a forty-year low. Congress is producing legislation at a historically anemic rate, while many of the nations immediate problems fester. Those are the facts. The fiction? The notion that we cant do anything about it. The U.S. Constitution assigned obligations to our legislative branchcalling on our elected representatives to promote the general welfare. Congress is in breach of contract. In Unlock Congress, veteran journalist and former political strategist Michael Golden examines the ways in which congressional failure generates a harmful PRODUCT. Rather than affixing blame to individual politicians, Golden diagnoses the causes behind the breakdown. He then identifies the PROBLEMobsolete rules that lead to major defects within the system. Finally, Unlock Congress lays out a PLATFORM of solutions designed to reinvigorate both the process and its players.

The Congressional Record is the official record of the proceedings and debates of the United States Congress. It is published daily when Congress is in session. The Congressional Record began publication in 1873. Debates for sessions prior to 1873 are recorded in The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (1789-1824), the Register of Debates in Congress (1824-1837), and the Congressional Globe (1833-1873)

For decades, advocates of congressional reforms have repeatedly attempted to clean up the House committee system, which has been called inefficient, outmoded, unaccountable, and even corrupt. Yet these efforts result in little if any change, as members of Congress who are generally satisfied with existing institutions repeatedly obstruct what could fairly be called innocuous reforms. What lies behind the House's resistance to change? Challenging recent explanations of this phenomenon, Scott Adler contends that legislators resist rearranging committee powers and jurisdictions for the same reason they cling to the current House structure—the ambition for reelection. The system's structure works to the members' advantage, helping them obtain funding (and favor) in their districts. Using extensive evidence from three major reform periods—the 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s—Adler shows that the reelection motive is still the most important underlying factor in determining the outcome of committee reforms, and he explains why committee reform in the House has never succeeded and probably never will.

This study contains detailed briefing papers prepared by 16 representatives and senators, based on a series of informal discussion groups organized by the Center for Responsive Politics. The discussion groups were formed around four topics of particular interest to members: the reality of money, the use of members' time, the budget and legislative process, and the public's understanding of Congress. The discussions were based on a revealing survey of Congress, which polled 114 members of the House and Senate and 115 key staffers on their views of Congress, its chief strengths and weaknesses. The members describe their problems, such as too much time spent on fund raising for future campaigns, too little time to think and confer with their aides and colleagues, and too little home life. They attempt to outline workable solutions that will increase the effectiveness of Congress.

Using the Committee on Ways and Means for a case study, Strahan assesses the far-reaching effects of internal reform efforts in the House of Representatives in the 1970s. Responsible for reviewing tax, trade, and social welfare legislation, the committee became an epicenter of the upheavals that rocked the House. The author focuses on the role of the committee in the unexpected breakthrough on comprehensive tax reform and emphasizes the importance of leadership on the postreform committee. Originally published 1990. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.