Confederate Cavalry At Chickamauga What Went Wrong

This study investigates General Braxton Bragg’s use of cavalry during the pivotal Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. As army commander, Bragg was responsible for organizing units, selecting commanders, and assigning missions. His decisions had significant impact upon the tactical and operational fortunes of the Army of Tennessee and on Confederate strategy. First, this investigation defines the unique heritage of American cavalry. Second, it addresses the actual employment of cavalry in the United States of America. Did these roles coincide with those of European cavalry? Did available army and cavalry leadership play a crucial part in the successes and failures of Confederate plans? Do the careers of Generals Bragg, Wheeler, and Forrest offer clues to their efforts at Chickamauga? Also, how did the elements of national power (political, military, economic, geographic, and national will), contribute to Confederate cavalry performance? This study concludes that blame is to be shared between the commanders involved and the system within which they fought. This study presents an in depth view of the performance of Confederate cavalry in this “victory” at the “River of Death”.

This book investigates General Braxton Bragg's use of cavalry during the pivotal Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. As army commander, Bragg was responsible for organizing units, selecting commanders, and assigning missions. His decisions had significant impact upon the tactical and operational fortunes of the Army of Tennessee and on Confederate strategy. First, this investigation defines the unique heritage of American cavalry. Second, it addresses the actual employment of cavalry in the United States of America. Did these roles coincide with those of European cavalry? Did available army and cavalry leadership play a crucial part in the successes and failures of Confederate plans? Do the careers of Generals Bragg, Wheeler, and Forrest offer clues to their efforts at Chickamauga? Also, how did the elements of national power (political, military, economic, geographic, and national will), contribute to Confederate cavalry performance? This book concludes that blame is to be shared between the commanders involved and the system within which they fought. This work presents an in depth view of the performance of Confederate cavalry in this "victory" at the "River of Death."

This book investigates General Braxton Bragg's use of cavalry during the pivotal Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. As army commander, Bragg was responsible for organizing units, selecting commanders, and assigning missions. His decisions had significant impact upon the tactical and operational fortunes of the Army of Tennessee and on Confederate strategy. First, this investigation defines the unique heritage of American cavalry. Second, it addresses the actual employment of cavalry in the United States of America. Did these roles coincide with those of European cavalry? Did available army and cavalry leadership play a crucial part in the successes and failures of Confederate plans? Do the careers of Generals Bragg, Wheeler, and Forrest offer clues to their efforts at Chickamauga? Also, how did the elements of national power (political, military, economic, geographic, and national will), contribute to Confederate cavalry performance? This book concludes that blame is to be shared between the commanders involved and the system within which they fought. This work presents an in depth view of the performance of Confederate cavalry in this "victory" at the "River of Death."

An award–winning, “deeply researched and thoroughly analyzed” account of the Confederate cavalry’s mistakes that turned Chickamauga into a Pyrrhic victory (Eric J. Wittenberg, award-winning author of The Battle of Brandy Station). Tales of the Confederate cavalry’s raids and daring exploits create a whiff of lingering romance about the horse soldiers of the Lost Cause. Sometimes, however, romance obscures history. In August 1863 William Rosecrans’ Union Army of the Cumberland embarked on a campaign of maneuver to turn Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee out of Chattanooga, one of the most important industrial and logistical centers of the Confederacy. Despite the presence of two Southern cavalry corps—nearly 14,000 horsemen—under legendary commanders Nathan Bedford Forrest and Joe Wheeler, Union troops crossed the Tennessee River unopposed and unseen, slipped through the passes cutting across the knife-ridged mountains, moved into the narrow valleys, and turned Bragg’s left flank. Threatened with the loss of the railroad that fed his army, Bragg had no choice but to retreat. He lost Chattanooga without a fight. After two more weeks of maneuvering, skirmishing, and botched attacks, Bragg struck back at Chickamauga, where he was once again surprised by the position of the Union army and the manner in which the fighting unfolded. Although the combat ended with a stunning Southern victory, Federal counterblows that November reversed all that had been so dearly purchased. David A. Powell’s Failure in the Saddle is the first in-depth attempt to determine what role the Confederate cavalry played in both the loss of Chattanooga and the staggering number of miscues that followed up to, through, and beyond Chickamauga. Powell draws upon an array of primary accounts and his intimate knowledge of the battlefield to reach several startling conclusions: Bragg’s experienced cavalry generals routinely fed him misleading information, failed to screen important passes and river crossings, allowed petty command politics to routinely influence their decision-making, and on more than one occasion disobeyed specific and repeated orders that may have changed the course of the campaign. Richly detailed, Failure in the Saddle offers new perspectives on the role of the Rebel horsemen in every combat large and small waged during this long and bloody campaign and, by default, a fresh assessment of the generalship of Braxton Bragg. This judiciously reasoned account includes a guided tour of the cavalry operations, several appendices of important information, and original cartography. Winner of the Civil War Round Table of Atlanta’s Richard Harwell Award

This book is a historical analysis of the effectiveness of Union Cavalry during the Chickamauga campaign. General William S. Rosecrans' desire to develop Union--cavalry in the Army of the Cumberland into an effective counter to Confederate cavalry is compared to the results achieved during the Chickamauga campaign. The Chickamauga campaign was the first major test of the consolidated Cavalry Corps in the Army of the Cumberland. The contribution of the cavalry failed to meet expectation in developing intelligence on General Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee and in influencing the outcome of the two day battle. This study attempts to answer the question "How could the Union Cavalry have been better utilized during the campaign?" This book concludes that the improvements in the Union cavalry in terms of arms and equipment were not matched by development of senior cavalry leaders that had a clear vision of how to employ the instruments of their own making, a consolidated cavalry Corps.

The award-winning Civil War historian examines the actions of Union Cavalry on the first day of the Battle of Chickamauga in this history and tour guide. This volume provides an in-depth study of the two important delaying actions conducted by mounted Union soldiers at Reed’s and Alexander’s bridges on the first day of Chickamauga. Much like Eric J, Wittenberg’s “The Devil’s to Pay”: John Buford at Gettysburg—which won the Gettysburg Civil War Roundtable’s 2015 Book Award—this volume combines engaging military history with a detailed walking and driving tour complete with the GPS coordinates. On September, 18, 1863, a cavalry brigade under Col. Robert H. G. Minty and Col. John T. Wilder’s legendary “Lightning Brigade” of mounted infantry made stout stands at a pair of chokepoints crossing Chickamauga Creek. Minty’s small cavalry brigade held off nearly ten times its number by designing and implementing a textbook example of a delaying action. Their efforts thwarted Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg’s entire battle plan by delaying his army’s advance for an entire day. The appendices of this book include two orders of battle, a discussion of the tactics employed by the Union mounted force, and an epilogue on how the War Department and National Park Service have remembered these events. Complete with more than 60 photos and 15 maps by master cartographer Mark Anderson Moore, Holding the Line on the River of Death is a valuable addition to the burgeoning Chickamauga historiography.

This thesis is a historical analysis of Major General Joseph J. Reynolds and his division during the Battle of Chickamauga. Chickamauga was the division’s first major engagement. Arriving on the battlefield the first day, amidst a fierce Confederate offensive, the division was separated into brigades and regiments. The various units were piecemealed into battle, operating independently of their division commander’s control. Division experiences included a desperate charge and the crushing route of an entire brigade. On the second day, the division withstood an initial Confederate onslaught in which the Union line was cut in half. After an attack south of the division position, the division was forced back, and eventually withdrew. The day ended with another charge, attacking a threat to the retreating Union army. The division’s performance varied during the two-day battle, its reputation neither enhanced or scorned. General Reynolds did not distinguish himself at Chickamauga. Although not a subject of official inquiry, he was never again to command troops in the field during the Civil War. This study analyzes Reynolds and his division at the Battle of Chickamauga and draws conclusions as to the proximate causes of the performance. These causes include division disposition, division control, and a focus on Reynolds’ leadership and decisions.

In 'The Civil War Battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga' by Jesse Littleton Rogers, readers are taken on a detailed and immersive journey through two pivotal battles of the American Civil War. Rogers masterfully weaves together military strategy with personal accounts of soldiers on both sides, providing a comprehensive and engaging look at these significant events in history. His thorough research and vivid descriptions transport readers to the battlefields, making the chaos and intensity of war palpable. Written in a clear and concise style, this book is both informative and accessible to a wide range of readers interested in Civil War history. Rogers' attention to detail and ability to capture the human experience in the midst of war make this a standout work in the genre. Jesse Littleton Rogers, a renowned historian and military expert, brings a unique perspective to the study of the Civil War. His passion for the subject shines through in his writing, making the events of Chickamauga and Chattanooga come alive on the page. Having dedicated years to researching and studying these battles, Rogers offers valuable insights that shed light on the complexities of war and its lasting impact. 'The Civil War Battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga' is a must-read for history buffs, students, and anyone interested in gaining a deeper understanding of the Civil War and its significance. I highly recommend this book to anyone looking to explore the human side of war and delve into the intricacies of these historic battles.

The bestselling author of Stonewall Jackson offers a vividly detailed account of the pivotal battles (Chickamauga in September 1863, and Chattanooga, two months later) that became the most critical three-month period of the Civil War. 16 pages of photos.